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The 2011 East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami suddenly took the homes, family members, 
friends, and familiar neighborhoods away from the children of Iwate. In the midst of this difficult 
situation, early childhood development (ECD) programs provided protective environments for 
the young children to access continuous care and development opportunities. This case study 
examines how these daycare centers in Iwate prepared for, responded to, and coped with the 
severe natural disaster, providing physical, cognitive, and psychosocial protections to these 
children.  
The study re-affirmed that daycare centers in Iwate had integrated the national standards 
for disaster risk reduction (DRR). On the day of the disaster, personnel safely evacuated the 
children while practicing monthly drills. Despite the challenges, the daycare programs quickly 
re-established normalcy in children’s lives, ensuring continuous access to care. Not only did 
daycare personnel act in loco parentis for these children, but also re-installed daycare programs 
during the recovery.  
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Chiharu Kondo, PhD 
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v 
The study revealed that local governments also faced serious challenges in their 
leadership and coordination roles. Their response capacities had been severely affected by the 
disaster. Governments’ appropriate and timely guidance was most beneficial for the daycare 
providers. Among other recommendations, I assert that in the future, local governments could 
take more active roles in coordinating the massive influx of humanitarian organizations. 
This interpretivist research was based on my one-year fieldwork in Iwate immediately 
after the disaster, and employed a series of survey instruments (questionnaires and interviews). 
This case study contributes to the field of education and ECD in emergencies through the use of 
qualitative, ethnographic research. It also recognizes significant and complimentary contribution 
of qualitative inquiry methods, including on-site fieldwork, ethnographic analyses, and follow-up 
interviews, for better understanding of crisis situations.  
While pre-school programs are not compulsory in Japan, the study calls attention to the 
valuable protection that they provide for both young children and their childhoods in 
emergencies. A recovery strategy that focuses on protective environments for children has great 
potential as a harmonizing approach, rather than as a parallel one, in the complex nature of 
humanitarian assistance.  
Keywords: education in emergencies; early childhood development (ECD); disaster risk 
reduction (DRR); child protection; protective environments for children; mixed method case 
study. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
On March 11, 2011, there were about 26,000 young children attending 353 daycare centers in 
Iwate, Japan. At 14:46 Japan time, an enormous earthquake shook the entire eastern region of the 
country, followed by a giant tsunami. This massive disaster took thousands of lives and caused 
severe destruction in the region. Suddenly, children’s daily normalcies were disrupted, their 
familiar environments were gone, and their promised safety and security were taken away. 
The purpose of this dissertation study is to understand the roles of early childhood 
development (ECD) programs in protecting children and their childhood experiences in 
emergencies. The study is focused on the case of daycare centers, or hoikusho or hoikuen in 
Japanese, 3 in Iwate, Japan, which was one of the prefectures severely affected by the 2011 Great 
East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami4. In this dissertation, I investigate how these childcare and 
educational institutions prepared for, responded to, and coped with the challenges presented by 
the serious natural disaster to ensure the safety and security of young children in daycare centers. 
By focusing on the experiences in Iwate, the research also identifies and examines the critical 
relations of how relevant stakeholders (e.g., families, communities, humanitarian organizations, 
and governments) supported, or compromised, the protective capacities of these daycare centers 
3 In this document, I will use the term daycare center to refer hoikusho (保育所) or hoikuen (保育園). 
4 The Japan Meteorological Agency officially named the earthquake that had occurred on March 11, 2011 at 14:46 in Japan time as the 2011 Off 
the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake (平成 23年 [2011年] 東北地方太平洋沖地震), and the Prime Minister and His Cabinet named the 
disaster caused by this earthquake, including the subsequent tsunami, fire outbreaks, damages to the nuclear plants and more, as the Great East 
Japan Earthquake (東日本大震災) (From the Emergency Natural Phenomenon Report issued by the National Meteorological Agency, on August 
28, 2011). In addition, the Iwate Prefecture Government referred the disaster as the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (東日本大震災津
波) (Iwate Prefecture, 2013).  
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in emergency situations. Lastly, it reviews how domestic and international policy frameworks 
and response structures reinforced, or undermined, local efforts to make tsunami-affected 
communities more (young-)child-friendly (or safe) and disaster resilient for generational survival 
and sustainability.  
At the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Hyogo, Japan in January 2005, the 
participant governments identified the priory areas for action, and one of them was to: “(u)se 
knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels 
(UNISDR, 2005, p. 9).” The term “resilience” or “resiliency” is often used to describe about the 
ability to bounce back from or sustain through difficulties or adversities. This doctoral 
dissertation study analyzes how education and child protection issues are intertwined, especially 
at the time of a crisis. While many think of resiliency as a set of individual behaviors, it is also a 
broader social concept that encompasses larger problems of child development and education 
and national and international responsibilities for the protection of generations, and the 
generational resiliency of the society. Together, these individual and social frameworks help 
construct the childcare and educational institutions that can support the resilient communities 
necessary for the protection of both children and their childhoods. 
 
3 
Figure 1. Map of Japan with seismic intensities registered for the earthquake on March 11 2011 
at 14:46 (JST) 5 
Adapted from “Search result of the seismic intensity between 1440 and 1449 on March 11, 2011,” by the Japan 
Metrological Agency, 2011, retrived on July 23, 2013 from the seismic intensity database search webpage 
(http://www.data.jma.go.jp/svd/eqdb/data/shindo/index.php). Copyright 2013 by the Japan Metrological Agency. 
5 In Figure 1, the cross sign shows the epicenter of the earthquake, and the numbers indicate the Japanese scales of seismic intensity.
Translations of the descriptions in Figure 1 are: [Upper] March 11th 2011, at 14:46 (JST – Japanese Standard Time); Off the Sanriku Area; and 
[Lower] Latitude 38°06′N Longitude 142°52′E; Depth: 24km; Magnitude: 9.0.  
4 
1.1 STUDY BACKGROUND 
On March 11th 2011, at 14:46 (JST), a magnitude-9.0 earthquake occurred off the Pacific coast 
of the Tohoku region, northeastern part of the Honshu or Main Island of Japan. The massive 
earthquake was followed by a giant tsunami, which washed away vast areas of the coastal region, 
destroyed a few hundred thousand buildings, and took thousands of lives. The massive 
earthquake was so large that almost entire country registered some levels of seismic tremor (See 
Figure 1).  
The calamity did not stop at the tsunami, but triggered secondary disasters. In Iwate and 
Miyagi, large fires broke out from ship fuels in the fishery communities (Iwate Prefecture, 2013). 
In Fukushima, while both Dai-Ichi and Dai-Ni Nuclear Power Plants were damaged by the 
earthquake and tsunami, massive damages to the Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant resulted in a 
series of equipment failures, nuclear meltdowns and releases of radioactive materials. This not 
only caused a massive mandatory evacuation of the local populations in large surrounding areas 
(Government of Japan, 2011-[on-going]), but also led to power supply cuts, because this 
particular power plan supplied electricity throughout the Tokyo metropolitan area (Tokyo 
Electric Power Company [TEPCO], 2011).  
The death toll from the East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster reached 15,883 and 
2,671 were still missing as of June 10, 2013 (See Table 1). As for infrastructure, 126,458 
buildings were completely destroyed and 272,191 partially destroyed. The impacts were spread 
from Hokkaido in the north, to Kanagawa in the south, and even one case of injury was reported 
in Kochi, which is 900 kilometer, or 560 miles, away from the epicenter. 
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Table 1. Casualties and damages of the 2011 East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster 
Prefecture 
Human Casualties  
(persons) 
Infrastructure Damages  
(buildings) 
Dead Missing Completely destroyed 
Partially 
destroyed 
Iwate 4,673 1,149 18,370 6,558 
Miyagi 9,537 1,308 82,889 155,107 
Fukushima 1,606 210 21,167 72,947 
Others 67 4 4,032 37,579 
Total 15,883 2,671 126,458 272,191 
Source: National Police Agency (NPA), 2013 
Immediately after the disaster occurred, the Japan Self-Defense Forces dispatched its 
rescue and recovery teams, deploying the grand total of 10,580,000 forces between March 11, 
2011 and August 31, 2011 (with the maximum daily deployment of 107,000 forces per day) 
(Ministry of Defense, 2011). Tremendous support was also given by the international 
community, including: 29 countries, regions and internationals dispatched rescue teams; and 163 
countries and regions as well as 43 international organizations offered assistance (Government of 
Japan, 2012). Overwhelming assistance, not only emergency supplies and goods, but also 
additional police forces, emergency response medical teams and volunteers, started arriving 
immediately after the disaster (Government of Japan, 2012; Iwate Prefecture, 2013). Evacuation 
centers were soon organized, daily supplies, such as blankets, clothes and other necessities, were 
distributed, and foods were provided. 
The number of evacuees, at one point, increased up to some 470,000 people on the third 
day, 14 March 2011, of the disaster (Reconstruction Agency, 2012). 6  The prefecture 
governments of Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima soon began the construction of temporary housing 
units, and a total of 53,537 units were been constructed in the tsunami affected prefectures and 
four other neighboring prefectures (See Table 2). In Iwate and Miyagi, all the evacuees moved 
                                                 
6 The data were originally cited from the reference materials of the Emergency Disaster Countermeasure Headquarter. 
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out of evacuation centers by October 7, 2011 and January 4, 2012 respectively (Iwate Prefecture, 
2011f; Miyagi Prefecture, 2012). In addition to these temporary housing units, the prefecture 
governments contracted more than 72,000 rental properties and assigned public housing units as 
additional housing options for evacuees (Reconstruction Agency, 2012). 7  For example, the 
government of Fukushima contracted 24,102 rental or public housing properties for its evacuees 
(Fukushima Prefecture, 2013).  
Table 2. Numbers of temporary housing units constructed by prefecture  
Prefecture Temporary Housing Units Completed as of April 1, 2013 
Iwate 13,984 
Miyagi 22,095 
Fukushima 17,143 
Others (Ibaragi, Chiba, 
Tochigi, Nagano) 315 
Total 53,537 
Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), 2013 
In terms of the situation of children, the casualties among children were small compared 
to the other age cohorts. According to the National Police Agency (NPA), the ratios of 0 to 9 and 
10 to 19 years old among the total dead were 3.0% and 2.7% respectively (Fire and Disaster 
Management Agency, 2013). These numbers were evidently smaller than other age cohorts.8  
However, the disaster related information and data were fragmented, or not easily available to 
the public. This was also because, in Japan, the administration of institutional services for 
children is distributed to two ministries: 1) the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science 
and Technology (MEXT; or I will simply refer it as the Ministry of Education in the remaining 
of the document.) administers kindergartens (ages 3-5), elementary schools, lower and upper 
                                                 
7 The data were originally cited from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. 
8 The same report showed: 3.3% for 20-29 years old; 5.5% for 30-39; 7.2% for 40-49; 12.3% for 50-59; 19.2% for 60-69; 24.7% for 70-79; and 
22.1% for over 80.  
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secondary schools, (junior) colleges, universities and other specialized schools and colleges; and 
2) the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) is in charge of daycare centers (or 
nurseries; ages 0-5) and after-school care centers (ages 6-12).  
The Ministry of Education, for example, reported the information related to educational 
institutions, which included kindergartens, elementary, lower and upper secondary schools, 
(junior) colleges, universities, or other specialized schools and colleges. As of September 14, 
2012, a total of 7,988 educational institutions in 22 prefectures were destroyed or damaged by 
the disaster, and 659 kindergarteners, pupils, students, teachers and staff died (See Table 3 for 
the detailed numbers) and 74 missing in three tsunami-affected prefectures (Iwate, Miyagi, and 
Fukushima) and Tokyo. 
Table 3. Ministry of Education related casualties 
Prefecture Kindergarteners Elementary pupils 
Secondary 
school 
students 
College and 
university 
students 
Teachers 
and staff Total 
Iwate 10 17 63 11 9 110 
Miyagi 70 167 158 41 24 460 
Fukushima 4 24 50 6 3 87 
Other 
(Tokyo) - - - - 2 2 
Total 84 208 271 58 38 659 
Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology [MEXT], 2012a 
As for daycare centers, the disaster related information were often not consistent, nor 
easily accessible by the public. While the official data by the MHLW were not available, the 
regional newspaper reported the numbers of affected daycare centers and casualties among 
daycare children (See Table 4). The article indicated that totals of 43 and 35 daycare facilities in 
Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima were completely or partially destroyed by the tsunami 
respectively. It also indicated that only three of the children who were with daycare personnel 
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lost their lives, although 111 children of those who had left daycare centers with their parents or 
had been absent on that day were dead or missing.  
Table 4. Numbers of affected daycare centers and children (Regional newspaper’s report)  
Prefecture 
No of affected nurseries No of daycare center children killed (missing) 
Completely 
destroyed 
Partially 
destroyed Under care Outside care 
Iwate 13 4 0 (0) 25 (16) 
Miyagi 27 22 3 (0) 53 (15) 
Fukushima 3 9 0 (0) 2 (0) 
Total 43 35 3 (0) 80 (31) 
Source: Kahoku Shinpo, 20119 
To compare, the Iwate Prefectural Government’s report showed that 12 daycare centers 
were completely destroyed by the tsunami and 6 were partially destroyed in Iwate (Okudera, 
2012 [See Table 5]). 10  There was no casualty among the children who had evacuated with 
daycare personnel in Iwate. However, 47 children were killed by the tsunami after they had been 
returned to their parents’ care. From these examples, the disaster related information and data 
available to the public were not always consistent or easily obtainable by the public. 
Nonetheless, all these information showed how the disaster impacted daycare centers and their 
children, but also indicated that the casualties among children were significantly small, 
considering the scale of the disaster. 
                                                 
9 The article noted that these numbers were inclusive of government-certified, not-certified, and remote daycare centers (both public and private). 
However, it  did not list  the references from which they cited the data.  
10 The report did not specify whether these numbers included all government-certified, not-certified and remote daycare centers in Iwate or not.  
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Table 5. Numbers of affected daycare centers and children (Iwate Prefecture’s report) 
Prefecture 
No of affected nurseries No of daycare center children killed 
Completely 
destroyed 
Partially 
destroyed Under care 
Outside 
care 
Iwate 12 6 0 47 
Source: Okudera, 2012 
As the devastation of the disaster was extensive, nevertheless, many educational 
institutions, like schools and kindergartens, as well as childcare institutions, like daycare centers 
and after-school care centers, in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima were severely affected by the 
disaster and had to close temporarily. Some schools were destroyed or damaged, and others had 
to accommodate large numbers of evacuees in their classrooms and gymnasium buildings. Even 
under such difficult conditions, however, all schools in Iwate, including those directly affected 
by the tsunami, managed to re-open during the month of April 2011, the first month of the new 
school year, just after four to six weeks of the disaster (Iwate Prefectural Board of Education, 
2011).  
Many affected private kindergartens and daycare centers, however, faced difficulties to 
resume their programs immediately, due to the direct damages to their infrastructure, difficulties 
to find alternative sites, lack of basic utility services, insufficient supply availability and many 
other reasons (Kondo, 2013). In addition, the local governments were heavily affected by the 
disaster, including the damages to the municipality buildings and loss of governmental 
personnel. Because early learning, or early childhood development (ECD), was not part of basic 
education, nor compulsory, assistance to the affected daycare centers and kindergartens was 
delayed, or not prioritized within the scope of initial governmental emergency responses (Japan 
Committee for UNICEF [JCU], 2011a).  
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From early days of the disaster, however, many private and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) started providing relief and recovery assistance supporting children in the 
affected communities. For example, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) announced 
its emergency assistance in the disaster-affected region in partnership with the Japan Committee 
for UNICEF, which is a private foundation that supports UNICEF’s missions and work, three 
days after the disaster (JCU, 2011b). This included allocating and raising funds, procuring 
necessary supplies, deploying program specialists, providing technical guidance and more. 
UNICEF’s program areas were: 1) emergency supplies; 2) health and nutrition; 3) education; 4) 
psychosocial support; 5) child protection; and 6) child-friendly reconstruction plans (JCU, 
2011c). For tsunami-affected daycare centers, UNICEF refurbished the damaged materials and 
equipment, supported the construction of temporary school buildings, and provided psychosocial 
support trainings and counseling to their personnel. In Iwate, more than a dozen organizations 
focused their relief operations specifically to assist children in the affected area.11   
Even though enormous external assistance had been poured to the affected communities, 
the local populations had to face various post-disaster challenges, including:  
• Loss of family members, belongings, properties, jobs (means to live/earn) and more; 
• Temporary and/or long-term displacements (difficult living situations, such as congested 
evacuation centers as well as limited spaces and privacy in prefabricated temporary 
housing arrangements); 
                                                 
11 In addition to the Japan Committee for UNICEF (JCU), for example, the list  of organizations that were participated in the Coordination 
Meeting of Affected Children Assistance Organizations and Groups, which was held on 27th September 2011, in Morioka, Iwate, included: Japan 
Association for Play Therapy; HANDS (Health and Development Service); Save the Children Japan (SCJ); Kokkyo naki Kodomotachi [or 
Children without Borders]; Good Neighbors Japan; Peace Winds Japan; Nippon International Cooperation for Community Development; 
Campaign for Children in Palestine; World Vision Japan; Care International Japan; Shanti Volunteer Association; Japanese Red Cross Society; 
Child Line Support Center; Foundation for International Development/Relief; Ashinaga; and local universities, associations, and other 
governmental (service) offices and councils.  
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• Damages to lifeline services, including electricity, water and sewage systems, gas, 
telephone and mobile systems; 
• Damages and disruption in public and other service systems; 
• Damages to local businesses, industries and transportation systems; 
• Difficult access to the daily necessities, including food, household items, etc.;  
• Destruction and damages to the local infrastructures, which left massive debris to clean 
up, creating a large amount of dust and environmentally hazard wastes; 
• Large areas of the land, including cultivated fields, residential houses and other public 
buildings, were flooded with and damaged from sea water, caused soil liquefaction;  
• Various problems from the damaged Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant; and  
• Long years of reconstruction, and unknown future of the affected communities (Iwate 
Prefecture, 2013; Kondo, 2012). 
These conditions also disrupted the lives of children in the affected communities. Some 
children directly experienced the horrific event, and lost their parents, siblings, family members 
or friends. Their familiar home and neighborhood environments were also gone. Whether they 
witnessed the tsunami or not, many children, even young ones, were affected by the disaster, 
such as bed wetting, nightmares, aggressive behaviors, or regression as acting back as babies 
(Heroman & Bilmes, 2005; Sato & Honda, 2011).  
While the recovery and reconstruction from the disaster are expected to take years, 
children in the affected areas need to cope with their disaster experiences and post-disaster 
situations, including changes in their familiar environments. Under such challenging conditions, 
how did the affected communities rebuild and maintain protective environments for children to 
access their care and development needs, This dissertation project examines the roles of early 
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childhood development (ECD) programs, especially daycare centers, as protective environments 
for young children in emergencies. This study furthermore investigates how their protective 
capacities were supported, or compromised, by concerned stakeholders to ensure children’s 
safety and security at the critical times before, during and after the disaster.  
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND STUDY STRUCTURE 
Once month after the giant tsunami hit the entire eastern shoreline of the Tohoku, or northeastern 
region of Japan, I was in Iwate and began working as Field Manager of the Japan Committee for 
UNICEF (JCU) for its emergency response program. This study was developed based on my 
one-year working experience as a humanitarian worker and focused data collection activities in 
the Iwate’s disaster-affected areas. 
In Chapter 2, I discuss the conceptual frameworks that provided the theoretical 
foundations to this study. Although the humanitarianism has its long history, education, and early 
childhood development (ECD), in emergencies is a relatively new field in both humanitarian 
assistance and international development education. While the international legal frameworks 
supported the compliance of the humanitarian principles and the protection of children and their 
rights in emergencies, to ensure children access educational and childcare needs is not only a 
child protection concern but also a generational security issue for the crisis-affected communities 
and nations (Aguilar & Retamal, 2009; McClure & Retamal, 2010; Vargas-Barón & McClure, 
1998).  
As for the research approach, I situate my ontological and epistemological perspective 
within the interpretivist research paradigm (Crotty, 1998). While using both qualitative and 
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quantitative data available to my dissertation project, I focus on the qualitative, or ethnographic, 
inquiry process that allows me to "strive for coherence, which provides the reader with a vivid 
picture of the essence of the meanings of what is under study (Piantanida & Garman, 1999, 
p.247).” With the process, I intend to provide better understanding of how the protection of 
children and their childhood experiences were fulfilled under the disaster-affected conditions. 
Chapter 3 offers the detailed methodological frameworks, including the detailed explanations of 
the research procedures, for this study.  
Based on the above conceptual and methodological frameworks, I place the following 
overarching research question to achieve the purpose of my dissertation study:  
“How do childcare and educational institutions respond to and cope with a severe 
disaster and provide ‘protection’ to young children and their childhood experiences 
during crisis time?” 
To answer this broad question, furthermore, I propose the following sub-questions:  
• To what extent had daycare centers been prepared for a natural disaster like the 2011 
earthquake and tsunami? 
• What challenges did daycare centers face and overcome to ensure the safety and security 
of daycare age children (0-5 years old) during and after the disaster? 
• Throughout the emergency response, recovery, and reconstruction periods, what elements 
were highlighted as important for daycare centers in order to provide safe and secure 
environments for children?  
• How was the concept of protecting children and their childhood experiences integrated in 
the recovery and reconstruction process? 
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• How were the international and national child protection policies and practices 
incorporated into the local childcare and education systems in the disaster-affected area?  
• How did these policies and practices complement, or undermine, local resiliency, 
sustainability and development in the post-disaster settings? 
In Chapter 4, I present the comprehensive research findings based on the qualitative and 
quantitative data thoroughly collected and analyzed. As a result, the study unveils the following 
specific subject matters and questions:   
1) How did daycare centers in Iwate prepare for such a severe catastrophe in regards to their 
disaster risk reduction (DRR) standards and measures? 
2) How did they respond to and cope with the disaster situations and overcome specific 
challenges to ensure the safety and security of children in difficult environments?  
3) What were the critical contributions and collaborations that the concerned stakeholders 
made to reinforce the protective capacities of daycare programs in emergency situations?   
4) What can be learned from the 2011 experiences to improve and strengthen national and 
international disaster and emergency response capacities?  
In addition to its theoretical and methodological contributions in the field of education 
and ECD in emergencies, in the final chapter, I discuss how this study and its critical findings 
reflected on and contributed to the conceptual frameworks given to this study. The study 
concludes with the recommendations that to (re-)establish and maintain protective environments 
for (young) children should be a critical strategy for sustainable development and generational 
security of the emergency-affected communities in the context of Japan and beyond. 
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2.0 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS 
In 2013, the United Nations (UN) estimated that at least 16 countries around the world were still 
in great need of humanitarian assistance from the international community, with 51 million 
people affected by crises like natural disasters and armed conflicts (UN, 2012a). According to 
the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, between 2000 and 2012, 2.9 billion people were 
affected by disasters, like drought, earthquake, epidemic, extreme temperature, flood, and others 
(UNISDR, 2013). Such crises result in disruption of normal lives among local populations and 
communities, or even in extreme hardships that may continue for years even after the events. 
Government systems may not be functioning temporarily or for a long period of time, 
infrastructures be damaged, and law and order may collapse. Under such difficult environments, 
how can children survive and fulfill their childhood potentials? How can the safety and security 
of their life cycles be protected even in crisis situations?  
Over the last few decades, education became part of ‘emergency responses’, or 
‘international assistance’. While food and water, shelter, and medical care (including sanitary 
environment) were considered as the traditional relief areas, both field professionals and 
researchers together attempted to advance the Education Sector to be “the fourth pillar” of 
humanitarian assistance (Machel, 1996; Norwegian Refugee Council, Redd Barna, & UNHCR, 
1999). (Re-)creating protective environments for children in crisis situations became a key 
strategy in providing quality education (Aguilar & Retamal, 2009). Moreover, it was considered 
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as an important conceptual framework for protection of children and generational sustainability 
(Aguilar & Retamal, 2009; McClure & Retamal, 2010; Vargas-Barón & McClure, 1998).   
In this chapter, I present conceptual frameworks that support my dissertation research 
focus: protection of children and their childhood experiences, including educational 
opportunities, in emergencies. First, I start with a larger picture of the field of emergency 
response and humanitarian assistance, exploring what an emergency entails in the context of 
international cooperation. Second, I discuss how ‘humanitarianism’ and security strategy shifted 
in the post-Cold War period. Third, this shift leads to the next discussion on how the context of 
emergency has been adopted into the field of international and development education. Fourth, I 
describe the importance of protective environments frameworks in relation to early childhood 
development (ECD) in emergencies, which is my primary study focus area. This chapter as a 
whole provides conceptual frameworks on the protection of children and their childhood 
experiences in emergencies. 
2.1 HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES IN RECENT DECADES  
In general, an emergency is described as “a serious, unexpected, and often dangerous situation 
requiring immediate action.”12 In the field of international cooperation, the term ‘emergency’ is 
often referred as a situation where the international community is required to respond to 
humanitarian needs of the populations in a country or region affected by crises, such as natural 
disasters and armed conflicts (UN General Assembly, 1991). To start, here, I review the recent 
                                                 
12 New Oxford American Dictionary, (2nd edition), 2005 by Oxford University Press, Inc. 
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experiences of natural disasters and armed conflicts around the world, and how these 
catastrophic events affected people and countries. 
2.1.1 Natural disasters and armed conflicts 
For the last two decades, the scale of damage and destruction from some natural disasters has 
been overwhelming. For example, notable earthquakes occurred in the countries like Turkey 
(1999), India (Gujarat, 2001), Iran (Bam, 2003), Pakistan (Kashmir, 2005), China (Sichuan, 
2008), and Haiti (2010) in recent memory. In 2004, a 9.1 to 9.3-magnitude earthquake in the 
Indian Ocean caused giant tsunamis. This massive catastrophe affected the entire surrounding 
region, from Southeast Asia to Africa. Devastating tropical storms are common along the 
coastlines of Asia and other regions. For example, Cyclone Nargis hit politically isolated and 
economically vulnerable Myanmar’s poorer communities in 2008. Floods and droughts were 
more frequently seen around the globe – particularly the recent floods devastated Pakistan, and 
flooding became a seasonable event in Africa.  
Natural disasters also hit industrial countries. Japan is chronically prone to earthquakes, 
and its earthquake preparedness systems are well developed. However, a 2011 magnitude 9.0 
earthquake and subsequent enormous tsunami brought massive destruction and damages to local 
communities and the region. Furthermore, this catastrophe led to a series of secondary disasters, 
including the nuclear meltdown in Fukushima. The US also experienced large-scale tropical 
storms in recent years. The Hurricane Katrina and the latest Hurricane Sandy caused not only 
vast infrastructural devastation but also huge economical losses in the major metropolitan areas. 
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In many countries, tropical storms 13 may not be massive; however small island countries like 
Dominica experienced these storms as chronic events and serious threats to their survival and 
sustainability (Serrant, 2013). As climate changes may becoming more evident, natural disasters 
continue impacting people’s lives around the world (O'Brien, O'Keefe, Rose, & Wisner, 2006; 
Schipper & Pelling, 2006). 
As of April 2014, the International Crisis Group were monitoring and reporting more 
than 90 country and regional cases of conflicts, instabilities, and other forms of threats around 
the world. 14 With the end of the colonial period in the South and later the end of the Cold War, 
the world witnessed more internal conflicts, or conflicts within territories, than wars across 
international borders. Both the colonization and the Cold War periods left imbalanced power 
opportunities and unequal access to resources among different social groups within those 
countries. Many of these countries were used to be under the control of the western countries or 
the two big powers, US and the Soviet Union. These groups were often divided by political, 
ethnic, tribal, religious, or secular differences. Many conflicts happened in developing nations, 
newly independent countries, or countries that experienced political or ideological transitions or 
dramatic regime changes. Some of these conflicts resulted in inhuman acts, such as the genocide 
in Rwanda, the ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, or the horrific atrocities and massive child 
soldiering in northern Uganda. Others were not necessarily sudden or intensive, but rather 
gradual, accumulated, or even quiet, and perhaps to be amplified or suddenly erupted by a small 
fracture of the problem if neglected for a prolonged time, such as the Democratic Republic of 
                                                 
13 The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) uses “ tropical cyclone” and “tropical revolving storm” as the same term (from WMO’s 
Manual on Codes, 1995 edition). The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) described the characteristics of 
such storm as “a large scale closed circulation system in the atmosphere which combines low pressure and strong winds…(IFRC, 2013).” 
Depending on where it  occurs, a tropical storm or cyclone is named differently – a “cyclone” in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific, “hurricane” 
in the Western Atlantic and Eastern Pacific and “typhoon” in the Western Pacific. Here I use “tropical storm(s)” as a generic term for all the 
above.  
14 Periodic reports are available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en.aspx 
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Congo. A few of the conflicts that had begun in the corners of the countries transformed into the 
major political changes, like Timor-Leste, Nepal, and more. 
2.1.2 Complex emergencies 
For the last two decades, the international community has often used the term of ‘complex 
emergencies’ to describe major emergencies. While no commonly used definition is given, the 
term ‘complex emergency’, or even ‘complex humanitarian emergency’, is also widely used to 
describe an armed conflict (Pigozzi, 1999; Sinclair, 2002). However, its use seems not limited to 
describe only armed conflict. The World Health Organization (WHO) explained:  
The term complex emergencies is used to describe situations of disrupted livelihoods and 
threats to life produced by warfare, civil disturbance and large-scale movements of 
people, in which any emergency response has to be conducted in a difficult political and 
security environment. A combination of complex disasters and natural hazards (e.g. 
military and political problems combined with severe winter weather, coastal storms and 
flooding, drought and a cholera epidemic) was particularly devastating in the 1990s in 
such countries as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Myanmar, Peru and Somalia (2002, 
pp.12-13). 
Complex emergencies can be further exacerbated by natural disasters. Moreover, the 
Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC) defined complex emergencies as “those [crisis 
situations] which exceed the mandate and/or capacity of any agency and are deemed to require a 
system-wide approach” and “often linked to natural calamities (1994, p. 2).” The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) noted that the term ‘complex emergency’ 
was coined in Mozambique during the latter half of the 1980s. According to them, there “was the 
need for international aid agencies to acknowledge the ‘emergency aid’ or humanitarian 
assistance needs were being generated by armed conflict as well as by periodic ‘natural disaster’ 
events,” while it was too sensitive to use the “terms such as ‘war’, ‘civil war’ and ‘conflict’ … in 
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the Mozambican context at the time (OECD, 1999, pp. 5-6).” They needed to create a different 
term to frame the newly challenging and complicated situations that could not be defined simply 
by either of emergency, natural disaster, or man-made crisis.   
 The term ‘complex emergencies’, nonetheless, is still more commonly used to describe 
armed conflicts or instabilities, whether or not natural calamities are to be added into the context. 
For example, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (1999) listed the 
following characteristics of complex emergencies:  
• extensive violence and loss of life;  
• massive displacements of people;  
• widespread damage to societies and economies;  
• the need for large-scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance;  
• the hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by political and military 
constraints; and  
• significant security risks for humanitarian relief workers in some areas.  
As for another example, OECD (1999) described that the situations of complex emergencies 
entailed the following:  
• intra-state rather than inter-state conflict;  
• difficulty in differentiating combatants and civilians;  
• violence directed towards civilians and civil structures;  
• fluidity of the situation on the ground;  
• lack or absence of normal accountability mechanisms;  
• the potential and actual development of war economies;  
• the potential for humanitarian assistance to prolong the conflict; and  
• a multiplicity of actors.  
Recent conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Syria and many others consisted the 
characteristics of ‘complex emergencies,’ and the situations were extremely complicated and 
challenging for the humanitarian agencies to respond. These observations suggest that complex 
emergencies present further challenges that require: a) careful analysis of complicated local 
situations; and b) cautious planning and execution of humanitarian interventions.  
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2.1.3 Impacts on people and governments 
The crises described above can heavily impact people’s lives, including the loss of lives and 
mass displacements either within the countries (i.e., Internally Displaced Populations [IDPs]15) 
or beyond international borders (i.e., refugees). These emergency situations disrupt people’s 
normal pace of living, or force them into extreme hardships for a long period of time. They may 
be affected by loss of lives, homes, belongings and livelihoods; and inadequate access to medical 
care, food sources, safe water and sanitation facilities, and education and other essential services. 
The impacts on children can be devastating: physical harm; displacement; separation from their 
families; psychological distress; or lack of access to health, nutritious and educational services. 
Children may be specifically targeted in violence, including direct attacks in conflicts, forced 
recruitment in military forces, or sexual and gender-based violence. Some of these impacts may 
become causes of: malnutrition; health problems; or disruption to normal physical and cognitive 
development with long-term consequences.  
 These crises also severely affect the countries themselves. Government structures may be 
damaged extensively, with losses of material, financial and human resources paralyzing their 
governing systems. The disasters may also impact, or even regress, these countries’ economic 
development. For example, the Maldives ‘graduated’ from the list of Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs)16 on December 20, 2004, just 6 days before the tsunami disaster hit the country. Later 
the decision to graduate Maldives from the list of LDCs was reconsidered (Ministry of Planning 
                                                 
15 IDP is defined as “ internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes 
or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result  of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, 
violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (UN 
Commission on Human Rights, 1998) 
16 For the criteria to be added to the list of Least Developed Countries (LDC) and to qualify for graduation, see the Criteria for the Identification 
of the LDCs published by the UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and 
Small Island Developing States at: http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm 
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and National Development, 2006). Only in 2011, the country finally graduated form the LDC list 
to become a Middle Income Country (MIC) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).  
 When disasters happen, the affected governments are often overwhelmed, and sometimes 
unable to solely respond to the massive and unexpected humanitarian needs of their populations. 
In next section, I discuss how humanitarian assistance has been approached as part of the 
international cooperation.  
2.2 NEW HUMANITARIANISM AND HUMAN SECURITY 
“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” 
The UN headquarters in New York displays a mosaic work of Norman Rockwell’s painting “The 
Golden Rule,” which was given by Mrs. Nancy Reagan, the then First Lady, on behalf of the 
United States (UN, 2001). The painting contains the above inscription, which can be clearly 
associated with the mission of UN. The Golden Rule represents the idea of humanitarianism and 
its shift in the last two decades or so.  
In this section, I first lay out the humanitarian principles as basis for all humanitarian 
actions, which include education. Then, I discuss how humanitarianism has shifted, coinciding 
with changes in security concerns from national to individual, or ‘human security.’ Based on 
these contexts, lastly, I review what challenges affected states and the international community 
faced and what efforts they made to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance to the affected.  
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2.2.1 Humanitarian principles 
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the battle of Solferino in 
northern Italy in mid 1859 was “a pivotal moment in the evolution of modern humanitarianism,” 
where Henry Dunant, its founder, led local female volunteers to care for and treat the wounded 
and dying equally “regardless of what side they had fought on (2010).” Similar to the creation of 
the ICRC and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, humanitarian assistance 
became one of the central missions of the UN to assist the people affected by wars and armed 
conflicts as well as natural disasters around the world.  
The 1991 General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/46/182), which was agreed by the UN 
member states, clearly stated that:  
1) humanitarian assistance is of cardinal importance for the victims of natural disasters and 
other emergencies; and that 
2) humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity 
(or humanitarian imperative as often referred), neutrality and impartiality (UN General 
Assembly, 1991).  
The above resolution also affirmed the establishment of the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) as well as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
(IASC) to support and strengthen the state capacities to respond to emergency situations. These 
bodies were to coordinate with UN and other humanitarian organizations and to ensure the listed 
humanitarian principles to be shared and respected by all actors of the humanitarian community.  
Some humanitarian organizations have incorporated additional values to the above 
principles. For example, UNICEF adopted a human rights-based programming approach, gender 
equality programming, and the ‘Do No Harm’ principle in its emergency response frameworks 
(UNICEF, 2010). These clearly defined and agreed humanitarian principles also influenced the 
understanding of humanitarian assistance. Traditionally, humanitarian assistance was seen as the 
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provision of basic survival needs, such as access to food and water, shelter and medical care. 
After the end of the colonial period and of the Cold War, humanitarian relief efforts became a 
major part of the international cooperation enterprise, and the field of humanitarian assistance 
gradually involved the protection of “survival, livelihood and dignity (Amouyel, 2006, p. 16)” in 
the affected communities. Greenaway (2000) noted this shift as “inevitably, it has not gone 
unnoticed that more might be done, and needs to be done, … than simply providing relief [italics 
added].” This expansion of humanitarian assistance coincided with the shifting focus from 
national security to human security, and, in the following, I explore the concept of security in 
relation to how the security of the crisis-affected populations affect their overall development, 
and vice versa.  
2.2.2 From national security to human security 
At about the same time, after the end of the Cold War, the concept of ‘security’ was also 
expanded from territorial, national security, to include individual security, or “human security” 
as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reported (1994). While a few 
exceptions had remained (e.g., Israeli and Palestinian disputes), the nature of wars and armed 
conflicts in the 1990s changed from across national borders to within state’s territories, or 
between groups with political, ethnic, tribal, religious, or secular differences. These shifts led to 
giving more attention to personal protection, or security for individuals (or individual groups), 
from national collective protection of territories and resources. This change occurred during the 
last decade(s) of the 20th century, as the international community started more focusing on 
human rights-based approaches to their development as well as humanitarian assistance 
programmes (Early Years, 2010; UNICEF & UNESCO, 2007).  
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Although the definition of human security remained debatable (Amouyel, 2006; Jolly & 
Ray, 2007), the University of British Columbia’s report suggested two (2) characterizations of 
human security as follows: 
1) a narrow definition that focuses on the protection of communities and individuals from 
violence; and  
2) a broader formulation of human security agenda that encompasses even economic 
insecurity, threats to human dignity, and “hunger, disease and natural disasters which in 
reality kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined” (2005).  
Even the definitions of ‘violence’ could be varied. For example, Galtung (1969) argued the 
following two definitions of violence: 
1) personal and direct violence refers to physical and psychological violence; 
2) indirect and structural violence indicates the situations where people are oppressed by 
and/or suffer from certain sociopolitical and economic systems.  
He used the following example of tuberculosis as ‘indirect and structural violence’: 
[I]f a person died from tuberculosis in the eighteenth century it would be hard to conceive 
of this as violence since it might have been quite unavoidable, but if he dies from it 
today, despite all the medical resources in the world, then violence is present according to 
our definition (Galtung, 1969, p. 168). 
UNDP, nonetheless, explained that economic, food, health, environmental, personal, 
community and political securities could become threats to human security, and suggested that 
human security should be achievable through sustainable human development could should be 
considered (1994). It defined (human) development as follows:  
Human Development is … about creating an environment in which people can develop 
their full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accord with their needs and 
interests. … Development is thus about expanding the choices people have to lead lives 
that they value. (UNDP, 2009) 
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UNDP further characterized the difference between human security and human development as 
follows:  
Human development is a broader concept --- as a process of widening the range of 
people's choices. Human security means that people can exercise these choices safely and 
freely --- and that they can be relatively confident that the opportunities they have today 
are not totally lost tomorrow. [italics added] (1994, p. 23)  
In other words, safety and freedom of choice should be prerequisite and relatively sustainable, or 
promised, in order to enjoy increasing opportunities for human development. However, this 
presents a question of which should come first, development or security. In fact, human 
development and human security are mutually inclusive phenomenon that: if there is no human 
security, it may not be possible to achieve sustainable human development; and if there is no 
prospect for sustainable human development, it may become threat to human security, which 
may even become national security threat.  
In regards to the relations of human security and education, Williams chose the broader 
concept of human security to discuss the relation of education and human survival, and described 
that human security was to seek for peaceful human co-survival where education could be 
impacted by and influence: development (human needs); environment (resource limits); and 
violence (conflicts) (2000). Davies also pointed out that education could contribute to human 
security in four interlinked areas: economic, national, political, and personal security (2006).  
Whether security threats became the causes of crisis situations or emergencies further 
created security hazards, humanitarian responses should be focused on security, national or 
human, or in the broad or narrow definition (Rêve, 2006). Next, I review humanitarian 
responsibilities by outlining the existing humanitarian response capacities within the states as 
well as in the international community. 
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2.2.3 Humanitarian responsibilities  
Some of the actors involved in humanitarian assistance are specialized in relief programs, and 
others are those that operate in both development and humanitarian. In the recent decades, there 
are hundreds, if not thousands, of organizations worldwide involved in the field of humanitarian 
assistance to support the host governments and crisis-affected communities. These include: 
community-based, national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or non-
profit organizations (NPOs); inter- or quasi-governmental organizations, and bi- and multi- lateral 
donor agencies. Because of the demanding nature of crisis situations, furthermore, expectations 
and requirements in humanitarian assistance have created critical mechanisms and dynamics at 
all levels. As a result, the field of humanitarian assistance has become complex both situationally 
and operationally. In the following, I highlight such actors and systems to respond to the 
humanitarian assistance needs of the crisis-affected populations on the ground.  
2.2.3.1 (Affected) governments and communities 
The 1991 General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/46/182) clearly stated:  
Each State has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims of natural 
disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory. Hence, the affected State has 
the primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of 
humanitarian assistance within its territory (UN General Assembly, 1991). 
The industrialized countries like Japan or US should be able to generate their existing systems 
and own resources and capacities to respond to humanitarian needs of the crisis affected 
populations. In Japan, for example, the law called “Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures” 
ensures the immediate establishment of disaster countermeasure headquarters, or saigai-taisaku-
honbu, within the governments to manage all disaster responses ("Basic Act on Disaster Control 
 28 
Measures," 1961). In the US, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is 
responsible for coordinating government-wide relief efforts (FEMA, 2014). However, there are 
many countries, like Afghanistan, Haiti, Pakistan, Uganda and others, that may not have the 
structures, resources or capacities (or even willingness) to “take care of the victims of … 
emergencies occurring on its territory (UN General Assembly, 1991),” and require external 
assistance. Yet, according to the above resolution, the affected nation should be responsible for 
and lead the humanitarian response processes, and the availability of external humanitarian 
assistance should be based on the consent of and an appeal by the host country.  
A few literature and reports highlighted that many governments and communities that 
were affected by crises like disaster and conflicts often did not have the capacities to respond to 
the needs of their populations (Department for International Development [DFID], 2005; Kirk, 
2007; Rose & Greeley, 2006). Often governing systems were heavily damaged or dysfunctional 
after crises. In armed conflicts, governments themselves might become central targets of 
violence. When their capacities were weak, or weakened by the crises, the host governments 
could be sometimes sidelined by the international community, which might take over the 
operation and coordination of assistance on the ground. Nevertheless, governments should hold 
the primary ‘human security’ responsibility for their own people, and the focus of the 
international community should be given to maintaining and reinforcing such governmental 
capacities in humanitarian assistance.  
As for the roles of affected communities themselves, community participation, or 
community involvement, was often encouraged in the processes of assessment, planning, 
implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian assistance programs (INEE, 
2010; Sphere Project, 2004). Furthermore, as government systems and structures were often 
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collapsed or not adequately responsive in emergencies, humanitarian agencies, especially NGOs, 
tended to directly deliver aid to or work with the communities. Burde (2004b), however, 
criticized their over-reliance on community participation in the absence of strong democratic 
state structures, especially in the context of (post-)conflict. She described that it might 1) 
undermine) the social contract between citizen and state; and 2) aggravate rather than assuage the 
social divisions that are particularly dangerous and pronounced after a conflict. She continued: 
“participation may provide a patchwork solution to systemic problems, veiling more profound 
and contentious issues of structural change and political representation (Burde, 2004b, p. 73).” 
Humanitarian intervention should never go as far as “(revising) the relationship of the state to its 
citizens (Ibid.).” It should be carried out with understanding of and respect to the roles and 
responsibilities of the state in relation to its people and communities.  
In regards to the effectiveness of external assistance, a few academics were concerned of 
the reliance on best practice approaches, which might overlook historical relations and local 
capacities of the affected communities. Referring to the US post-conflict intervention strategy in 
education reform, Sobe pointed out the importance of “(having) a better historical understanding 
of the linkages between education reform and post-conflict peace building (2009, p.13).” He 
further criticized that technical solutions based on best practice research, which was often used 
by aid agencies from western countries, would stay as partial. Burde (2004b) also concurred as 
common NGOs’ usage of best practice approach might not be resulted in best outcomes, unless 
focusing on the local capacities of governments and the communities.  
In emergency and post-crisis situations, where the local response capacities are limited, 
the international community could, and should, step in to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of 
the affected populations. However, the local relevance of emergency, recovery and 
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reconstruction assistance and social contracts of their relations need to be respected by all actors. 
For most sustainable impacts of humanitarian assistance, the international community should 
largely support and strengthen the essential roles of and relations between governments and 
communities so that they could help themselves to care their own populations.  
2.2.3.2 Humanitarian community and coordination 
The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), for example, was established in December 
1946, and its initial founding mission was humanitarian assistance to provide food, clothing and 
health care to European children who were facing famine and disease after World War II 
(UNICEF, 2003). The agency was originally called as the United Nations International 
Children’s Emergency Fund, or U-N-I-C-E-F, and its acronym has remained till today. Along 
with UNICEF, many other UN agencies are specialized in humanitarian assistance, and each 
organization operates based on its own specific mandate. As UNICEF is specialized is the 
protection and promotion of children’s rights, for example, the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) focuses on health and medical care, the World Food Programme (WFP) on food security 
and distribution, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) specialized in the 
protection of displace populations, including refugees and IPDs. They closely work and 
coordinate with host governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in delivering aid 
to the affected.  
The field of humanitarian assistance is chronically under-funded against the assessed 
requirements and appeals presented to the international community. Some of the above 
organizations raise funds through their own structures. In addition, donor communities, bilateral 
and multilateral, contribute financially to the relief operations on the ground. While they focused 
on different foreign assistance agendas, such as ensuring human and national security or building 
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governmental capacities, these donors came together to make the aid better “harmonized” and 
more “effective” (High Level Forum, 2005). Furthermore, the private sectors’ contributions and 
partnerships, both corporations and individuals, also increased in recent years. Rieth (2009) 
explained that this might be due to the growing realization of “(corporate) social responsibility”. 
The recent advanced development of information technology and media outreach might also help 
the interest and contributions from the private sectors. 
Focusing on human security and expanding traditional humanitarianism certainly opened 
the door for many non-traditional relief organizations, both UNs and NGOs, to re-discover 
themselves in humanitarian assistance. For example, after the fall of Taliban, there were massive 
influxes of NGOs in Afghanistan to prepare for the repatriations of Afghan refugees. The 2004 
Indian Ocean Tsunami required larger numbers of organizations, which could be quickly 
deployed with the substantial operational capacities to the widespread countries in the Southeast 
and South Asian, and even East African, regions. As a result, these emergency operations created 
opportunities for the organizations to extend their reach – from development to humanitarian 
assistance, from non-education to education services, or from one geographical area to another 
(e.g., from Afghanistan to Pakistan, from Aceh to Haiti). Consequently, the situations often 
became chaotic, creating challenges to the coordination of numerous agencies with different 
capacities, mandates, and backgrounds (UNICEF, 2005a).  
Coordination is always an issue in humanitarian assistance. This is especially true where 
governments in the developing world lack the capacity to orchestrate external aid organizations 
to respond to the overwhelming humanitarian needs of the crisis-affected communities. In 
response to the coordination problem, the UN, specifically the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), implemented 
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the humanitarian aid reform. One of the three main reform areas was the introduction of Cluster 
Approach into the UN’s humanitarian assistance programmes in 2006. According to the then UN 
Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), 
the Cluster Approach consisted “raising standards; and ensuring greater predictability, 
accountability and partnership in all sectors [italics added] (Holmes, 2007, p. 4).” As shown in 
Figure 2, eleven Clusters were established, including: 1) logistics; 2) nutrition; 3) emergency 
shelter; 4) camp management and coordination; 5) health; 6) protection; 7) food security; 8) 
emergency telecommunication; 9) early recovery; 10) education; 11) sanitation, water and 
hygiene (OCHA, 2013). 
Figure 2. Cluster coordination - "How the cluster system works" 
Adapted from “How the cluster system works,” by OCHA, 2013. Copyright 2013 by the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 
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Each Cluster was assigned with a Cluster Lead agency, or Co-Leads at both global and 
country levels. UNICEF and Save the Children are currently appointed as Co-Leads of the 
Education Cluster. The terms of reference for Cluster Leads were clearly defined, as Country and 
global Cluster Leads are:  
1) to be accountable to the Humanitarian and Emergency Relief Coordinators respectively;
2) to play the role of facilitator in each Cluster group to coordinate the activities by different
actors;
3) to set the standards of their services; and
4) to become the provider of “last resort” (IASC, 2006).
For the third point, the following guidelines were the results of ‘standard settings’ for the 
humanitarian community and their assistance:  
• The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and
NGOs in Disaster Relief, developed by the Steering Committee for Humanitarian
Response (SCHR) in 1994; and
• The Sphere standards – Humanitarian Charters and Minimum Standards in Disaster
Response, issued in 1998 (Sphere Project, 2004).
These principles became the essential guidelines for the humanitarian agencies to respect and 
follow as the rules and standards in the provision of quality relief assistances. For the last point 
for the Cluster Leads “to become the provider of last resort,” IASC explained: 
Where there are critical gaps in humanitarian response, it is the responsibility of cluster 
leads to call on all relevant humanitarian partners to address these. If this fails, then 
depending on the urgency, the cluster lead as ‘provider of last resort’ may need to commit 
itself to filling the gap. If, however, funds are not forthcoming for these activities, the 
cluster lead cannot be expected to implement these activities, but should continue to work 
with the Humanitarian Coordinator and donors to mobilize the necessary resources. 
(2008, p. 1)  
In the Education Sector, the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) 
has played the role of facilitator and information resource provider for education professionals 
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and academics working in emergencies. As its efforts to make education as the fourth pillar of 
humanitarian assistance, INEE followed the above Sphere model, and developed the Minimum 
Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction (INEE, 2004, 
2010). While its development and consultation process of the standards was initially questioned 
(Andina, 2007), INEE suggested that the minimum standards need to be flexible and adaptable 
based on each field situation. As part of the cluster approach to “ensuring greater predictability,” 
it is important to have standards or guidelines to quickly respond to an emergency, but it is also 
necessary to be aware that in reality, including cluster use “(w)hat works in one emergency 
might not work so well in another (Haiplik, 2007, p. 42).” 
Natural disasters and armed conflicts devastated both local populations and governmental 
capacities. As relief and security needs of the affected are to be more inclusive to achieve 
sustainable human development and survival, humanitarian assistance has become a complex 
enterprise. As Greenaway described, “(the) point of the ‘new humanitarianism’ is … to 
acknowledge that ‘complex emergencies’ need ‘complex response[s]’ (2000).” To maneuver 
such demanding and complex dynamics, it seems to be important for the humanitarian 
community to balance between: the rapid response capacity through predictable scenarios and 
models, clearly-set roles and responsibilities, and already-established partnerships; and the 
ability to recognize and adjust based on the local knowledge and context.  
2.3 EDUCATION IN EMERGENCIES 
Education … gives shape and structure to children’s lives and can instil community 
values, promote justice and respect for human rights and enhance peace, stability and 
interdependence (Machel, 1996, p. 54). 
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In 1996, Graça Machel, the third wife of Nelson Mandela and the widow of the former 
Mozambique’s president, was commissioned to lead a landmark study called The Impact of 
Armed Conflict on Children, and presented it to the UN General Assembly. While the report 
thoroughly and vividly portrayed children’s sufferings, risks, and vulnerabilities in the time of 
armed conflict, she stressed the importance of schooling, or educational activities, even in the 
difficult time because it would represent a state of normalcy for children and hope for the 
community (IASC, 2002; Machel, 1996).  
 In this section, I review the key frameworks and perspectives that supported protection of 
children’s rights to education in crisis situations. Then, I examined critical roles and risks of 
education that would affect children’s safety and security in emergencies.  
2.3.1 International legal frameworks and global commitments 
Everyone has the right to education (UN General Assembly, 1948).  
The right to education was promised in Article 26 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948), and, later, the 1989 Conventions on the Rights of the 
Child specified the education right for children in Article 28 and 29 (UN General Assembly, 
1989) (See the relevant Articles in APPENDIX A). Both of these international legal frameworks 
affirmed that basic education should be free and compulsory. In 1990, national governments 
came together at the World Conference on Education for All (EFA) in Jomtien and promised to 
achieve universal access to basic education for all children worldwide (UNESCO, 1990). This 
commitment was re-affirmed at both the 2000 Dakar World Education Forum (UNESCO, 2000) 
and the 2000 Millennium Summit (UN General Assembly, 2000b). Eight Millennium 
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Development Goals (MDGs) were set for 2015, and two of them reflected the goals in education 
as follows:  
• MDG Goal 2 [Achieve universal primary education] Ensure that, by 2015, children 
everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary 
schooling; and 
• MDG Goal 3 [Promote gender equality and empower women] Eliminate gender disparity 
in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no 
later than 2015 (UN, 2008). 
These listed key frameworks and targets were adopted and incorporated by the national 
governments in their national development and educational planning. However, the global 
progress toward EFA seemed to have been struggled, as UNESCO reported:  
The number of primary school age children out of school has fallen from 108 million to 
61 million since 1999, but three-quarters of this reduction was achieved between 1999 
and 2004. Between 2008 and 2010 progress stalled altogether (2012, p. 3).  
These commitments, furthermore, did not exclude children affected by crises, like armed 
conflicts and natural disasters. At the 2000 Dakar World Education Forum, the subject of 
education in situations of emergency and crisis was discussed as one of the main thematic areas 
for the first time. The participating national governments agreed on the following strategic goals:  
Meet the needs of education systems affected by conflict, natural calamities and 
instability, and conduct educational programmes in ways that promote mutual 
understanding, peace and tolerance, and that help to prevent violence and conflict 
(UNESCO, 2000, p. 19). 
For the contexts of war and armed conflict, there were additional international legal 
frameworks that specifically supported the protection of children’s rights, including education 
(ICRC, 1949; UN General Assembly, 2000a). The UN Security Council further recognized 
“attacks against schools or hospitals,” places generally having a significant presence of children, 
as one of the “six grave violations against children (and their rights) during armed conflicts” 
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(UN, 2009). 17 These frameworks gave parties involved in conflicts, including non-state entities, 
the responsibilities to respect and protect children to access their educational rights.  
As for natural disasters, the nation states and international community came together in 
2005, resulted in the landmark Hyogo Framework for Action (UNISDR, 2005). They made the 
commitments to strengthen the disaster preparedness systems and capacities, including in the 
Education Sector, and make the world more resilient to hazards and crises (UN, 2012b). 
 These above frameworks and commitments indicated the international efforts to protect 
the rights of children, including their education rights, in emergencies. This was emphasized in 
the collective statement by the leading humanitarian agencies in education: 
(D)elivering education in emergencies is … about providing children with continued 
opportunities for formal and non-formal learning and development. … Education must 
form part of all humanitarian responses from day one if children are to be protected, have 
their rights upheld and have an opportunity for a brighter future (Education Cluster Unit, 
2009).  
The international community, often led by the UN, urged that the nation states, and extended 
local communities (including non-state entities in conflicts), must be primarily responsible to 
ensure their children’s education rights in any context. At the same time, it became the global 
responsibility for the international community to: 1) promote (re-)building of peaceful and 
resilient nations and democratic societies; and 2) support the nation states’ efforts to ensure 
children access educational opportunities even in crisis situations. 
                                                 
17 According to the UN’s Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (UN, 2009), the Six 
Grave Violations Against Children During Armed Conflict included: 1) killing or maiming of children; 2) recruitment or use of child soldiers; 3) 
rape and other forms of sexual violence against children; 4) abduction of children; 5) attacks against schools or hospitals; and 6) denial of 
humanitarian access to children; and its framework paper further explained that:  
The Rome Statute (UN General Assembly, 1998) extends the criminal accountability for these actions (or failures to protect), providing the 
ICC (International Criminal Court) explicit jurisdiction to prosecute and punish those that intentionally target schools or hospitals during 
wartime. Such actions amount to war crimes regardless of whether they occur during an international or non-international armed conflict. 
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2.3.2 Complex frameworks of education in emergencies  
Practitioners and researchers use the term ‘education in emergencies’ to describe this emerging 
sub-field of international development education. However, what is classified to be ‘education in 
emergencies’, has been varied, and it may not be necessarily associated with a conflict or natural 
disaster. For example, UNICEF included even “persistent poverty, the increasing number of 
children living on streets, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic” as “silent, chronic emergencies,” which 
all “have an adverse impact on education (Pigozzi, 1999, p. 1).”  
Some multilateral and bilateral donors used the term of ‘fragile states’ to describe the 
nations with the governments that may not have capacities, or willingness, to aid fundamental, or 
urgent, needs of their populations (Bird, 2007; Brannelly, Ndaruhutse, & Rigaud, 2009; Kirk, 
2007; Rose & Greeley, 2006; Save the Children, 2007). These countries experienced instabilities 
or insecurity within or across their borders. However, many of these states did not consider 
themselves nor wanted to be labeled as ‘fragile states’ (Mosselson, Wheaton, & Frisoli, 2009). 
The 1998 edited book Education as a Humanitarian Response offered early examples of how 
education could be situated as part of humanitarian assistance (Retamal & Aedo-Richmond, 
1998b). At the 2000 EFA forum in Dakar, emergency education specialists and government 
officials concluded that the education systems affected by “calamity, conflict and instability 
[italics added]” required special measures to meet their needs (Sinclair, 2002; UNESCO, 2000).  
While different terms were used to describe the field of education in emergencies, they 
all indicated the same or similar critical situations where: 1) children’s rights to education were 
denied or difficult to attain due to catastrophic events or dire conditions; and 2) urgent responses 
and special measures were required to fulfill their educational needs. Thus, the term of 
‘education in emergencies’ is inclusive, and perhaps appropriate, to describe such diverse and 
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complicated conditions, in which educational opportunities should be protected. However, the 
next question is: Is education, or did it become, a relief activity in the traditional sense, where 
urgent ‘survival’ requirements of the affected need to be met? Or, should education be 
considered as a traditional development enterprise even in emergency situations? In the 
following, I review and compare both camps of education ‘as humanitarian assistance’ and ‘as a 
development activity’ to examine how these ideas were interrelated and co-existing.  
2.3.2.1 Education as humanitarian assistance 
As discussed earlier, the shift to human security and increased focus on human rights-based 
approaches in international cooperation also gave non-survival sectors, such as education, an 
opportunity in humanitarian assistance. Aguilar and Retamal pointed out that the 1991 UN 
Resolution 46/182 gave the international community new guidelines to adjust their strategies in 
emergencies: 
The new political framework faced by the Post-Cold War era has forced the international 
community to give priority in its agenda to a new strategy for peace-keeping and 
humanitarian assistance. As a response to this need, United Nations Resolution 46/182 
created guidelines in order to ensure an international mandate that is able to provide ‘a 
continuum of action from early warning prevention and preparedness to humanitarian 
relief and the transition to rehabilitation and development’ (1998, p. 7). 
They, however, noted that, in the cited UN Resolution, “no clear reference is made to the role 
education should play in complex emergencies (Ibid.).” In the mid 1990s, humanitarian 
education specialists began active advocacy within the international community to recognize 
education as the “fourth pillar of humanitarian assistance” (Machel, 1996; Norwegian Refugee 
Council et al., 1999). This was based on the recognition of education as one of the fundamental 
rights of children even in difficult circumstances like conflict or natural disaster. These 
specialists further emphasized that education should be the central element of all humanitarian 
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assistance programs (Bensalah, Sinclair, Nacer, Commisso, & Bokhari, 2001; Retamal & Aedo-
Richmond, 1998a; Sinclair, 2002; Sommers, 2002; Talbot, 2002).  
It has been, nevertheless, a great challenge for the education professional group to situate 
education within the humanitarian field. Education does not directly impact on basic survival of 
the affected populations. However, it has rather sustainable impacts on their lives in post-crisis 
periods. For a long time, education was not recognized or treated as a priority area in 
humanitarian assistance. Moreover, its funding was, and still is, chronically short (so as any other 
humanitarian fields have been) (Nicolai, 2007). Aguilar and Retamal described: “Usually, 
education is perceived as a developmental initiative. Thus, it is often excluded from the 
‘emergency preparedness response’ [italics added] (1998, p. 8).”  
 In order to ‘fit in’ with the larger humanitarian culture, the education group needed to 
‘package’ the educational interventions. In this way, education could be considered as part of 
emergency response activities. It was in Somalia in early 1990s, and later in Rwanda, 
Mozambique, Angola, and other places, that a few emergency education specialists developed 
the foundation of what are considered now as emergency education response programs. Aguilar 
and Retamal summarized those innovative program interventions and experiences in their 
publication Rapid Educational Response in Complex Emergencies (1998). This document 
included the following key elements of the emergency education programs: a) phase-wise 
programming; b) examples of education kits with essential teaching and learning materials; c) 
training needs of both new and existing teachers; and d) development of various emergency 
specific subject areas, such as landmine awareness education and psychosocial support activities.  
Although the use of ‘kits’ was much debated (Sinclair, 2001; Sommers, 2002), these 
emergency education program components became relevant, feasible, and comprehensive 
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models among the humanitarian education actors. However, the focus was given to how to 
incorporate education in emergency operations, or how to make educational programs relevant in 
humanitarian assistance. In other words, it was rather for education programs to become like 
other emergency interventions.  
Emergency education responses were focused on speedy delivery and minimum inputs to 
resume educational activities in the affected communities. Traditionally, one of the measures for 
successful relief operations was how many people’s needs were how quickly met. Thus, the 
Education Sector was often expected to produce the same types of results as other relief 
activities, such as: how quickly educational activities were started, whereas how rapidly shelter 
tents were distributed; or how many children received learning materials, comparable to how 
many children received vaccines.  
This exact perception also affected monitoring and evaluation of education programs as 
part of humanitarian assistance. It has been an obvious challenge that educational achievements 
cannot be simply measured in the same way as other sectors do. For example, how many 
children enrolled in educational programs does not instantly translate to how many children 
completed a school year or primary education, or to what kind of educational knowledge and 
skills they attained. Educational achievements cannot be measured overnight as often demanded 
in relief operations.  
 The nature of education programs and activities may be always different from other 
traditional humanitarian sectors. Lack of it will not directly affect someone’s physical survival. 
However, it is a human right, and a vital element in one’s life, for his or her development and 
sustainability. Next, I explore the perception of education in emergencies as a development 
activity to compare with the above discussion.  
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2.3.2.2 Education as a development activity 
While facing the challenge to be fully part of humanitarian assistance, education specialists kept 
the foundation of emergency education programs in a development sphere. Pigozzi stressed that 
“education is not a relief activity: … and must be conceptualized as a development activity 
(1999, p. i).” She further suggested that “education in emergency situations” should not be seen 
“as a short-term response that is a ‘stop-gap’ measure until normalcy can be restored (Pigozzi, 
1999, p. 3).” Obviously, education is not a relief work in a traditional sense, because educational 
experiences are continuous processes. In order to recover and rebuild the entire Education Sector 
in crisis situations, there is no quick solution, and interventions should be continuous and 
sustainable (Aguilar & Retamal, 2009).  
 For those who work for education programs in emergency settings, however, the 
challenge is not as simple as it seems. At the onset of crisis, often planning has to be done in a 
short period of time; urgently required humanitarian needs are prioritized; and there are often 
limited resources and capacities available in the affected nations or communities (e.g., finance, 
human and leadership capacities, implementing bodies, and supply procurement). Often multi-
sectoral coordination simplifies and overlooks detailed technical elements of individual sectoral 
interventions. Furthermore, the donor communities often have: inadequate financial 
commitments; limited flexibility in utilization and liquidation; and high demands for 
accountabilities.  
It has been also recognized that there is a gap between emergency response and 
development assistance in both planning and finance (Brannelly et al., 2009). Often different 
(and uncoordinated) departments and actors deal with either emergency or development 
assistance within governments, external agencies, or donor institutes. Funding allocation 
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mechanisms are also separated, and even decision-making procedures can be different. Or no 
adequate transition plans are considered or developed in the early phase of emergency 
operations. These gaps present additional challenges for relief agencies and affected 
governments to respond to immediate requirements and to plan smooth transition to 
reconstruction and development.  
 Managing education programs can be quite different between emergency situations and 
normal development contexts. Aguilar and Retamal pointed out that, in emergencies “‘business 
as usual’ is no longer a viable option (2009, p. 5).” Special measures are required at different 
levels of emergency responses (Pigozzi, 1999), and Sinclair listed additional differences in 
managing education programs in emergencies, including: 1) procedural; 2) special needs of the 
affected populations; and 3) the short time scale and planning horizon imposed in emergencies 
(2002). She explained: “this imposition (of the short time scale and planning horizon) comes 
from both the urgency of the situation itself and the exigencies of international donors, who often 
work on an annual project cycle and thus find multi-year educational activities difficult to 
support in emergencies (p. 31).” 
 Despite these given demanding circumstances in emergencies, Aguilar and Retamal 
suggested the following: 
There is a clear relationship between emergency, rehabilitation and development. In order 
to ensure a smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation and development, emergency 
assistance should already provide ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term 
development. Thus, emergency measures should be seen as a step towards long-term 
development (1998, p. 9). 
The 1991 UN Resolution 46/182 also stated the same: “Emergency assistance must be provided 
in ways that will be supportive of recovery and long-term development (UN General Assembly, 
1991).” Aguilar and Retamal added that "more and more, recent educational humanitarian 
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interventions have been perceived as coherent responses serving two purposes: (a) responding to 
the humanitarian and psycho-social needs of affected children; (b) contributing to the future 
economic/human resource development of countries in crisis (1998, p. 8)."  
 Clearly, there are dual, or multiple, viewpoints to approach education programs in 
emergencies. However, the goals should be the same – sustainable and improved educational 
opportunities for all children. While struggling to ‘compete’ among other relief sectors, the 
important question to ask here is not a question of either relief or development. However, the 
question is what can be done to ensure the lasting security of children and protection of their 
rights even in difficult situations. And, one of the answers should be to provide immediate and 
sustainable support to their educational needs during, and beyond, a relief stage. 
2.3.3 Critical roles of education in crisis situations 
Whether education is considered as a humanitarian or development activity in emergencies, 
researchers and professionals focused on the role(s) of education in emergency contexts. 
Emergency situations affect children’s well-being and development. Education might not always 
become a “positive impact” on children and the society, unless its relation to conflict and peace 
was carefully considered (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000). Or, educational environments might not be 
always ‘safe haven’ for children, and there is a possibility that education could place children at 
risk of violence (Fawcett, 2005). In this section, I explore some of these complex natures of 
education in the context of emergency situations.   
In recent years, education itself became a specific target of violence in conflict situations 
or unstable environments (O'Malley, 2007, 2010). In relatively recent incident, one Pakistani 
girl, Malala Yousafzai, was shot by a Taliban group in the country’s northeastern region 
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(Ahmad, 2012). In Afghanistan, teachers received “night letters” threatening them to close 
schools otherwise to be attacked (Glad, 2009; O'Malley, 2007). During the Maoist insurgency 
period (1996-2006) in Nepal, children were indoctrinated into the rebel political ideology and 
recruited to its military at school; or, worse, became victims of the crossfire on school grounds 
(M. Smith, 2010). In northern Uganda, students were abducted from school compounds, school 
buildings were used as military barracks, and landmines were planted around school areas. In 
southern Thailand, teachers carried guns for their protection (UNICEF, 2008). These threats and 
attacks in learning environments can cause serious negative impacts to the progresses in 
education. Such negative impacts include: a) loss of education staff and students; b) physical 
damages in schools; c) closure of schools; d) parents stop sending their children to schools; e) 
set-back of the progress made in education; and f) losing out of a generation, especially girls, 
accessing education (O'Malley, 2007, 2010; World Bank, 2005).  
Some of these attacks were specifically targeted because the role and content of 
education were perceived as not welcome or negative influence to children and societies. Bush 
and Saltarelli (2000) described that there were possible polarized characteristics of education that 
may have positive or negative consequences for social justice and equality, calling them as 
“positive and negative faces of education [italics added].” According to them, the positive face of 
education gives peacebuilding and conflict- limiting impacts; and the negative one has peace-
destroying conflict-maintaining impacts, especially in conflict-experienced societies.  
In case of natural disasters, similarly, schools or educational environments may not be 
always the safest places. For example, the 2005 earthquake devastated the mountainous region of 
north-eastern Pakistan, completely destroyed many communities and killed thousands of children 
inside school buildings (Kirk, 2008). The similar incident happened when another huge 
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earthquake hit the Sichuan region of China in 2008, and the school buildings collapsed and killed 
many school children. In Pakistan, prior to the disaster, the Kashmir region was rapidly 
progressing toward universal primary education (UPE). Numerous village schools were 
established to accommodate children in those mountainous communities, but many of them were 
poorly built. As a result, instead of protecting them, these school buildings became the biggest 
hazard for children’s safety at the time of the disaster.  
 Schools and communities, however, tried to make educational environments safe and 
secure. In Afghanistan, establishing home- or community-based schools close to children’s 
homes or within their villages became a key strategy in mitigating girls’ potential exposure to 
violence (Mathieu, 2006). Physical safety in school, such as erecting fences, was a critical 
preventive security measure to keep children safe and protected from outside harm (Davies, 
2005). Parents and community members were involved in school security committees, or shuras, 
to increase the security at school and even negotiate with hostile elements (Glad, 2009). 
 In order to secure access of humanitarian assistance to the affected in active conflict 
situations, the humanitarian community developed the strategy called “corridors of peace” or 
“days of tranquility” as a “breathing space” (Evans, 1996; IASC, 2002). This inspired the 
development of “children as conflict-free zones,” or “Children as Zones of Peace,” which was 
implemented in Nepal in early 2000s as “School as Zones of Peace (SZOP)” (M. Smith, 2010). 
The SZOP initiative was based on community involvement through which the code of conduct 
was negotiated among all conflicting parties in relations to ensuring conflict- free schools and 
banning attacks against school children and teachers. M. Smith (2010) described that the 
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initiative in Nepal was successful because of associated social pressure. She also explained that 
different but flexible negotiation tactics were used at different phases of the conflict.18 
For natural disasters, schools in Japan were built based on earthquake resistance building 
codes.  Teachers and students regularly carried out evacuation drills and safety check of school 
compounds. Even schools were assigned as temporary evacuation locations for the communities 
(Kondo, 2013).  
 The above examples demonstrate that, if not carefully examined and planned, education, 
or educational environments, could become negative influence to, or hazardous for children in 
challenging situations like conflict and disaster. Despite the challenges, however, it is doable to 
ensure safe and protected educational access and environments for all children, both girls and 
boys, those from different backgrounds or with special needs. This critical element of education 
should not be limited to emergency programs, but also extended to non-crisis contexts as primary 
concern of education.  
Because crises bring chaos and complex factors and dynamics into the affected 
communities, focusing on clear priorities becomes crucial – protecting children and their 
childhood experiences even in difficult situations for their survival, well-being, and 
development. Next, I further explore the relations between education and child protection in the 
context of emergency situations.  
                                                 
18 According to M. Smith (2010), from 2004 to 2006, a back door and shuttle diplomacy process at local level became useful, while, from 2007 
onwards, using the top-down structure of each party was effective because there was very little autonomy at local level. 
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2.4 EDUCATION AND CHILD PROTECTION IN EMERGENCIES 
The ability to carry on schooling in the most difficult circumstances demonstrates 
confidence in the future: communities that still have a school feel they have something 
durable and worthy of protection [italics added] (Machel, 1996, p. 54). 
The international community recognizes that education is not only an individual right, but also 
often understood as an enabling right (Pigozzi, 1999). Dewey described that education is 
necessity in people’s lives – the foundation for all activities that one be engaged throughout his 
or her life (formally, informally, or non-formally) (1944). Nicolai and Triplehorn (2003) also 
applied this concept in emergency situations, and explained that education is a significant part of 
children’s development processes, and it is an important protection tool. They considered that 
education is a basis to protect all children’s rights – rights to survival, development, 
participation, and protection (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003). 
 Referring to the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, furthermore, Nicolai and 
Triplehorn (2003) listed the following three protective elements of education in the crisis 
contexts:  
• physical protection as providing a safe, structured places for learn and play, positive 
alternatives to military recruitment, gangs and drugs, and basic knowledge of health and 
hygiene;  
• psychosocial protection as giving children an identity as students, a venue for expression, 
support to social networks and community interaction, and a daily routine; and  
• cognitive protection as developing and retaining the academic skills of basic education, 
accessing urgent life-saving health and security information as well as knowledge of 
human rights and skills for citizenship.  
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They continued suggesting that these linkages between education and protection should be 
strengthened by:  
a) maximizing the opportunities (through community leadership, facilitating access, 
presence as prevention, and assessment, dissemination, reporting and monitoring); and  
b) minimizing the risks (such as attack, recruitment, separation, and exploitation) (Ibid.).  
Education became a significantly important element in crisis contexts to protect children 
and their childhood experiences from violence, harms, or risks. In this section, I focus on two 
specific strategic frameworks to ensure the safety and security of children in emergencies: 1) 
protective environments and child-friendly spaces (CFS); and 2) early childhood development 
(ECD) or early learning programs.  
2.4.1 Protective environments for children 
‘Child protection’ is the term commonly used by international cooperation agencies to describe 
the work related to protect the rights of children. It is related to their family and community 
environments as well as social systems and services, including health, education, welfare, law 
and more. For instance, UNICEF referred the term ‘child protection’ to “preventing and 
responding to violence, exploitation and abuse against children (2006a, p. 1).” In addition to this 
definition, an international NGO, Save the Children, further identified the following as most 
critical types of protection that children require in disaster areas and war zones:  
1) protection from physical harm;  
2) protection from exploitation and gender-based violence;  
3) protection from psychosocial distress;  
4) protection from recruitment into armed groups;  
5) protection from family separation;  
6) protection from abuses related to forced displacement; and  
7) protection denial of children’s access to quality education (2005).  
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The 1998 Convention on the Rights of the Child, furthermore, was developed based on 
the following principles: 1) non-discrimination; 2) best interest of the child; 3) survival and 
development; and 4) respect for the views of the child (right to participation). Because child 
well-being and development involve many components, protecting a child, and his or her rights, 
should require a multi-disciplinary and cross-sectoral approach (Pais, 1999). This approach is in 
line with the principles of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, which consists: 1) non-
discrimination; 2) best interest of the child; 3) survival and development; and 4) respect for the 
views of the child (right to participation) (Pais, 1999). To attempt mapping out this multi-
disciplinary and cross-sectoral field of child protection, Landgren proposed a conceptual model 
called the “Protective Environment Framework” (2005). The framework consisted the following 
eight (8) essential dimensions to provide protection to children (See Figure 3; and APPENDIX B 
for the detailed descriptions of each dimension):  
1) protective government commitment and capacity;  
2) protective legislation and enforcement;  
3) protective culture and customs;  
4) open discussion;  
5) protective children’s life skills, knowledge, and participation;  
6) protective capacity of families and communities; 
7) protective essential services; and  
8) protective monitoring, reporting, and oversight.  
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Figure 3. Landgren’s Protective Environment Framework 
Adapted from “The Protective Environment: Development Support for Child Protection” by K. Landgren, 2005, 
Human Rights Quarterly, 27, p. 228. Copyright 2005 by the Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Landgren explained: “(t)his approach … identifies the systems and capacities needed to 
support child protection at all levels (2005, p. 226).” She also recognized that “(h)ow 
protectively these elements function, and how they interact, differs from one society to another, 
and may vary in relation to different types of abuse (Ibid.).” 
As showed in Figure 3, there could be different serious obstacles and threats to the safety 
and security of children and their environments, including emergencies like disaster and conflict. 
Landgren stressed that “(c)onflict, poverty, natural disasters, and epidemics are … recognized as 
undermining the availability of protection (Ibid.).” Thus, she suggested: a) child protection 
related programs should be more preventive nature than ‘curative’; and b) there should be more 
systematic responses to tackle root causes of such risks and improve surroundings to be safer for 
children (Landgren, 2005). 
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When facing a natural disaster or armed conflict where social structures and resources are 
damaged or lost, it may be difficult to achieve these protective conditions. However, Landgren 
(2005) explained: 
A range of mitigating interventions is traditional in humanitarian emergencies. … 
Providing services or material assistance (…) can reduce the vulnerability of men, 
women, and children, and can enable parents to offer greater protection and stability to 
their children (p. 226). 
Moreover, she pointed out that “(a) school environment, however primitive, gives children a 
constructive focus for their energy (Ibid.).” The suggested protective dimensions should become 
preventive measures to protect children from threats of violence, exploitation, abuse and other 
risks. 
To ensure the protection and assistance for children affected by natural disasters and 
armed conflicts, UNICEF also developed a programmatic strategy called “Child Friendly Spaces 
(CFS),” and explained its six core principles of CFS as follows (UNICEF, 2009b): 
• Principle 1: CFS are secure and safe environments for children. 
• Principle 2: CFS provide a stimulating and supportive environment for children. 
• Principle 3: CFS are built on exiting structures and capacities within a community. 
• Principle 4: CFS use a participatory approach for the design and implementation. 
• Principle 5: CFS provide or support integrated programmes and service. 
• Principle 6: CFS are inclusive and non-discriminatory. 
The conceptual design and aerial picture of the early CFS model in Turkey showed in Figure 4 
and Figure 5. CFS was designed to be protected from the rest of the camp, where children could 
access to all necessary services and activities in chaotic conditions of the displaced communities.  
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Figure 4. Example of child-friendly spaces 
Adapted from by “Chapter 5: Schools as Protective Environments,” by UNICEF, 2009a, Child friendly schools: 
Manual, p. 35 (Originally from P. Aguilar, 2001; and cited in UNICEF, 2009b; UNICEF & University of Pittsburgh, 
2004). Copyright 2009 by UNICEF. 
Figure 5. Aerial view of CFS in Turkey 
 Adapted from “Child friendly spaces/environments (CFS/E): Lessons learned from Turkey,” by P. Aguilar, 2001, 
Paper presented at the Education Programme Officer (EPO) Meeting in Senegal. Copyright 2001 by Pilar Aguilar. 
Reprinted with permission. 
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To compliment the CFS model, Aguilar proposed a conceptual framework “to guarantee 
children’s right to survival, development, participation and protection, particularly in a situation 
of crisis or instability (Aguilar, 2001).” In CFS, as shown in Figure 6, multi-disciplinary and 
cross-sectoral protective elements supports child well-being, and its protection focus is “not only 
defending [children] against physical aggression but also ensuring that their full range of rights 
and needs are respected and fulfilled (UNICEF & University of Pittsburgh, 2004, p. 2).”  
Figure 6. "How to Operationalize CFS" 
   Adapted from “Child friendly spaces/environments (CFS/E): Lessons learned from Turkey,” by P. Aguilar, 2001, 
Paper presented at the Education Programme Officer (EPO) Meeting in Senegal (cited in UNICEF, 2009b; UNICEF 
& University of Pittsburgh, 2004). Copyright 2001 by Pilar Aguilar. Reprinted with permission. 
CFS, or others may call Safe Spaces, Child Centered Spaces, or Emergency Spaces for 
Children, became a common program strategy in emergencies, implemented by various 
humanitarian organizations (Ager & Metzler, 2012). Some were focused on establishing safe and 
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stimulating environment for younger children, and others were creating spaces available to 
different age groups of children (e.g., youth club, after school center). Save the Children 
highlighted the most common objectives of CFS as follows (but not limited to): 
1) To offer children opportunities to develop, learn, play, and build/strengthen resiliency;
and
2) To identify and find ways to respond to particular threats to all children and/or specific
groups of children, such as those with particular vulnerabilities (2008).
In addition to these, Ager and Metzler suggested that CFS could be used as a means of 
promoting children’s psychosocial well-being, and as a foundation for strengthening capacities 
for community child protection capacity (2012). Even in the East Timor’s post-conflict 
community, CFS not only supported families but also became a safe place for reconciliation with 
their common interest of children (IASC, 2002). UNICEF summarized: “CFS protect children by 
providing a safe space with supervised activities, by raising awareness of the risks to children, 
and mobilizing communities to begin the process of creating a Protective Environment (2009b, 
p. 9).” The UNICEF/University of Pittsburgh desk study of CFS further articulated:
(The CFS) approach also focuses on empowering families and communities in the 
healing process. (…) The most effective and sustainable approach to recovery is to 
mobilize the existing social care system (2004, p. 4).  
While traditional humanitarian assistances are often reactive, or “a stop gap measure,” to 
an emergency condition, CFS, or a program strategy based on the Protective Environment 
Framework, became the key strategy to (re-)install the normalcy in children’s lives and support 
the recovery capacities of families and communities. CFS is not only to provide quality 
educational opportunities to children, but also to become the foundation for generational 
protection and sustainability of the crisis-affected communities (Aguilar & Retamal, 2009; 
McClure & Retamal, 2010; Vargas-Barón & McClure, 1998). 
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2.4.2 Early childhood development (ECD) programs as protective measures  
In his 2013 State of the Union address, the US President Barack Obama stated providing high-
quality early learning opportunities for all young children starting at birth as one of his second 
term priority areas (Obama, 2013). Internationally, ECD is recognized as first goal of the 
Education for All (EFA), while the Millennium Development Goals did not include a specific 
goal on ECD (Birdsall, Levine, & Ibrahim, 2005; UNESCO, 2000). It would be a great precedent 
if the country like US could lead the way to achieve better early childhood development (ECD)19 
support for young children.  
The area of early learning, or ECD, however, is still often considered to be a private, 
family matter, or even a luxury item (Consultative Group on Early Childhood Care and 
Development [CGECCD], n.d.). The Education for All (EFA)’s thematic study listed the 
following as the problems in ECD: weak political will; weak policy and legal frameworks; lack 
of, or poor use of financial resources; uniformity (lack of options); poor quality; lack of attention 
to particular populations; lack of co-ordination; and narrow conceptualization (UNICEF & 
Myers, 2001). In this last section of the chapter, I review this field of ECD in relation to the 
protection of young children and their childhood experiences in the specific context of 
emergency situations 
The Consultative Group on Early Childhood Care and Development (CGECCD) defined:  
• Early childhood care and development (ECCD) is a field of endeavor that focuses on 
supporting young children’s development; and  
                                                 
19 The field of early childhood development (ECD) is also referred in similar terms like: early childhood care and development (ECCD), early 
childhood care and education (ECCE), early learning, and more. These terms are often interchangeable, and they indicate the field concerning 
children’s physical and cognitive development at their early years. For the purpose of this paper, I use the term of early childhood development, 
or ECD, as a general term, otherwise I maintain the terms used in the cited references.  
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• Early childhood encompasses the period of human development from prenatal through 
the transition from home or ECCD centre into the early primary grades (prenatal – 8 
years of age) [italics added] (2010).  
As framed by the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC), furthermore, the field of ECD is 
interdisciplinary in its nature, including health, nutrition, education, social science, economics, 
child protection, and social welfare (CGECCD, 2010). As discussed in the previous section, the 
Landgren’s Protective Environment Framework corresponded this idea. 
 It is a well-known fact that early years of a child’s life are the most significant period of 
his or her development for immediate well-being, school readiness and future success (CGECCD 
& INEE; UNICEF, 2006c; Vargas-Barón, 2005). Especially, first three years of life are the 
period when incredible growth happens in all areas of a child’s development. According to the 
National Center for Infants, Toddlers, and Families, a young child’s brain grows to about 80 
percent of adult size by three years of age and 90 percent by age five (Zero to Three, 2012). At 
the cost-benefit side, for example, research showed that long-term benefits from ECCD 
intervention programs could be a cost-benefit ratio of 7:1, or, in other words, for every dollar 
spent on ECCD programs, 7 dollars were saved through the added benefit to society (Karoly, 
Kilburn, & Cannon, 2005) [cited in CGECCD & INEE, n.d.]). UNESCO and OECD described 
“early childhood care and education … as an effective strategy for reducing poverty and social 
inequity, addressing their causes from the start (UNESCO, 2004, p. 3).” 
Emergencies, however, pose a set of challenges for young children who are often 
considered to be one of the most vulnerable groups, including elderlies and persons with special 
needs, in an adversity (Nantchouang, 2011; Tran, 2011). Malnutrition, disease, poverty, neglect, 
social exclusion, violence, and lack of a socially stimulating environment are the threats to 
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children’s developmental delays (CGECCD, 2010; CGECCD & INEE), and these risks could be 
higher in crisis environments. Vargas-Baron described:  
Higher rates of (developmental) delay are often seen in camps for internally displaced 
families or refugees and areas affected by famine. In such situations, mild to severe 
delays often go undiagnosed (2005, pp. 3-4). 
Landers (1998) also warned the risks of excess stresses that children would experience in 
catastrophic events. She explained: “(Especially) young children living in situations of armed 
conflict (not only) are … in danger of becoming the victims of violence (but also) can become 
accustomed to violence … It is the accumulation of risk factors that jeopardizes development 
particularly when there are no compensatory forces at work (to mitigate the effects) (Landers, 
1998, p. 6).” Additional literature concurred with this. When early developmental opportunities 
were missed or delayed, many of the capacities required for later healthy development could be 
compromised or altered, and it would be difficult to reverse (CGECCD, 2010; CGECCD & 
INEE; Mustard, 2005). 
“Despite their vulnerability, young children do have the capacity to anticipate, cope with 
and recover from hazard impacts,” Tran described (2011, p. 7). She further cited the International 
Resilience Research Project, which was conducted with children (ages 0-3, 4-8 and 9-11) in 22 
countries, and indicted that “by the age of 9 years, children can promote their own resilience at 
the same rate as adults and while cultural differences exist these do not prevent the promotion of 
resilience” (Grotberg, 2001) [cited in Tran, 2011, p. 7]). 
 The field of ECD, furthermore, “links the young child’s cognitive, social, emotional, and 
physical processes with the care (by families, communities, and the nation) required to support 
their development [italics added] (CGECCD, 2010).” Thus, it is important to focus on the care 
capacities or environments available for children in their families and communities. Among the 
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key strategies suggested for ECD interventions, other literature also emphasized the importance 
of supporting caregivers to care for their children (Early Years, 2010; Heroman & Bilmes, 2005; 
Nantchouang, 2011; Tran, 2011). The Consultative Group on Early Childhood Care and 
Development (CGECCD) (2010) suggested the following specific inputs in supporting 
caregivers: 
• providing preconception, pre- and post-natal education, care, and protection; 
• providing parenting information and support for parents and family members through 
formal and nonformal approaches, including home visits; 
• providing developmentally appropriate child care  for working parents; 
• supporting six months of exclusive breastfeeding, and thereafter ensuring balanced, 
responsive, and appropriate complementary feeding at all growth stages; 
• ensuring birth registration; and 
• promoting opportunities for women’s development. 
Vargas-Baron explained the close relationship between young children’s success and 
their family support capacities as follows: 
The survival and developmental prospects of children – the odds that they will reach 
school age with the basic cognitive, social and emotional skills necessary for success – 
reflect the capacities, resources and supports available to their families. Put another way, 
the economic, health, mental health, nutritional and educational status of families drive 
the trends for child survival, developmental and school readiness. … The key to 
improving school performance is to invest in the families of young children (2005, p. 4). 
In emergency situations, not only children are affected by crises, but also their caregivers, 
including immediate parents and those involved in childcare work, are equally affected, which 
may impact their care capacities (Tran, 2011). To make sure of children’s healthy growth and 
development and support their resiliency at difficult times, a priority should be also given to (re-
)install and strengthen protective capacities of families and communities as part of psychosocial 
support strategy in crises.  
As discussed earlier, the field of education in emergencies is a new sub-field of 
international development education. Then, the field of early childhood development (ECD) in 
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emergencies is even less studied, not prioritized, or often neglected (Tran, 2011). However, early 
years of children’s lives are too important to overlook not only for their survival, well-being and 
development, but also for their contribution to the development and sustainability of family, 
community and country in the future. For this very reason, Vargas-Baron (2005) stressed that 
each country “must be the architect of its own generational commitment to its young (p. 1),” and 
its “ECD Policies should consider placing emphasis on increasing national investment in 
community- led, cost-effective and culturally competent programmes for pregnant women and 
(young) children (p. 4).” Even under difficult circumstances like disaster and conflict,, to ensure 
all children’s adequate and appropriate physical and cognitive growth and psychosocial well-
being is a generational duty for all stakeholders to achieve sustainable development and long-
lasting security in the global community. 
2.5 SUMMARY 
In the 21st century, the world is witnessing devastating crises like natural disasters, conflicts and 
instabilities. These catastrophic events and unstable conditions have disrupted and disturbed 
many innocent people’s lives around the world. The international community and affected states 
continue to face challenges in assisting humanitarian needs of families and communities, and 
supporting children to survive, grow and have a reasonable chance for a ‘normal’ life in crisis-
affected situations.  
In this chapter, I reviewed the field of education, and ECD, in emergencies, in relation to 
humanitarianism and protection of children and their childhoods as a whole. The recent 
experiences of natural disasters and armed conflicts indicated the complex natures of emergency 
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situations. To accommodate the situation, humanitarian assistance became a more complex 
enterprise where humanitarianism and security concerns were focused on protection of 
individual survival, livelihood and dignity (Amouyel, 2006; IASC, 2002; University of British 
Columbia, 2005).   
As for education as part of humanitarian assistance, I reviewed how the field of education 
in emergencies had been conceptualized and examined the critical roles of education to ensure 
protecting children and their childhood experiences in crisis situations. As one of the key 
strategies, relations between education and child protection was reviewed, with detailed analysis 
of how the protective environment framework was translated into safe and protected spaces for 
children in emergency situations. Moreover, protective environment frameworks should be 
addressed as cross-sectoral priority (Aguilar & Retamal, 2009; Landgren, 2005).  
Lastly, special focus was given to early childhood development (ECD), or early learning, 
programs as protective measures in emergencies. While young children could be most vulnerable 
in difficult situations, protection of their physical and cognitive development as well as 
psychosocial well-being should be considered as a generational responsibility (Aguilar & 
Retamal, 2009; McClure & Retamal, 2010; Vargas-Barón & McClure, 1998). In humanitarian 
assistance, central focus should be given to strengthening the child protection capacities and 
systems of affected communities and states.  
 In the next chapter on research methods and methodology, based on the complex 
frameworks presented in this chapter, I first explore how research, both qualitative and 
quantitative, can help better understand the field of education and ECD in emergencies. Then, 
based on my primary focus on qualitative research methods, I detail my study subject and present 
the structure of my field research. 
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3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This dissertation research project investigated how daycare centers had provided the protection 
and safety to young children at the time of the 2011 East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami 
Disaster. The study was intended to provide deeper understanding of how early childhood 
development (ECD) programs, specifically daycare centers in Iwate, had ensured (re-)building 
and maintaining protective environments for children in crisis situations. As I detailed in the 
previous chapter, humanitarian assistance is a complex field that requires complex solutions. In 
this chapter, I first review the current research and knowledge sharing practices in the field of 
education in emergencies, focusing on the uses of qualitative and qualitative inquiry methods and 
the relevance of qualitative or ethnographic research methods to study crisis context. Second, I 
describe the research structures and tools that entail in this research, including: 1) my research 
perspectives; 2) study site and sample; 3) research instruments and data collection methods used; 
and 4) qualitative analysis process, including the use of NVivo, qualitative data analysis 
software.  
3.1 RESEARCH INQUIRIES IN EMERGENCY EDUCATION 
Whether it is in an emergency situation or not, research and information management, including 
assessments, monitoring reports, case studies, or empirical researches, provide important insights 
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of situations to make appropriate and timely decisions in planning, implementation, practice, and 
policy development and adjustment. Especially in humanitarian assistance, the detailed 
conditions and urgent needs of the affected populations must be rapidly uncovered. As phases 
move from initial emergency to recovery, reconstruction and development, constantly changing 
situations need to be closely monitored and interventions should be adjusted accordingly. In such 
demanding environments, it is crucial not only to quickly access, share and record data and 
information that would dictate both operational and policy decision-makings, but also to develop 
relevant knowledge bases for future emergency responses. 
To frame the methodology for my dissertation research, in this section, I review the 
current knowledge-base management and research inquiries in the field of education in 
emergencies. I examine the advantages and challenges of both quantitative and qualitative 
inquiry methods and suggest the relevance of ethnographic approaches to study the context of 
humanitarian assistance. Lastly I discuss ethical challenges involved in conducting researches in 
crisis-affected situations.  
3.1.1 Knowledge base development in humanitarian assistance 
The international humanitarian community have attempted to improve the large information and 
knowledge sharing systems through rapid assessments, Cluster approaches for better 
coordination mechanisms, on- line situational reports and more (Holmes, 2007). In the field of 
education in emergencies, various information reference tools have been used to make critical 
operational and policy decisions. For example, rapid assessment is “to develop a sound 
information base” and “a plan for action” to respond to urgent and longer term needs of the 
affected communities (UNESCO, 2006). A situational report, which is known as sitrep, provides 
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a general overview of developing situations of the crisis and the progress made by relief efforts. 
Results of rapid assessments and situational reports are used to share common understanding of 
crisis-affected situations among humanitarian agencies, offices and donors (OCHA, 2002; 
UNICEF, 2005b). In addition, a few emergency education professionals produced in-depth 
descriptive case studies about complex educational experiences in various crisis countries and 
regions, including Burundi, East Timor, Kosovo, Pakistan, Palestine, Rwanda, and Southern 
Sudan.20 
All of these above information resources were developed from field observations and 
experiences, and used extensively by those involved in emergency programs. However, they also 
presented some challenges. For example, formats for rapid assessment and situational reports 
were often standardized and simplified with numerical data (See INEE, 2004; Sphere Project, 
2004; UNESCO, 2006; UNICEF, 2006b). These tools needed to be quickly and easily prepared, 
used and shared. As Darcy pointed out, however, characterizing complex situations through 
‘checklist’ approaches might limit understanding of the actual affected community as a whole 
(2005, p. 14). A solo focus on quantitative accounts makes the findings appear standardized and 
generic, overlooks critical issues of local contexts, and creates limitations or gaps in both 
immediate and long-term outcomes. These contextual issues and their multiplicity should be 
carefully examined to make most appropriate strategic decisions for both immediate 
humanitarian assistance and accelerating sustainable recovery and development of the affected 
communities (Burde, 2004b; Sobe, 2009).  
                                                 
20 Most of these case studies are available electronically at the UNESCO International Institute for Education Planning (IIEP)’s website - http:// 
http://www.iiep.unesco.org/information-services/publications/search-iiep-publications/education-in-emergencies.html (Accessed on September 8, 
2013). 
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In regards to case studies, especially focusing on conflict-affected situations, Rappleye 
and Paulson described them as “not simply objective accounts of the realities of conflict but 
fusions of evidence from conflict, dominant modes of discourse, and political imperatives 
particular to each given organization at given points in time packaged into the seemingly 
innocuous language of ‘best practice’ (2007, p. 255).” Use of ‘best practice,’ or ‘good practice,’ 
models seemed to have become popular among international humanitarian actors. However, a 
few scholars criticized that the dependency on best practice could obscure the complexity of 
local realities and relevance, and suggested not to rely on such rhetorical assumptions solely but 
to back them up with further critical scholarly inquiry and research using solid theoretical and 
analytical tools needs (Burde, 2004a; Rappleye & Paulson, 2007).  
Other researchers, in addition, discussed the technical and operational problems in the 
current information management practices in humanitarian assistance. In his study on OCHA’s 
SitReps (2009), Rabinowitz observed that information in sitreps were often not reliable or useful, 
or outdated, and attributed failures of leaderships, unclear mandates of each agency, and the 
culture of the humanitarian community to the problem. Hofmann (2004) also blamed the 
characteristics and circumstances of humanitarian assistance, such as: humanitarian workers 
were not equipped with skills and capacities to collect and interpret critical information; volatile 
environments in which interventions generally take place; lack of access to crisis affected areas; 
high turnover of agency staff; and, short lifespan of many projects. 
As A. Smith (2007) described as “an emerging field,” history of education in 
emergencies is still short both operationally and academically. Over the time, however, 
comparative education researchers suggested various study areas for the field of education in 
emergencies. In late 1990s, field specialists suggested to develop conceptual frameworks for 
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education “in disrupted societies,” including: general context and nature of violence in society; 
the root causes of violence; psychological effects; early warning systems; and effects on 
education systems (Tawil, 1997). In regards to schools and war, Davies (2005) proposed the 
following examples of research subjects: a) learning achievements (e.g., Mathematics and 
literacy); b) the ratios of military to education spending, and the link to stability; c) citizenship, 
peace and security, and democracy education and their impacts; d) teaching about conflict; e) 
resilient schools; and f) the relation of young people joining fundamentalist or terrorist 
organizations. Williams, furthermore, stressed that the relations between education and human 
survival and security should be recognized as a relevant subject in the current context of 
international and development education and human rights (2000). Yet, there are a limited 
number of scholarly researches available, some analytical, but not many theoretical studies 
conducted on education in emergency. Crisis environments, both armed conflict and natural 
disaster, are often hostile and complex, which make carrying out empirical researches on the 
ground and developing theoretical frameworks more challenging.  
Educational achievements in emergency situations are not only about the number of 
children accessing education, but also about what kinds of education they receive, how their 
educational needs are realized and more. However, all the knowledge-base development 
resources could directly influence the strategies to provide educational opportunities to children 
in need at their critical times and to rebuild and strengthen the education systems in crisis-
affected communities. Especially, it is critical for policy and decision makers to carefully 
consider types and use of information and knowledge both most relevant to represent realities 
and most useful to make timely and important decisions at the critical times of emergency 
responses and recovery and reconstruction efforts.   
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3.1.2 Quantitative measurements and qualitative inquiries  
As described earlier, many operational documents in humanitarian assistance were often 
supported with quantitative accounts of crisis-affected situations and humanitarian interventions. 
These numerical accounts can be quickly collected and formulated, and easily (almost 
universally) comprehended. For example, UNICEF’s Emergency Field Handbook provided an 
example form of the Rapid Assessment of Learning Spaces (RALS), through which basic 
situational information could be collected, such as numbers of classrooms, teachers, and pupils 
or availabilities of school furniture, supplies, water, and toilets (2005b). These quantitative 
accounts are relatively easy to cover areas, convenient to standardize the formats, and consistent 
to analyze. Use of these numerical descriptions became become essential for humanitarian, and 
often diverse, group to share common understanding of situations and targets, to which specific 
interventions and inputs are directly contributed.  
Hofmann (2004), however, pointed out that “a focus on measurement,” which is the 
product of Western result-based framework approach, “could reduce operational effectiveness, 
and lead to the neglect of issues such as protection and dignity because they are difficult to 
measure (p. 1).” He continued: “focusing on what is measurable risks reducing humanitarian aid 
to a technical question of delivery, rather than a principled endeavor in which the process as well 
as the outcome is important [italics added] (Ibid.).”  
 Doing research or collecting data and information in and about emergency situations is 
not a simple task. To interact with affected communities, or even simply observe their lives in 
refuge, researchers need to carefully consider complex nature of circumstances and ethical 
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concerns that emerge, such as: secured access to information or subjects; uncertainty of 
situations; data quality and accuracy; impartiality; and more. Because such complexity is 
involved, qualitative inquiries may be suitable to understand the multi-dimensional 
characteristics of, and relations between, affected communities and humanitarian assistance. 
Furthermore, the shift of humanitarian assistance from provision of basic survival needs to 
protecting human security or individual human rights made the field more complicated, requiring 
broader and cross-disciplinary, but in-depth and context-based analyses of conditions.   
It is, therefore, crucial for humanitarian practitioners, who are often outsiders to the 
affected communities, to be sensitive to the local contexts and historical backgrounds of 
emergency situations (Sobe, 2009). For example, as pointed out by de Waal, “humanitarian aid 
(should) fit into and complement people’s coping and livelihood practices (1997 [cited in Darcy, 
2005, p. 4]).” This should be the core principle in both development and humanitarian 
cooperation; not to create dependency nor undermine local social contract systems (Burde, 
2004b). Understanding what the affected populations experienced, how they see their own 
situations, and what they want their futures to be would help the humanitarian community 
provide more appropriate and timely assistance for prompt recovery and sustainable 
reconstruction of the communities.  
The positivistic approaches to utilize quantitative accounts are imperative, useful and 
suitable to measure universal values and outlooks of situations and interventions. However, 
focusing solely on ‘delivery’, or result-based framework approaches, may undermine valuable 
accounts of contextualization, local particularity and relevance, or even for root causes of crisis 
situations, which may be hidden behind numbers. Or, simplifying affected communities as 
‘numbers’ and stereotyping them as ‘victims’ of tragedies may undermine local existing coping 
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capacities, such as both individual and collective resilience. Thus, understanding of detailed 
contextualization, or lack thereof, can largely influence outcomes of post-disaster recovery and 
reconstruction. Under difficult circumstances like disaster-affected communities, various 
qualitative contexts are intertwined. Qualitative research could best help untangle these complex 
accounts for better understanding of the experiences and relations among those involved in the 
particular situations. In the following sections, I further review how qualitative research, 
especially ethnographic studies, can contribute to the educational work in crisis contexts.  
3.1.3 Relevance of ethnographic research 
In any situations, educational settings are where social and cultural norms and values are shared, 
communicated and learned, as Spindler and Spindler described as “education as cultural 
transmission” and explained:  
(C)ulture (is) a continuing dialogue that revolves around pivotal areas of concern in a 
given community.  The dialogue is produced as social actors apply their acquired cultural 
knowledge so that it works in social situations --- they make sense and enhance, or at 
least maintain, self-esteem.  Neither the knowledge nor the situations replicate 
themselves through time, but both exhibit continuity (1997b, p. 52). 
Even in emergency situations where humanitarian assistance is involved, this idea should not be 
forgotten. In such chaotic and complex environments, having the means to share and learn socio-
cultural values is one of the most meaningful rights that affected populations are left with. The 
idea of “(e)ducation … as a major instrument in cultural survival (Spindler & Spindler, 1997a, 
p.58)” is even more relevant in crisis situations.  
 Educational anthropologists described that ethnography “is primarily descriptive in 
nature (Fetterman, 1989, p. 139),” and “use(s) some model of cultural process in both the 
gathering and interpretation of data (Spindler & Spindler, 1997b, p. 50).” Even though it may not 
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be easily done in crisis settings, direct or participant observation is one of the important 
ethnographic research steps. Many researchers agreed on the significance of “being there,” or 
“being in situ,” and “ethnographic observation … that lasts long enough to permit the 
ethnographer to see things happen not once but repeatedly (Spindler & Spindler, 1997a, p. 66).” 
Geertz explained its importance for ethnographers in their relations with readers: “Ethnographers 
need to convince us … not merely that they themselves have truly ‘been there,’ but … that had 
we been there we should have seen what they saw, felt what they felt, concluded what they 
concluded (1988, p. 16).” 
Spindler and Spindler, and many other academic researchers, suggested ethnography or 
ethnographic research as an essential inquiry method for better understanding complex social and 
cultural interactions in communities (Fetterman, 1989, 1993; Spindler & Spindler, 1997a; 
Spradley, 1980). Ethnographic approaches allow researchers “to discover the cultural knowledge 
that (local) people hold in their minds, how it is employed in social interaction, and the 
consequences of its employment (Spindler & Spindler, 1997a, p. 71).” This is significant in 
studying complex crisis experiences. For example, Boyden (2003) explained that, when 
ethnographic research and knowledge about pre-conflict society and culture is absent, social 
norms, values, dynamics and power structures are often stereotyped, which could lead to 
undermining, rather than reinforcing, social reconstruction and healing. This suggests a need for 
far greater contextualization and ethnographic, or qualitative, inquiry of crisis-affected situations 
where humanitarian assistance is involved.  
 Educational anthropologists, furthermore, suggested that an ethnographer should enter 
study site with a fresh mind (Fetterman, 1989, p. 11), with flexible and open hypotheses, coded 
instruments, and categories of observation (Spindler & Spindler, 1997a, p. 68). However, 
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researches in the field of international cooperation often begin with already developed 
hypotheses and questionnaires, and their fieldwork schedules are pre-determined with limited 
flexibility. Nonetheless, researchers should attempt to minimize biases and prejudices and 
remain flexible to access rich and untapped sources of local knowledge and information. 
Ethnographic inquiry techniques and processes seem to be valuable applications in 
humanitarian assistance, or in the field of international cooperation in general. Spindler 
suggested:  
Ethnographic training can be very valuable for non-anthropologists and for people who 
do not expect to be professional researchers but who are directly involved in education. 
Ethnography can provide a sensitizing experience of great significance (1982b, p. 3). 
Humanitarian assistance is a complex field where the local populations, governments, external 
relief agencies and donors with different values and realities would interact and communicate 
one another. Educational anthropologists suggested that ethnographic approaches would help 
recognize multiple realities in multicultural environments that require better observation and 
more realistic interpreters of social interaction and communication (Fetterman, 1989, 1993; 
Spindler, 1982a, p. 496). Furthermore, Fetterman stressed the importance of ethnographers’ 
ability to communicate with their audiences as follows:  
(I)n delivering their findings to their various audiences … ethnographers must again 
observe and distinguish differing realities. Further they must speak in the several 
languages appropriate to those realities (1993, p. 1). 
To research about and apply knowledge to assist crisis-affected communities where humanitarian 
assistance is involved, one needs to be able to: 1) recognize multiple realities of his or her subject 
field; and 2) communicate the multiple realities that were observed with multiple concerned 
groups. For this reason, ethnographic approaches seem to be best fit to study education in 
emergencies.  
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3.1.4 Ethical and practical challenges in conducting research in emergencies 
Applying ethnography, or qualitative inquiry methods, to understand crisis contexts will not 
come without a challenge. Researchers must face and understand (ethnographic) ethical 
responsibilities. First of all, they need to acknowledge that, once they enter the field, the 
presence of researchers themselves may change the dynamics, relations, and even consequences 
in subject communities. Spindler and Spindler stressed that “the primary obligation is for the 
ethnographer to be there when the action takes place and to change that action as little as 
possible by his or her presence [italics added] (1997a, p. 66).” This is also one of the challenges 
in humanitarian assistance where the external community could ‘invade’ and influence social 
contracts and capacities of the affected communities, such as creating or increasing dependency 
on external assistance. 
A second challenge is ‘authority of research’, or “exercise of power” as Wolf described: 
The anthropologist listens to as many voices as she can and then chooses among them 
when she passes their opinions on to members of another culture. The choice is not 
arbitrary, but then neither is the testimony. … she eventually takes the responsibility for 
putting down the word, … I see no way to avoid this exercise of power … (1992, p. 11). 
As discussed in the previous section, it is important for researchers, whether 
anthropologists/ethnographers or not, to listen to local voices. In humanitarian assistance, 
however, voices of affected populations are hardly reflected in the operational and strategic 
decision making processes (Darcy, 2005, p. 8), while local voices and knowledge can be critical 
for sustainable effects of interventions. At the same time, there are rhetoric risks for those who 
transmit the voices to be perceived as “information source” instead, if they “manipulate truth as 
well as language” and “adapt to many audiences and many realities” (Fetterman, 1993, pp. 4-5).  
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The principle seems to be “informants first” (Spradley, 1980, p. 21), and not exploit them 
(Wolf, 1992). How ethnographies, or ethnographers, serve their informants, would all depend on 
how they “face the task of interpretation and cultural translation (Spindler & Spindler, 1997b), 
p.53).” As Geertz explained, an ethnographic responsibility, or traditional anthropological goal, 
is “transmitting the information from one culture to another with less puzzlement” or he describe 
as “thick description” (1973, p. 16). Wolf also agreed: “As ethnographers, our job is not simply 
to pass on the disorderly complexity of culture, but also to try to hypothesize about apparent 
consistencies, to lay out our best guesses, without hiding the contradictions and the instability 
(Wolf, 1992, p. 129).” Any researchers should be fully aware of their ethical responsibilities and 
risks. However, this is a more critical issue in dealing with qualitative accounts, which hold 
multiple possibilities of interpretation and cultural translation.  
In the context of emergencies, third, researchers may need to review and ensure 
additional ethical issues and comprehensive strict codes in conducting qualitative or 
ethnographic research. For example, Boyden (2000) suggested the following ethical and practical 
topics to be considered in conducting research with war-affected and displaced children: 1) 
informed consent of research and researcher; 2) clear expectations explained; 3) accountability 
toward interests of research informants (including children); 4) protection of informants from 
harm, or clear “do no harm” policy; and 5) respect for informants’ abilities. She explained 
another serious risk that “research is not a neutral exercise and, especially in the context of 
armed conflict, civil strife and forced migration, has considerable potential to infringe upon the 
privacy, well-being and security of its subjects (Ibid.).”  
Lastly, there are other practical challenges expected in doing researches about emergency 
settings and humanitarian assistance, such as: 1) access to study locations and subject groups; 2) 
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timing and duration of study; 3) safety and security of researchers; 4) logistic arrangements; 
priority; and 5) interests of the humanitarian community (OECD, 1999). These issues could 
affect decisions on research focuses and designs, considering what are feasible in given 
circumstances. Conducting research in crisis situations, researchers are required to be flexible, 
and adapt to different research process or methodological issues due to their subjects’ protection 
or their own safety.  
3.2 STUDY PROCEDURES 
Based on the methodological classification provided by Bhattacherjee (2012), I consider my 
dissertation study to be interpretive research. It takes a form of case study that reveals specific 
disaster experiences of daycare centers in Iwate, Japan in the East Japan Earthquake and 
Tsunami. Bhattacherjee explained: 
(C)ase research (or study) is an intensive longitudinal study of a phenomenon at one or 
more research sites for the purpose of deriving detailed, contextualized inferences and 
understanding the dynamic process underlying a phenomenon of interest (2012, p. 107).  
Thus, this study is expected to provide better understanding of how daycare centers in the 
affected areas protected young children from the disaster and their childhood experiences in 
post-disaster environments. 
In this section, first, I briefly discuss what is my epistemological and ontological research 
perspective from which this study was developed. Then, the study site and sample population are 
described, and I detail the data collection processes and research instruments that were used in 
the study. Lastly, I explain the processes that were applied for research analysis.  
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3.2.1 Qualitative and interpretivist research perspective 
The previous section showed that I am primarily interested in, and largely influenced by, 
educational anthropology and qualitative or ethnographic inquiry methods. Such methods help in 
“exploring the broader understanding possible in natural conversations and narratives, as well as 
examining the essential qualities within human experience (Piantanida & Garman, 1999, p. 
245).” Furthermore, I situate my ontological and epistemological perspective within the 
interpretivist research paradigm. Crotty (1998) defined the interpretivist (or social 
constructivistic) perspective as a view of how different groups of people construct, or do not 
construct, their realities. Piantanida and Garman described: “A basic tenet of interpretivism 
includes the notion that as reflective human beings, we construct our realities, for the most part, 
in discourse communities (Piantanida & Garman, 1999, p. 247).” Realities are not just ‘out there’ 
or ‘given’, but, through our interactions with others, society, events, and more, we ourselves 
individually and collectively construct realities.  
Referring to Burrell and Morgan’s sociological paradigms (1979), Bhattacherjee also 
described: 
(I)f (researchers) believe that the best way to study social order is through the subjective 
interpretation of participants involved, such as by interviewing different participants and 
reconciling differences among their responses using own subjective perspectives, then 
they are employing an interpretivism paradigm (2012, p. 19).  
These descriptions resonated myself with the interpretivist paradigm. I often find myself drawn 
to unique individual experiences rather than generalized and median states of the subjects that I 
study about. That is where I gain significant understanding of the subjects and their realities, and 
identify gaps and root causes of the problems. Piantanida and Garman pointed out that: 
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(I)nterpretivists do not claim that their research portrayals correspond to a general reality, 
but rather that interpretivist portrayals strive for coherence, which provides the reader 
with a vivid picture of the essence of the meanings of what is under study (1999, p. 247). 
Some of the data collected in this study may “correspond to a general reality” and the past 
knowledge in the field of education and ECD in emergencies or humanitarian assistance. 
Focusing on various qualitative accounts collected in my fieldwork, however, I hope to logically 
highlight and structures my discovery and understanding of unique insights and gaps hidden 
behind the obvious pictures of general disaster experiences. By taking the interpretivist approach, 
therefore, the research findings should help me develop some theoretical frameworks both 
unique to the case and applicable to other settings in the field of protection of children in 
emergencies.  
3.2.2 Study site and sample  
I chose Iwate Prefecture in Japan as study site for my dissertation research. Iwate was one of the 
prefectures most heavily affected by the 2011 disaster. It is situated in northeastern of Japan’s 
main island, Honshu, some 300 miles away from Tokyo. While the strong tremor reached the 
whole prefecture, whose area is about 5,900 mile2 (a little larger than Connecticut) and the 
second largest in the country, the tsunami hit the entire coastline of Iwate. Especially, the 
destructions in the six southern coastal municipalities were extremely severe and extensive (See 
Figure 7 for the map of Iwate).  
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Figure 7. Map of Iwate 
Adapted from “東日本大震災津波  岩手県保育所避難状況記録  - こどもたちは、どう守られたのか  [East 
Japan Earthquake and Tsunami - Survey study on the evacuation of nursery schools in Iwate: How were children 
saved?],” by C. Kondo, 2013, pp. 2-3. Copyright 2013 by the Japan Committee for UNICEF and Iwate Prefecture's 
Children and Family Division of the Health and Welfare Department. 
Prior to the disaster, the coastal area of Iwate faced modern societal problems, such as 
decreases in their total population, aging community, and declining birthrates (Iwate Prefecture, 
2011b). As for its economy, the inland southern part of the prefecture had successfully attracted 
a few industries in the recent years due to its accessibility from/to the Tokyo metropolitan area. 
However, economic development in the northern and coastal areas remained slow and income 
disparities were widening among different parts of the prefecture (Iwate Prefecture, 2008).  
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The March 11 disaster severely impacted the already economically and socially 
vulnerable area. Because of its unique geographical character 21 , government offices, local 
businesses and industries, and residential buildings were located in the limited land along the 
coastline, and were completely destroyed or severely damaged by the tsunami. Among the 
twelve (12) coastal municipalities directly hit by the tsunami, especially, the damages in 
Rikuzentakata and Otsuchi were extensive, lost their municipality buildings along with many 
government staff. Also, it was estimated that these two municipalities lost 7.6% and 8.2% of 
their populations respectively by the disaster (Iwate Prefecture, 2013). Even tsunami survivors 
lost their family members, houses, belongings, jobs, and many others.  
For the purpose of my dissertation, I chose to focus on the childcare support systems, 
especially daycare centers, in the disaster-affected area of Iwate as my primary study subject. 
During my assignment in Iwate for JCU, whose mission is primarily focused on protecting the 
rights of children, it had come to our attention that early childhood development (ECD) was the 
area where the timely and adequate governmental assistance was not given after the disaster 
(JCU, 2011a). 
In 2011, 353 government-certified daycare centers (both public and private) operated in 
Iwate Prefecture, enrolling about 26,146 young children of age between 0 and 5. Out of total 33 
municipalities in Iwate, 12 coastal municipalities were directly hit by the tsunami. Among them, 
the Iwate government reported that 18 daycare centers were directly affected by the tsunami – 12 
centers were assessed as ‘completely destroyed’ and 6 as ‘partially damaged’ (See Table 6 for 
the list of tsunami affected daycare centers in Iwate). At least 1,240 children were enrolled at 
these daycare centers on the day when the disaster happened. 
                                                 
21 In Japan, this saw-toothed coastline is known as rias coast. It is similar to fjord in the Scandinavian Peninsula.     
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Table 6. List of daycare centers directly affected by tsunami 
No 
Daycare 
center (DC) 
name 
Owner Capacity 
Damage Operational status 
(as of March 2012) Assessment (by Govt) Detailed condition 
1 Katakuri DC Public 150 Completely destroyed Washed away 
Reopened at the old 
building of Z DC 
2 Hanamizuki DC Private 90 
Partially 
destroyed Flooded above the floor 
Reopened at the same 
facility 
3 Hamanasu DC Public 90 
Completely 
destroyed Washed away Closed 
4 Kosumosu DC Private 45 
Partially 
destroyed Front yard side destroyed Closed 
5 Ajisai DC Public 45 Completely destroyed Washed away 
Reopened at R 
Kindergarten 
6 Nanohana DC Private 55 Completely destroyed Washed away 
Reopened at H Community 
Assembly Center 
7 Satsuki DC Private 60 Partially destroyed 
Large scale damage; First floor 
washed away 
Reopened at the old 
building of SN Kindergarten 
8 Botan DC Public 45 Completely destroyed Washed away 
Reopened at D Elementary 
School 
9 Ayame DC Private 60 Completely destroyed Washed away 
Reopened at a temporary 
school building  
10 Kantsubaki DC Private 90 
Completely 
destroyed 
Flooded up to the ceiling; 
Building structure remained, 
but assessed as “completely 
destroyed” 
Reopened at a temporary 
school building 
11 ShakunageDC Public 60 
Completely 
destroyed Washed away 
Reopened at a temporary 
school building 
12 Yamabuki DC Private 56 Partially destroyed 
Flooded above the floor at 130 
cm 
Reopened at the same 
facility 
13 Asagao DC Public 90 Completely destroyed Washed away 
Reopened at a temporary 
school building 
14 Himawari DC Private 90 Partially destroyed 
Flooded above the floor; 
exterior a/c units and heating 
systems damaged 
Reopened at the same 
facility 
15 Suzuran DC Private 50 Partially destroyed 
Partial foundation damaged; 
Window glasses, flooring, 
beddings, furniture damaged 
Reopened at the same 
facility 
16 Kinmokusei DC Private 30 
Completely 
destroyed Washed away 
Reopened at the old 
building of K Hotel 
17 Mikan DC Public 45 Completely destroyed Washed away 
Reopened at a temporary 
school building 
18 Sumire DC Private 90 Completely destroyed Washed away 
Reopened at the old 
building of Y DC 
Source: Iwate Prefecture, 2011a 
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For the purpose of this dissertation, I randomly assigned a pseudonym, or pseudo-name, 
to each daycare center listed as “directly affected.” In addition, I chose not to indicate their 
geographical locations on the map to protect their identities. Instead, I use general terms of their 
proximity to the shoreline and local geographical features to character where these daycare 
centers were situated relative to the tsunami.  
3.2.3 Data collection and research instruments 
After the earthquake and tsunami disaster hit east Japan, I joined the Japan Committee for 
UNICEF (JCU) in April 2011, and managed its emergency programs in Iwate for one year. The 
tsunami disaster severely damaged a large scale of local infrastructures and businesses and left 
almost no accommodations available in the affected coastal region. Because the coastline region 
was separated from the inland central area by mountains, JCU could only set up a temporary 
operational base in Morioka, Iwate’s capital. Thus, we drove for 60 miles of partially 
mountainous local roads, or 2 to 2 1/2 hours by car for one way, every day to reach the affected 
communities. 
 Because of my work as Field Manager, I worked with daycare centers, kindergartens, 
schools and local government offices in tsunami-affected municipalities on a daily basis. Initial 
introduction experiences were not always smooth, because many were under complete 
devastation and loss. Throughout the course of a year, however, I got to know and gain trust 
from many of the childcare workers, teachers, and government officials. Especially, because our 
organization was involved in the recovery assistance for tsunami-affected daycare centers, I built 
close relationships with their personnel. Furthermore, the year that I spent in Iwate gave me an 
opportunity to “be there,” take part of humanitarian assistance as well as local events and 
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activities, and observe how various groups of people were interacting in the situations. Thus, I 
chose the childcare support systems, or daycare centers and their stakeholders, in Iwate as my 
dissertation subject or study sample.  
My primary study sample group, or informants, was the personnel of daycare centers, 
more specifically the directors. They were also the primary counterparts in my work as 
humanitarian worker. All the relevant daycare directors were invited to participate in the study 
voluntarily – no mandatory reporting was requested. For each research collection process, 
furthermore, relevant groups of these informants were selected based on “non-probability” and 
“expert sampling” (Bhattacherjee, 2012). The directors were the representatives of daycare 
centers, and in the positions to lead and oversee their institutions. Thus, they were considered to 
be “more credible (Ibid.)” as study sample for my research.  
During the spring of 2012, I conducted a survey study about evacuation measures of 
daycare centers in Iwate (Kondo, 2013). It was a joint project of the JCU and Iwate Prefecture’s 
Children and Family Division of the Health Welfare Department (or the Iwate Prefecture 
Government [IPG from this point]). Because objectives of the survey study and my dissertation 
shared the similar concerning topics within the larger spectrum of protecting children and their 
childhood experiences in emergencies, I used the data and information collected through the 
research instruments developed for both projects. The research design and instruments were 
approved by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board (IRB) as an exempt study in 
September 2012 (PRO12040137). 
For my dissertation research project, I used the following four (4) main research 
instruments or methods: 
1) Multiple choice questionnaire survey; 
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2) Open-ended questionnaire survey;  
3) Face-to-face semi-structured interview; and 
4) Direct or participant observation.  
Both survey questionnaires (1 & 2) and interview questions (3) were developed based on: 
a) relevant literature and publications in the field of disaster risk reduction (DRR) in childcare 
institutes (All-Japan Federation of Private Kindergartens, 2010; Japan Society for Civil 
Engineers [JSCE], 2005; Kochi Prefectural Board of Education, 2012; Ministry of Economy 
Trade and Industry, 2012; Shizuoka Prefecture, 2012); and b) components of the Landgren’s 
Protective Environments for Children framework (2005). For this dissertation research, my 
primary interest remained in the qualitative accounts gathered through the above research 
instruments. However, due to the availability of both qualitative and quantitative data from the 
listed research instruments, I attempted to partially employ “mixed research methods” for this 
study. Bhattacherjee (2012) suggested the benefits of using quantitative data in interpretive 
research as: a) “quantitative data may add more precision and clearer understanding of the 
phenomenon of interest than qualitative data”; b) “joint use of qualitative and quantitative data, 
…, may lead to unique insights and are highly prized in the scientific community” (pp. 103-104). 
All the survey questionnaire sheets and interview questions are showed in APPENDIX C.  
There were a total of 353 government-certified daycare centers registered and operating 
in Iwate as of 1 March 2011, in which 26,146 children were enrolled (Iwate Prefecture, 2011c). 
Out of them, the following Table 7 shows the summary of study samples targeted and 
participated for each research instrument in the study: 
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Table 7. List of study samples by research instrument 
Research instrument 
Study samples 
Category/Criteria No of daycare centers targeted 
No of daycare 
centers 
participated 
(response rate) 
1) Multiple-choice 
survey questionnaire Daycare centers in Iwate 353 
263 
(74.5%) 
2) Open-ended 
written survey 
questionnaire 
Daycare centers in the 12 
tsunami-affected 
municipalities22 
93 73 (78.5%) 
3) Interview 
Daycare centers assessed as 
“directly affected” (e.g., 
damaged completely or 
partially) 
18 18 (100%) 
 
All research instruments were prepared and responded in Japanese, which was the native 
language of both study participants and the researcher. I maintained all the data entries, both 
qualitative and quantitative, in the original language throughout the research process. It was 
especially important for the qualitative accounts so that any meaning or nuances would not be 
lost. It was not quite possible to do “word-for-word translation” from Japanese to English, 
because of their different grammatical structures, therefore, I attempted to do “literal translation” 
or “faithful translation” between two languages (Newmark, 1988 [cited in Ordudari, 2007]). I 
also used the Japanese terms and descriptions in the text where appropriate.  
In addition to the information generated through the above instruments and my own 
fieldnotes (questionnaires, interviews and observation), I had access to a large amount of public 
references, data and information during (and after) the year that I stayed and worked in Iwate. 
These locally available materials included, but were not limited to: government documents; 
agency reports; media materials, assessment reports; researches; and many more. As 
                                                 
22 These 12 municipalities were: Rikuzentakata, Ofunato, Kamaishi, Otsuchi, Yamada, Miyako, Iwaizumi, Tanohata, Fudai, Noda, Hirono, and 
Kuji. They all locate along the Pacific shoreline.  
 84 
Bhattacherjee described, these “external and internal documents … (were) used to cast further 
insight into the phenomenon of interest or to corroborate other forms of evidence (2012, p.107).” 
In the following, I describe each component of the listed research instruments.  
3.2.3.1 Multiple-choice survey questionnaire 
The first research instrument, multiple-choice survey questionnaire, was developed to capture 
different disaster experiences across the whole prefecture. Iwate had entirely experienced the 
massive earthquake, and, even in the inland region, many faced subsequent power outage, food 
and fuel shortage, and breaking down of transportation systems. From my interactions with 
daycare staff in tsunami affected area, furthermore, I learned that they wanted other people to 
understand their experiences, or sympathize them: what was like to face such a severe disaster; 
or what they went through in the aftermath. Hardships in tsunami-affected area could be 
compared with the other areas as the survey was targeted across the prefecture. Because the scale 
of the disaster was enormous, ranges of disaster experiences could be relevant for the rest of the 
country, which is highly prone to serious earthquakes in future.  
 This multiple-choice survey questionnaire, therefore, was designed to be relevant to all 
353 daycare centers in Iwate, examining their general disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures 
and disaster experiences. The questionnaire consisted the following three (3) subject sections:  
1) State of pre-3.11 earthquake and tsunami disaster risk reduction measures and 
preparedness taken at daycare center; 
2) State of school when the 3.11 earthquake happened; and  
3) Evacuation measures taken by school after the earthquake. 
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I used dichotomous and nominal response formats in this structured, multiple choice survey 
questionnaire where respondents could answer with yes/no, or choose a relevant answer(s) from 
a set of options (Bhattacherjee, 2012).  
In collaboration with the Iwate Prefecture’s Children and Families Division, this was 
conducted as a self-administered mail survey where willing respondents filled and returned the 
survey at their convenience. It was responded by 263 daycare centers out of total 353, with the 
response rate at 74.5%. This high response rate could be resulted from the fact that the survey 
materials, including the introduction letter, were sent from the governmental office. However, 
the questionnaires were developed to be simple and comprehensive so that respondents could 
easily fill the survey.  
I used a computer-based spreadsheet/database software program, Excel, to organize and 
formulate the data sets from the survey. I primarily used simple formulations of sums and means, 
and each indicator was summarized as total for the prefecture, or disaggregated by region or by 
disaster-affected area or others. This was because main readers of the mentioned survey study 
were primarily daycare center personnel, and presentation of the data needed to be simple and 
easy for any readers to comprehend. For this study, I maintained the same formats of data 
presentation, because of the time constrain. However, I acknowledge, and recommend, the 
possibility of further quantitative data analysis, such as correlations among the indicators or 
comparing with other data from external sources.  
3.2.3.2 Open-ended survey questionnaire 
This second research instrument, open-ended survey questionnaire, was targeted a total of 93 
daycare centers in the 12 coastal municipalities that were hit by tsunami. Many of these daycare 
centers were not damaged or destroyed, but, whether directly or indirectly, all of them were 
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seriously affected by the disaster. Due to their geographical characteristics, which are known as 
rias coast, or saw-toothed coastline, these municipalities’ residential, business, government and 
industrial areas were concentrated to the limited low and flat lands. The destruction from the 
tsunami was severe, and affected many, if not all, populations of these small concentrated coastal 
communities. Many daycare centers experienced the massive earthquake, extensive evacuations 
and difficult post-disaster recovery conditions at first hand. Thus, the second survey was 
designed for these daycare centers in tsunami-affected municipalities to describe details of their 
disaster experiences in their own writings.  
This rather semi-structured, open-ended survey questionnaire was divided into the 
following three sections:  
1) Actions taken by school on the day of the earthquake and tsunami (in the chorological 
order - before, when, and after the earthquake happened on 3.11); 
2) Situations of the related individual items, including:  
a. methods of evacuation;  
b. evacuation points;  
c. food access (including drinking water);  
d. anti-cold weather measures;  
e. sanitary situations; 
f. staffing; 
g. condition of children; 
h. information access; and  
i. returning children to their parents/guardians; and 
 87 
3) Any reflections, opinions or other notes that they thought of after the disaster (e.g., things 
that should have been done or prepared before the disaster; things that school changed 
improved after the disaster). 
Based on the Protective Environment Framework (Landgren, 2005), these questionnaires were 
specifically developed to review the situations and environments where these daycare centers 
had to protect their young children from the serious disaster. 73 daycare centers responded, with 
the response rate at 78.5%. Same as the process of the first survey, it was also done in a self-
administered mail survey manner, sent by the government office. All written responses were re-
entered into separate Word files (.doc/.docx), which were imported to NVivo, qualitative data 
organization and analysis software, for further analysis (See 3.2.4 Qualitative Analysis for more 
details). 
3.2.3.3 Semi-structured face-to-face interviews 
The surveys were excellent instruments to collect data remotely, reach a larger population, and 
allow comparative analysis of subgroups (Bhattacherjee, 2012). However, they were limited in 
their content scales and structures: In the multiple-choice survey questionnaires, for example, 
options for answers were controlled; and, in the open-ended survey questionnaires, written 
responses could be simplified and omit detailed insights. Therefore, face-to-face interviews were 
a great complimentary method to allow study sample groups to explain and express themselves 
in their own terms. Furthermore, interview is an important data collection method for an 
interpretive research. Especially, face-to-face interviews were suitable to investigate rather 
severe and complex disaster experiences of those tsunami-affected daycare centers in a sensitive 
manner. As Bhattacherjee described, descriptive information shared by the interviewees, or 
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informants, helped me uncover both obvious and not-so-obvious, or “hidden reasons behind 
complex, interrelated, or multifaceted social processes (2012, p. 105).”  
Table 8. List of interview participants 
No. Daycare center (DC) name Interview participants Post 
1 Katakuri DC Ms. Kaori Emura Head Childcare Worker 
2 Hanamizuki DC Ms. Jun Endo Director 
3 Hamanasu DC Ms. Sayori Egami Director 
4 Kosumosu DC Ms. Ruri Tamura Director 
5 Ajisai DC Ms. Naomi Kariya Childcare Worker Ms. Akiyo Tonda Director  
6 Nanohana DC Ms. Ritsuko Chiba Director 
7 Satsuki DC Ms. Wakako Ota Director 
8 Botan DC Ms. Hikaru Yoshii Director 
9 Ayame DC Ms. Fumie Kitano Director 
10 Kantsubaki DC Ms. Shoko Maehara Director 
11 Shakunage DC Ms. Megumi Ueda Director 
12 Yamabuki DC Mr. Jiro Umemura Director 
Ms. Nanako Inagawa Head Childcare Worker 
13 Asagao DC Ms. Yasuko Inui Director 
14 Himawari DC Mr. Eita Omi Director 
15 Suzuran DC Ms. Tomoyo Rikuta Director 
16 Kinmokusei DC Ms. Ikuko Yamanaka Director 
17 Mikan DC Ms. Komachi Seto Deputy Director 
18 Sumire DC Ms. Usako Rikimoto Head Childcare Worker Ms. Masayo Mochida Director  
 
The 18 daycare centers were identified as study samples for the interview component. 
These daycare centers were either completely destroyed (e.g., washed away or completely 
flooded) or partially damaged (e.g., flooded above the floor level, or damaged to the structure, 
furniture, and equipment) by the tsunami. The reason why the interview section was focused on 
these “directly affected” daycare centers was because their disaster experiences were within the 
same or similar range, such as: a) disaster preparedness measures; b) immediate actions and 
evacuation conditions on the day of the disaster; c) actual damages to their facilities and recovery 
efforts; and d) challenges in post-disaster environments. For the interview component, a total of 
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18 interview sessions were held at 18 tsunami-affected daycare centers, participated by 20 
informants (See Table 8). For the dissertation purpose, each interviewee was given a pseudonym, 
or pseudo-name, randomly assigned by the researcher to protect their identities.  
The introduction letter was sent by the Iwate Prefecture’s office, and the researcher 
followed up with the interview participants by phone. At the beginning of every interview, the 
Information Sheet was provided to the interviewee(s) to explain “ethical principles in scientific 
research,” which included: a) voluntary participation and harmlessness; b) anonymity and 
confidentiality; c) disclosure; and d) analysis and reporting (Bhattacherjee, 2012). This was 
particularly important in my interview process, because their participations in a research study 
should not become any harm or additional burdens, psychologically or physically, to these 
daycare center personnel who had gone through the tragic event.  
I prepared the interview exercise in a semi-structure manner with the following five (5) 
subject areas:   
1) Disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures taken by school before the disaster; 
2) Situation of school and action taken when the earthquake happened; 
3) Conditions of school and changes/improvements made as DRR measures since the 
disaster; 
4) Any reflections on the disaster experiences; 
5) Based on the crisis experiences, any thoughts about:  
a. what would be the safe and protective environments for children even in difficult 
circumstances;  
b. what were the most important elements to establish and maintain the safe and 
protective environments for children; and  
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c. any obstacles and challenges to provide such safe and protective environments for 
children. 
My questions were developed in relation to the Protective Environment Framework (Landgren, 
2005) in mind. Furthermore, I developed this flow of subject areas with a few sample questions 
to guide me through the interview process, but also left some spaces or flexibilities in the 
structure. Having both structures and flexibilities gave me the following advantages in the 
interview process: Advantages to have structures included: a) Explaining the structure at the 
beginning helped the interviewee know what to expect in the interview; and b) I could simply 
follow the order of the questions, while being attentive to the interviewee’s response. Benefits of 
having flexibilities were: a) By observing interviewee’s responses and reactions, I could 
reorganize the interview structure and use different ways to ask questions; and b) I could let the 
interviewee expand his or her responses as they wished. 
Each interview was designed for one hour or an hour and a half, considering of the 
availabilities of interviewees. All interviews were carried out during the month of April 2012, 
after one year passed since the disaster, and taken place at interviewees’ daycare centers during 
their working hours. All interviews were digitally recorded using ‘Voice Memos’ software 
application of a MP3 player (e.g., iPod, iPhone or other mobile phone), and saved in the .amr (or 
“Adaptive Multi-Rate”) format so that these files could be imported to the qualitative research 
analysis software like NVivo. After each interview, I also recorded my own audio memos, 
reflecting: a) overall impression of the interview and interviewee(s); b) subjects highlighted by 
the interviewee(s); and c) any other matters that I noted after the session. These audio memos 
became part of my fieldnote and helped me recall the interview details and important subject 
points that had been highlighted in the interviews.   
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The recorded interviews were later transcribed word-by-word and filed into separate 
Word files (.docx). Based on the transcriptions and my post- interview digital memos, in addition, 
I made summary notes (.docx) as quick references. All these interview files were imported into 
NVivo for further classification and analysis of qualitative data.  
3.2.3.4 Direct or participant observation 
Observation is one of the core techniques in interpretivist or ethnographic research. Spradley 
described that participant observation, which is often used in an ethnographic research, involves 
two purposes: 1) to engage in activities appropriate to the situation; and 2) to observe activities, 
people, and physical aspects of the situation (Spradley, 1980). Bhattacherjee (2012) 
distinguished the difference between direct and participant observation as follows:  
1) direct observation, where the researcher is a neutral and passive external observer and is 
not involved in the phenomenon of interest (as in case research); and 
2) participant observation, where the researcher is an active participant in the phenomenon 
and her inputs or mere presence influence the phenomenon being studied (as in action 
research) (pp. 106-107). 
During the year that I spent in Iwate, the study site, I often found myself having multiple 
positions in relation to the local populations and communities: Japanese; non-Japanese; a 
humanitarian worker; and a researcher. As a Japanese, on one hand, I could speak the national 
language, understand the general Japanese culture, and even shared the same, or at least similar, 
sympathy and grief to the disaster experience with the subject populations. In this sense, I 
considered myself as ‘insider’.   
I, on the other hand, found myself situated in a unique position in the subject 
communities, because of my background and work. First, I was from Osaka, far from Iwate, and 
did not share the same regional dialects, histories or social-economic backgrounds with the local 
populations. Second, my own country sometimes became ‘foreign’ to me, and I often situated 
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myself ‘outsider’ in it, because of living overseas for a half of my life and using English as 
primary communication language. As an aid worker, lastly, I kept a certain distance from the 
subject populations and communities, and not emotionally involved. It was part of my 
professional practices to stay objective towards the assisting communities. Thus, I could not 
completely become ‘a local,’ or one of them, and somehow stayed as ‘outsider’. 
I would not call myself an ethnographer, but, as a researcher, I was both an active 
participant and a passive external observer, at the same time or depending on the situations that I 
was in. As I had often done in any places that I lived or worked in the past, however, I 
maintained ‘ethnographic curiosity’. I always enjoyed being in another culture, and observing it 
or taking part of it. In sum I maintained myself in a very unique position where I balanced being 
both an insider and an outsider in the study site  
Many of the observation methods, nonetheless, whether participant or direct, became my 
field techniques as both researcher and humanitarian worker. Those techniques, suggested by 
Spradley, included: a) using a wide-angle lens to focus on the most important data; b) being an 
insider and outsider; c) continuous introspection or self- reflection; and d) taking fieldnotes or 
record-keeping (1980). The questionnaire surveys and interviews provided a great amount of 
essential data and critical information to the study. However, what I gained from my constant, 
direct and participant, observation in the field were not only equally important inputs to my 
dissertation, but also valuable learning experiences for myself academically, professionally and 
personally. Having “been there,” regularly observed and often participated in local actions, and 
had informal and formal constant interactions with those involved in the concerned study subject 
somehow ‘legitimatized’ me, or gave me the ‘right,’ or even “authority,” to communicate what I 
had seen and experienced at first hand. As discussed earlier in this chapter (Wolf, 1992), 
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however, this ‘right’ comes with a power, which I came to appreciate but also constantly 
reminded myself of the danger to exploit such power in the research process. 
3.2.4 Qualitative research analysis  
By the term “qualitative research,” we mean … research about persons’ lives, lived 
experiences, behaviors, emotions, and feelings as well as about organizational 
functioning, social movements, cultural phenomena, and interactions between nations 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 10-11). 
For my dissertation research, I followed the Strauss and Corbin’s “Grounded Theory” that “was 
derived from data, systematically gathered and analyzed through the research process (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).” They further explained: “A researcher does not begin a 
project with a preconceived theory in mind ... (r)ather, the researcher begins with an area of 
study and allows the theory to emerge from the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 12).” 
Bhattacherjee concurred: “Qualitative analysis is the analysis of qualitative data” and “(t)he 
emphasis … is ‘sense making’ or understanding a phenomenon, rather than predicting or 
explaining [italics added] (2012, p. 113).” Miles and Huberman explained the qualitative 
research process and tasks as follows:  
(Q)ualitative research is essentially an investigative process, not unlike detective work, as 
Douglas (1976) has argued convincingly. One makes gradual sense of a phenomenon, 
and does it in large part by contrasting, comparing, replicating, cataloguing, and 
classifying the object of one’s study (1984, p. 37). 
On the contrary, Piantanida and Garman (1999) used more practical terms to explain the facets of 
“(l)iving with the (qualitative) study” as:  
• immersing oneself in the inquiry; 
• amassing the stuff of the inquiry;  
• slogging through the stuff;  
• coming to a conceptual leap; and  
• crafting to a conceptual leap (p. 130).  
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While the limited quantitative data were also available (as discussed earlier), nonetheless, I 
employed and focused on qualitative methods for my dissertation research “where a detailed 
understanding of a process or experience (was) wanted,” and “where more information (was) 
needed to determine the boundaries or characteristics of the issue being investigated” (Bazeley & 
Jackson, 2013, p. 2).  
In qualitative (and ethnographic) research, nevertheless, all of these processes and tasks 
may follow a cyclical pattern of investigations, or Spradley called “the ethnographic research 
cycle (1980).” He listed the tasks in “the ethnographic research cycle” as: 1) selecting an 
ethnographic project; 2) asking ethnographic questions; 3) collecting ethnographic data; 4) 
making an ethnographic record; 5) analyzing ethnographic data; and 6) writing an ethnography 
(p.29). After 5) or 6), researcher may go back to 2) and repeat the subsequent tasks, which makes 
the process “cyclical.” Spradley (1980) suggested that this cyclical process helps researchers 
“describe a wilderness area rather than trying to ‘find’ something,” and leads to “explicit 
awareness (p. 26)” of the complex realities where they research. In my analysis stage, I was 
constantly engaged in the circle of these detail tasks and inquiry process, which became crucial 
exercise for me to refine the research findings.  
To aid analysis of the qualitative empirical data collected in the field, I used a computer 
assisted/aided qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS or QDAS) program, NVivo10. This 
software allows users to work on different types of qualitative data materials, such as: interview 
transcriptions; summary notes; online materials; pictures; video and audio files; and more, 
simultaneously.  
Using a CAQDAS software program like NVivo also enabled me to easily apply various 
coding techniques to classify, organize and categorize the massive qualitative data available to 
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the study (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Strauss and Corbin suggested a few coding techniques to be 
applied for qualitative data analysis, including:  
• Open coding: The analytic process through which concepts are identified and their 
properties and dimensions are discovered in data;  
• Axial coding: The process of relating categories to their subcategories, termed “axial” 
because coding occurs around the axis of a category, linking categories at the level of 
properties and dimensions; and  
• Selective coding: The process of integrating and refining the theory (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998).  
During my research analysis process, I applied and mixed these coding techniques, as 
well as codes that were both “purely descriptive” and based on “more interpretive or analytical 
concepts” (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). For example, I initially applied the open-coding technique 
based on the Protective Environment Framework components, or what Strauss called a priori, or 
theoretically derived, codes (1987). These were used “as sensitizing concepts, rather than as 
fixed categories (Patton, 2002; Strauss, 1987 [cited in Bazeley & Jackson, 2013]).”  
Much of the entire process involved the constant selective coding exercises, and, as it 
moved forward, I also encountered in vivo codes that emerged as repeatedly used in the 
interviews (Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). For example, many interview participants 
discussed about the importance of resuming daycare programs after the disaster in general, but 
some highlighted why it was importance, such as: 1) daycare center was a safe and secure place 
for children; 2) it was also supplementary to their home environments; 3) daycare program gave 
a sense of normalcy in their lives; and 4) it maintained their care and development opportunities 
and experiences. These four points were highlighted as supporting, or sub-, categories to the 
parent node of “significance of ECD programs.”  
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Table 9. List of nodes coded in NVivo  
Node No of Sources (s=18) 
No of References 
(r=1,374) 
1. Disaster responses of daycare centers 18 328 
1.1 DRR measures 16 78 
1.2 Emergency evacuation of children 18 136 
1.3 Post-disaster recovery challenges 18 114 
2. Roles of ECD programs for children in emergencies 18 206 
2.1 Children's DRR skills & abilities 17 55 
2.2 Psychological support needs 17 61 
2.3 Significance of ECD programs 17 90 
2.3.1 Safe and secure places 14 27 
2.3.2 Supplementary to home environments 5 7 
2.3.3 Normalcy - Usual daycare programs 11 33 
2.3.4 Continuous development opportunities 13 23 
3. Childcare workers' capacities 18 153 
3.1 Caregivers' responses to the disaster 18 79 
3.1.1 Peer discussion and support 8 12 
3.1.2 Sense of responsibility for children's safety 18 58 
3.1.3 Post-disaster civic duty 6 9 
3.2 Disaster effects on caregivers 15 61 
3.3 Issue of staff allocation 7 13 
4. Family and daycare relations 18 259 
4.1 Family participation in DRR 18 53 
4.2 Safe return of children to parents 18 180 
4.3 Families' early recovery 13 26 
5. Community disaster response capacities 18 241 
5.1 Communities' support in DRR & disaster responses 18 119 
5.2 Risks in massive evacuation 17 96 
5.3 Mutual relations with the communities 12 26 
6. Massive influx of external assistance 9 18 
7. Governmental roles and responsibilities 18 169 
7.1 DRR standards & guidance for daycare centers 17 120 
7.1.1 Disaster warning systems 8 18 
7.1.2 Emergency preparedness standards 17 53 
7.1.2.1 Evacuation drills 17 43 
7.1.2.2 Facility safety standards 5 6 
7.1.2.3 Auditing 4 4 
7.1.3 Manuals & technical assistance 14 49 
7.1.3.1 Disaster response manuals & guidelines 12 27 
7.1.3.2 Technical guidance & evacuation support  13 22 
7.2 Post-disaster leaderships & capacities 10 25 
7.2.1 Assessment & assistance 4 7 
7.2.2 Guidance & facilitation 9 18 
7.3 Child-friendly disaster resilient community planning 13 24 
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Table 9 shows the final list of nodes, or coded themes, that I generated in NVivo. The 
number of sources indicates how many of the total of eighteen (18) interview participants 
discussed the specific subject matters, or nodes, and the number of references shows how often 
the specific subjects were coded in the interviews. One part of the responses in the interviews 
can be coded for different nodes at the same time, and different parts of one interview can be 
coded for the same node. As a result, 1,374 reference parts of the 18 sources were coded under 
42 nodes as shown in Table 9. I also utilized different query methods in NVivo (e.g., matrix 
query and text search) to examine relations among the coded thematic subjects, or nodes, and 
highlight important concepts. Thus, these classification methods helped me consolidate and 
structure the research findings and subsequent analyses, which will be presented in the next 
chapter.  
These coding exercises involved the “constant comparison” process that would “(imply) 
continuous rearrangement, aggregation, and refinement of categories, relationships, and 
interpretations based on increasing depth of understanding” (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 115). In 
addition, I also applied other integration techniques like storylining, memoing, or concept 
mapping (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) in the process of (re-)organizing, linking, and refining the 
research findings for better and clearer understanding of the study subject. These qualitative 
analysis exercises helped me focus on critical findings of obvious or not-so-obvious concepts, 
categories, reasons, relations, and interpretations from the qualitative empirical data collected. 
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3.3 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I first reviewed the current research inquiry and knowledge-base management 
practices in the field of education in emergencies. This discussion was focused on the benefits of 
both quantitative and qualitative inquiries in the humanitarian assistance settings, including the 
relevance of ethnographic research to examine crisis situations and unique challenges in 
conducting researches in emergency settings. Then, I outlined the methods and design employed 
for my dissertation research in detail, which included the reason why qualitative research 
approaches were relevant, or suitable, to better understand the disaster experiences of daycare 
centers in Iwate to protect children and their childhood experiences from the 2011 disaster.  
In the next chapter, I consolidate and present the research findings and subsequent 
analyses based on the data and information that I had collected using the research design 
framework presented above. My intention is to provide better understanding about the disaster 
experiences of childcare institutions, like daycare centers in Iwate, in the midst of a serious 
disaster situation, including how these daycare centers ensured protection of children and their 
childhood experiences and what the emerging issues and challenges were to support and 
strengthen their protective capacities for safety and security of young children in the 
communities.  
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4.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
In Japan, pre-school education is not compulsory, but UNESCO reported that its 2011 net 
enrolment ratio (NER) in pre-primary education was 88% (2014). The common options of early 
childhood development (ECD), or early learning, programs in the country are kindergartens (or 
youchien in Japanese) and daycare centers or nurseries (or hoikusho). They are administered by 
the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) and the Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) respectively. Both institutions share the objectives of 
providing appropriate care and education for pre-school age children (Ichimi, n.d.). Their 
differences are: 1) that kindergartens are focused on education programs and operate for shorter 
hours, which may not be convenient for children with working parents; and 2) that daycare 
programs are to provide care and educational services to children of ages 0-5 who “have 
difficulties to be looked after at home” (e.g., their parents work during the day or for extended 
hours) ("Child Welfare Act," 1947a; "School Education Law," 1947b).  
Table 10 shows the numbers of estimated 0-5 age populations and enrollments at 
kindergartens (3-5 ages) and daycare centers (0-5 ages) in 2012. Among the populations between 
3 and 5 years old children, a total of 93% were enrolled in either kindergartens or (government-
certified) daycare centers. Moreover, about 800,000, or 25%, of the ages 0-2 children were 
registered in the daycare services.   
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Table 10. 0-5 age populations and enrollments at kindergartens and daycare centers in 2012 
  Estimated Population by Age 
Enrollment at 
Kindergarten [Ages 3-5] 
Enrollment at Daycare 
Center [Ages 0-5]23 
 Age Number Number Rate Number Rate 
0                   1,068,000  - - 108,950 10.2% 
1  1,045,000  2,090,000  - - 689,675 33.0% 2  1,045,000  - - 
0-2                   3,158,000  - - 798,625 25.3% 
3                   1,074,000  442,508 41.2% No data24 - 
4                   1,070,000  566,985 53.0% No data - 
5                   1,062,000  594,732 56.0% No data - 
3-5                   3,206,000  1,604,225 50.0% 1,378,177 43.0% 
0-5                   6,364,000 1,604,225 25.2% 2,176,802 34.2% 
Sources: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2011 (for the population data); MEXT, 2012b 
(for the kindergarten enrollment data); MHLW, 2012a (for the daycare center enrollment data) 
In recent years, more parents of young children work and demands for the daycare 
services have increased. In 2012, 2,176,802 children were enrolled at daycare centers, against the 
total capacity of 2,240,178 nationally, at the occupying rate of 97.2%. 25 As a result, there had 
been problems of children waiting to be enrolled in authorized daycare programs, called “taiki-
jido or wait- listed children.” As of April 2012, according to the Ministry of Heath, Labour and 
Welfare, there were 24,825 children waiting for the entrance to government-authorized daycare 
centers, and the number increased to 46,127 by October of the same year (MHLW, 2013a). 
In addition to government-certified daycare centers, there are options of: 1) non-certified 
childcare providers (including one with evening services and ‘baby hotels’); and 2) employer-
provided childcare services (such as hospital-provided childcare programs) available for families 
with young children. Under the Child Welfare Act, these non-certified childcare providers are 
also required to register with and annually report their operational situations to local 
governments (1947a). As of 2012, totals of 7,739 non-certified childcare providers and 4,165 
                                                 
23 These numbers only included the enrollments at government certified daycare centers, not those at non-certified daycare centers.  
24 The breakdown enrollment data for ages from 3 to 5 years were not available from the same source. Therefore, they were not indicated here. 
25 At the time of reporting, the 2012 data were the latest comprehensive numbers available on the subject.  
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employer-provided childcare facilities enrolled 184,959 and 61,451 children respectively 
(MHLW, 2013c). However, these non-certified childcare facilities often do not meet all the 
governmental childcare service standards, and many are not eligible to receive public funding 
assistance. Consequently, local governments do not subside the childcare service fees, which 
often become extra expenses for families.  
As an attempt to solve the problem of “wait- listed children,” the Government of Japan 
created a third type of pre-school program called nintei-kodomo-en, or “certified child care 
center” ("Law regarding the Promotion of the Holistic Provision of Education, Childcare and 
Others for Pre-school Age Children," 2006). This certified child care center is designed to have 
both kindergarten and daycare program components so that kindergartens can expand their 
programs to provide daycare services, such as lunch, napping and extended stay. As of April 
2012, the registration of certified child care centers reached a total of 1,099 facilities nationally 
(MHLW, 2013d).  
These recent developments indicate that childcare and early learning programs play 
important roles in the lives of young children and their families in Japan. For this dissertation 
research, I have focused on the situations of daycare centers in Iwate, especially those in 
tsunami-affected area. Young children spend much of their daily lives at daycare centers, and 
their daycare experiences are critical parts of these children’s healthy development and well-
being. However, the 2011 earthquake and tsunami disaster put these young daycare children in 
grave danger. Young children could become vulnerable to various risks at the time of a disaster, 
because of their physical and cognitive abilities to respond to and cope with the crisis itself and 
post-disaster environments that may not be conducive for them.  
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In this chapter, I will first provide the overview of how daycare centers in Iwate had 
prepared for, responded to, and coped with such a serious disaster (4.1). Especially, I will 
highlight the success of evacuation drills as a governmental standard for daycare programs. Later, 
the challenges that daycare centers faced on the day of the disaster and in their recovery efforts 
will be discussed. In the second section, I will describe the conditions of young daycare children 
in relation to the disaster (4.2). Then, I will further detail important roles that daycare, or early 
childhood development (ECD), programs, played to ensure the (re-)establishment of protective 
environments for children during and after the emergency.  
 The disaster experiences of childcare workers in tsunami-affected areas will be portrayed 
in the next section (4.3). The interviews highlighted their strong commitments and hidden 
concerns to be responsible for children’s safety at the time of an emergency. In the forth section, 
a critical lesson learned from this disaster will be shared in regards to important daycare-family 
relations and shared understanding of children’s safety in crisis situations (4.4). I will also 
discuss the roles of daycare centers to help children’s families in their early recovery.  
When the earthquake and tsunami struck the Iwate coastal region, communities provided 
extensive support for daycare centers to protect children from the chaos. In the fifth section, I 
will contrast how neighborhood communities could assist child-friendly emergency evacuations 
but also how they could become a risk factor for children’s safety at the same time (4.5). Next, I 
will review how external communities, including foreign aid, national and international 
humanitarian organizations, and volunteers, fitted in this context (4.6). Although the interviews 
and survey results did not explicitly reveal in regards to the effects of external assistance, my 
field observation and experiences of working as a humanitarian worker provided detailed 
insights of critical relations between external organizations and local populations.  
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Lastly, the research led to a number of crucial issues concerning national, prefectural, and 
local governments in terms of their roles and responsibilities to support childcare institutions, 
like daycare centers, to ensure protecting young children from a natural disaster (4.7). I will 
discuss that governments’ appropriate leadership and timely assistance would be essential to 
make community environments more (young-)child friendly and disaster resilient for the future 
generations in the country.  
At the end of this chapter, to sum up, I will not only describe the disaster situations of 
daycare centers and their children in Iwate, but also identify the gaps and important issues in 
regards to protecting children in emergencies. Furthermore, I intend to highlight complex but 
critical roles of and relations among concerned stakeholders in maintaining and (re-)building 
protective environments for children before, during and after the crisis situation. 
4.1 DAYCARE CENTERS TO PROTECT YOUNG CHILDREN IN DISASTERS 
The records showed that the coastlines of Iwate, and of the Tohoku region, had been historically 
vulnerable to large-scale tsunamis, and local communities were aware of their tsunami risks 
(Iwate Prefecture, 2013). Local municipalities had taken various disaster preparedness measures 
in recent years, including development and demonstration of computer simulated possible 
tsunami scenarios. Based on the historic data and estimates, governments marked tsunami risk 
areas with signs, such as tsunami-shinsui-soutei-kuiki, or “Estimated Tsunami Inundation Areas” 
(see Figure 8) (MLIT, 2012). For example, 11 of the daycare providers that I interviewed had 
been aware that their facilities were inside the marked tsunami risk zones, but the other seven 
had not considered tsunami risks at their facility locations prior to the disaster. Nonetheless, the 
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2011 giant tsunami reached beyond these tsunami risk areas, and completely destroyed or 
flooded a total of 18 daycare facilities in the Iwate costal region. 
Figure 8. Street sign of the Estimated Tsunami Inundation Area 
 Adapted from “道路管理者における津波被害軽減対策検討マニュアル  (案) [The manual which examines 
measures to reduce the damage of the tsunami in the road manager (A plan)],” by S. Takamiya, J. Usami, & S. 
Kataoka, 2010, Technical note of National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management (582). Copyright 2010 
by the National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport 
and Tourism, Japan. 
All the daycare centers in Iwate, however, managed to safely evacuate the children who 
were under their care, or with their personnel, at the time of the disaster. In this section, I will 
review overall disaster experiences of daycare centers, including: 1) to what extent these 
childcare providers had prepared for emergency disasters like the 2011 tsunami (a before 
question); 2) how they managed to evacuate young children safely (during); and 3) what 
challenges they faced to re-establish their childcare programs after the disaster (after). 
4.1.1 Pre-disaster preparedness measures 
Article 6. (CHILD WELFARE FACILITIES AND EMERGENCY DISASTERS) 
1) Child welfare institutions must be equipped with necessary facilities and
equipment against emergency disasters, including fire control tools, such as portable fire 
extinguishers, and emergency exists, and others. At the same time, these institutions must 
develop concrete response plans for emergency disasters and make constant efforts to 
beware of and conduct training for such hazards. 
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2) In regard to the matter of training in the previous item, evacuation drills as well 
as fire extinguishing drills must be carried out at least once in every month ("The 
Standards for the Equipment and Management of the Child Welfare Facilities," 1948). 
The above Government of Japan’s order clearly stated child welfare facilities, including daycare 
centers, were responsible to ensure necessary emergency disaster preparedness measures to be in 
place. In the interviews, most of the daycare providers indicated that they had developed their 
own emergency manuals or procedures, and only a few referred that they had manuals or 
guidelines provided by local authorities or external sources. There were only a few public 
references available, or accessible. Some were governmental manuals (Kochi Prefecture School 
Board, 2012; Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry, 2012; Shizuoka Prefecture, 2012) and 
others were developed by private technical groups (All-Japan Federation of Private 
Kindergartens, 2010; JSCE, 2005). These references were available online, but most daycare 
providers were not aware of, or in need to search for, these information resources.  
It seemed more common for daycare providers to develop their own manuals and 
improve their emergency response procedures as they practiced. If necessary, they sought out 
local fire departments for technical advice. In addition, governmental inspections usually 
included disaster prevention and preparedness components, and different prefectural 
governments could have different specific auditing items and formats. However, they were often 
in detail, such as (but not limited to):  
1) Assignments for personnel;  
2) Emergency disaster prevention plans;  
3) Safety measures for indoor and outdoor facilities;  
4) Emergency and fire prevention equipment; 
5) Information dissemination to children’s parents; 
6) Community cooperation and coordination; and 
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7) Emergency and evacuation drills (Aomori Prefecture, 2014; Iwate Prefecture, 2014).
These items were developed based on the above 1948 Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare’s 
standards as well as the Fire Service Act (1948) and its related fire laws. In general, daycare 
providers followed and respected the inspection standards and processes as disaster preparedness 
measures for their daycare centers.  
For the survey questions on disaster preparedness measures at daycare centers in Iwate, 
responses were not always unified (Kondo, 2013) (See APPENDIX D for summary results of the 
multiple-choice survey questionnaire responses). For emergency evacuation, however, 98 % of 
them carried out drills at least once in every month (See Figure 9). As clearly indicated in the 
1948 standards, emergency evacuation drill was a concrete action that daycare centers could 
take.  
Figure 9. Survey result: Frequency of evacuation drills at daycare centers in Iwate (N=263) 
For drills, daycare personnel planned different scenarios (e.g., fires, earthquake/tsunami, 
intruder) and timings (e.g., play time, naptime, lunch time, etc.). Each person was assigned to 
Less than 
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month
1.1%
Once per 
month
84.4%
More than 
once per 
month
13.7%
Not 
implemented
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No answer
0.8%
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certain tasks, including being in charge to guide different age-groups of children, checking the 
fire safety, listening to the emergency radio, and making emergency calls. 
The interviews with daycare personnel further revealed that some of tsunami-affected 
daycare centers took creative initiatives to conduct drills. In addition to their regular monthly 
emergency drills, for example, Asagao Daycare Center, which was located only 500 meter away 
from the nearest port, carried out an extra evacuation drill dedicated to a tsunami scenario. The 
director, Ms. Inui, described: 
We made sure that our children would get familiar with the word ‘tsunami.’ At our 
daycare center, we called the first (week-)day of every month as a ‘safety day,’ which 
sounded easy for children to remember. So, when we said “it’s a ‘safety day’,” children 
would know that “it’s the day that (they) practice running for tsunami” and react quickly 
(Ms. Inui, Asago Daycare Center). 
Another daycare center carried out drills without telling either children or staff. Ms. Maehara, the 
director of Kantsubaki Daycare Center, which had about 90 young children on the day of the 
disaster, explained: 
When planning for a drill, childcare workers would say: “It would be good when children 
playing outside”; “It’s better at the normal care time”; or “We prefer to avoid lunch or 
nap time.” … But, I thought: “Wait a minute, whose evacuation drill is it?” I thought that 
drill should not be for (convenience of) the staff (Ms. Maehara, Kantsubaki Daycare 
Center). 
The study exhibited that these childcare providers had developed, and incorporated, disaster 
safety measures and response plans appropriate and necessary to their own daycare 
environments.  Especially, evacuation drills were fully integrated as part of their curriculum. 
4.1.2 Safe evacuation of young children 
The initial earthquake on the day of the disaster was unusually strong and lasted long. Many 
personnel at daycare centers immediately thought: “This is not (a) normal (earthquake).” It was 
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around the naptime, and children were in the beddings or getting up and preparing for afternoon 
snacks. As they had practiced in drills, children quickly went under the tables, or covered their 
heads with blankets. Directors gave instructions and classroom teachers prepared children for 
evacuation. Like drills, many stayed put until the tremor stopped. Others let children get out of 
the building, while the earthquake continued. Teachers thought that the ceilings would fall onto 
children.   
Once the initial tremor was settled, daycare staff carried out the roll-call of children and 
checked the safety of fire hazards. A few described that, because the earthquake happened at the 
naptime, they knew where everyone was and it did not take too much time to gather children and 
do the roll-call. Soon, families started arriving for their children and childcare workers checked 
and handed over children to their parents and family members. While aftershocks continued, 
most daycare centers quickly prepared and started evacuating to the outside of their premises.  
In the Iwate’s coastal area, all daycare centers managed to safely evacuate from the 
tsunami. In drills for an earthquake, they usually take refuge in playgrounds to avoid any falling 
objects inside the buildings. However, about a half of the daycare centers in tsunami-affected 
municipalities evacuated to the outside of their compounds on the day of the disaster (See 
APPENDIX D). This indicates that daycare personnel assessed and anticipated further dangers 
(in this case, it was a tsunami, or building collapse). Furthermore, their evacuation experiences 
were nothing easy, or more than what they had projected. Most of them began their evacuation 
processes quickly. However, the interviews revealed that a few daycare centers waited until the 
last minute, because they thought that their facilities were outside the tsunami risk areas. Others 
had to move to the higher grounds, or run and climb the steep hills, even after they had arrived at 
their primary pre-assigned evacuation places.  
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It was a cold day in March, and it started snowing. Daycare groups looked for or 
followed the neighborhood residents to safe indoor spaces available. The spaces that people 
could seek for shelters were limited. Quickly, local schools, hospitals and community facilities 
were set up as evacuation centers (c.f., schools and other community facilities are commonly 
assigned as evacuation hubs by local authorities). Others temporarily took refuge in places like: 
residential houses, small office buildings at construction sites, a closed textile factory, an unused 
hotel facility, and Buddhist temples. 
 The conditions of evacuation shelters were far from ‘child-friendly,’ or not ideal for 
young children. For example, local evacuees quickly overcrowded shelter facilities. People at 
facilities (e.g., principles and teachers at schools or staff at hospitals) organized spaces available 
for evacuees, and often prioritized the families and groups with young children to be assigned to 
the separate rooms from the rest of local residents. Some facilities had limited stocks of 
emergency food and water and heating equipment. Often, local residents whose houses had 
survived the tsunami brought in food items, blankets and oil heaters, and helped make makeshift 
kitchens for evacuees. Throughout the tsunami-affected areas, basic utility systems (e.g., 
electricity, water, sewage, gas) were damaged so that access to water was limited and toilets 
were clogged up.  
The tsunami also shut down the phone communication and transportation systems, and 
some parents could not come for or contact their children. Daycare personnel stayed with 
children until the last one was safely handed over to his or her family. The survey indicated that 
while all daycare providers in inland areas returned all children to their parents on the same day 
of the disaster, only 45% in tsunami-affected coastal areas could manage to do the same. For a 
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few daycare centers, personnel stayed with children up to one week until their parents could 
reunite with them (See Table 11 for the details).  
Table 11. Survey result: When did the last child return to his/her parent? 
 Affected areas (N=73) 
Other areas 
(N=190) 
During the business hours 
(e.g., by 7:00pm) 28 (38.4%) 171 (90.0%) 
During the same day (before 
midnight) 5 (6.8%) 14 (7.4%) 
Next day 17 (23.3%) 0 (0.0%) 
Day after next day 12 (16.4%) 0 (0.0%) 
Others 
3 days later 6 (8.2%) 
0 (0.0%) 5 days later 1 (1.4%) 
1 week later 1 (1.4%) 
No answer 3 (4.1%) 5 (2.6%) 
 
In the interviews, many expressed: “We thought that we could go back (to daycare center, 
after the earthquake).” They did not expect for such prolonged evacuation with children and did 
not assume the situation where parents could not come for their children. Despite many 
unexpected challenges, most of the daycare personnel described that they were satisfied with 
how they had handled the situations. Especially, they were pleased how their evacuation drills 
had worked at the actual disaster. For instance, Ms. Egami, the director of Hamanasu Daycare 
Center, which was washed away by the tsunami, was on personal leave on that day, but she 
rushed back to her school after the earthquake. She only found out that the building was empty 
and all children and staff quickly and safely had evacuated to the assigned location. She praised 
her staff’s action saying “the evacuation was perfect.” These examples indicate that, under such 
challenging circumstances, daycare personnel carefully managed each situation to execute safe 
evacuation of children. 
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4.1.3 Post-disaster recovery challenges 
While the East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster was a traumatic event for children, post-
disaster environments were nothing close to “child-friendly” either. Destruction in tsunami-
affected municipalities was enormous, severely damaging local governments, businesses, and 
industries, as well as road and transportation systems. Much of the residential areas also suffered, 
and massive evacuee populations overwhelmed local shelters. Schools, kindergartens and 
daycare centers were also affected and temporarily closed. While outdoor spaces no longer 
existed, indoor environments were extremely limited for children to play freely and run around. 
Some even suffered allergies or hives from living in evacuation shelters. The situations at homes, 
if they survived the disaster, were not much better either, because the neighborhoods were 
completely destroyed.  
Figure 10. Survey result: Basic utility service conditions after disaster 
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The basic utility services, including electricity, telephone systems (both landline and 
cellular), water supplies, sewage systems, and natural gas, were not only heavily damaged in 
tsunami-affected areas, but also impacted throughout the larger area of Iwate (See Figure 10). 
The disaster also affected the supply chains of daily essentials, such as food and gasoline.  
Under these circumstances, the situation was extremely difficult for daycare centers to 
resume their childcare programs after the disaster. Especially, it was a serious challenge for 
tsunami-affected childcare providers to find proper and safe alternative facilities for daycare use, 
because many buildings were damaged by the disaster or occupied by evacuees. Some had to 
start with the room(s) available, or provided, at evacuation centers, residential home, Buddhist 
temple, or vacant facility. Table 12 shows that most daycare providers in inland areas managed 
to reopen their centers a few days after the disaster, when it took a few weeks to more than two 
months for a half of the daycare centers in tsunami-affected municipalities to resume their 
childcare services.  
Table 12. Survey result: When did your daycare center reopen? 
Affected areas (N=73) Other areas (N=190) 
Next day (Saturday) 8 (11.0%) 75 (39.5%) 
2 days later (Sunday) 0 (0.0%) 2 (1.1%) 
3 days later (Monday) 20 (27.4%) 69 (36.3%) 
4 days later  (Tuesday) 6 (8.2%) 23 (12.1%) 
Others 36 (49.3%) 10 (5.3%) 
No answer 3 (4.1%) 11 (5.8%) 
Even after these facilities were reopened, challenges continued. It was particularly 
difficult for daycare staff to commute to work, because they had lost their personal vehicles in 
the tsunami and there was fuel scarcity throughout the region. Some temporary daycare facilities 
were not child-safe or child-friendly, did not meet the governmental standards to conduct 
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daycare programs. For example, children had to use temporary toilet facilities or standard toilets 
that were not made for young children. In some municipalities, water access was limited. At 
daycare centers, they used baby wipes to clean their hands and faces, and one daycare center 
used plastic wraps to cover plates so that they did not need to wash them after used. Because 
local businesses, such as grocery stores, were also affected, or because some temporary centers 
did not have kitchen facilities, it was difficult, or not possible, for daycare centers to provide 
standard full-day childcare programs, which should include lunch and snacks.  
 In the end, some childcare providers found alternative facilities and spaces like vacant 
facilities of kindergarten, daycare center, community center, and school. Others were assisted by 
aid organizations to build temporary prefabricated school buildings. Only a couple of them were 
temporarily closed or merged to other daycare centers where both children and personnel were 
also re-assigned.  
A couple of daycare centers rehabilitated and re-used their buildings, because their 
damages were partial. Nevertheless, it was certainly not an easy decision for them to re-use the 
once-flooded facilities, concerned of possible health and sanitation risks. Ms. Endo, the director 
of Hanamizuki Daycare Center, expressed her uneasiness of using the facilities that were flooded 
above the floor level: 
It was really reckless (that we did). It was unthinkable in a normal circumstance. If it was 
at a normal time, I don’t think that we could have done it. There was no fence (around the 
facility). But, once the situation became like this, because everything became not normal, 
what can I say... We thought that it would be okay, if we could do the minimum stuff. 
First, we paid attention to sanitary conditions (of the facility) so that we could give 
children some peace in mind for a certain time (of the day)… It started as we could 
protect, or make sure of, minimum things… It wasn’t like the situation that we had 
everything we needed. We couldn’t wait for that (Ms. Endo, Hanamizuki Daycare 
Center). 
Under such devastating circumstances, these childcare providers had to make out of what 
were available to them and adjust their curriculum and daily activities in order to provide 
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childcare programs for children and their families. The disaster changed the neighborhood 
landscapes, and the numbers of military and construction vehicles increased for recovery and 
reconstruction work. Because of both neighborhood and environmental safety concerns, 
children’s outdoor activities, such as daily walks, were limited, or carefully chosen. Inside the 
facilities, some had to accommodate multiple age groups in the same classroom space, and 
carrying out age-specific activities became difficult. It might not have been perfect, or ideal, but 
there were not many choices to make, and they needed to manage and cope with the situation.  
4.2 YOUNG CHILDREN IN MAJOR DISASTER SITUATIONS 
Between 2004 and 2013, as Figure 11 shows, while the ages 0-2 and 3-5 children’s populations 
decreased by 8.9% and 9.8% respectively, the enrollment in kindergartens also decreased in the 
similar fashion by 9.7%. However, both ages 0-2 and 3-5 children’s enrollment in daycare 
programs increased by 33.6% and 3.3% respectively. This shows that, even though the child 
populations have been declining, demands on daycare services, especially for younger children 
(ages 0-2), have been getting higher in recent years.  
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Figure 11. Changes of Ages 0-5 Children's Populations and ECD Enrollments in 2004-2013 
Note: Adapted from: a) For the population data, “人口推計: 各年 10月 1日現在人口  - 2011年  [Population 
estimate: Current population as of October 1 by year - 2011],” by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, 2011; b) For the kindergarten enrollment data, “幼稚園教育の現状  (平成 24年 5月 1日現在: 
学校基本調査) [Current situation of kindergarten education (As of May 1, 2012: From the School Basic Survey)],” 
by MEXT, 2012b; and c) For the daycare center enrollment data] “保育所関連状況取りまとめ  (平成 24年 4月 1
日) [Summary of the daycare center related situations (As of April 1, 2012)],” by MHLW, 2012a. 
In Iwate, its 2011 population of children at ages 0-5 was about 60,000 (Iwate Prefecture, 
2010a), and about 26,000, or 43 % of these young children were enrolled in daycare centers, and 
away from their parents’ care. As literature often discussed, these young children could face 
various harms and become vulnerable at the time of an emergency (Tran, 2011). Thus, what did 
these daycare children experience before, during and after the 2011 disaster? In this section, I 
highlight the following insights learned from my on-site fieldwork and interviews with daycare 
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personnel: 1) how these young children had prepared for a disaster like the 2011 earthquake and 
tsunami; 2) how the disaster affected them; and 3) why it was important for them to access 
daycare programs after the disaster.  
4.2.1 Children’s disaster response skills and abilities 
Daycare children, ages 0 to 5, are at early stages of their cognitive and physical development. 
Thus, in order to ensure their safety in an emergency situation, adults, daycare personnel in this 
case, must provide proper guidance and assistance to them. It was not a simple task because 
childcare workers needed to consider age appropriate disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures 
and practices suitable to children’s abilities. For infants and toddlers, they had to prepare 
themselves to carry and assist these young children physically in drills. They discussed among 
themselves what specific additional assistance infant class teachers would need from other staff 
members. (e.g., changing children’s clothes, putting their jackets on, setting up evacuation 
buggies, or carrying the emergency bags). They had even decided who would carry which baby 
or child so that they would not waste time at an actual crisis event. Ms. Rikimoto of Sumire 
Daycare Center, who was in charge of infant class, described that because she had known that it 
would take more time to prepare babies for evacuation she had started changing children’s 
clothes as quickly as possible.   
For older children, childcare workers teach them how to protect their heads from falling 
objects, how to follow their teachers, and how to run to safer locations. For younger children, 
daycare staff used safety-walking ropes that children could line up with and hold on to while 
following their teachers. Sometimes daycare directors timed how fast children could run and 
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reach to safe areas, made drills more fun, and motivated children to do better and faster next 
time.  
In addition to drills, daycare centers commonly used various learning materials as 
disaster awareness and prevention education tools. The survey results indicated that learning 
materials like children’s books, picture-story show, and videos and films were commonly used to 
educate children on earthquake risks (87% of all daycare centers in Iwate), but not many used 
materials on tsunami. Even in tsunami-affected municipalities, only one third, or 33%, of 
daycare centers responded that they had used the materials about tsunami risks prior to the 
disaster. 
Many daycare centers regularly invited firefighters, or police officers, to interact with 
children and organize learning activities (e.g., disaster awareness talk, fire fighting 
demonstration, joint evacuation exercise, or general security demonstration). Some daycare 
centers arranged field trips to local fire department buildings or disaster prevention centers. 
Literature supported the importance and effectiveness of learning about hazards even for young 
children:  
Despite their vulnerability, young children do have the capacity to anticipate, cope with 
and recover from hazard impacts. … Children’s resilience increases with their 
understanding about risks in the surrounding environment and knowledge of what to do 
when a disaster strikes (Tran, 2011). 
All the above activities seemed to have helped young children to get familiar with emergency 
preparedness and disaster prevention at daycare centers.  
Every year some new and different children would join in daycare programs, and 
evacuation drills needed to be re-introduced or started over. Childcare workers had to take 
children’s physical abilities into consideration when planning and practicing, including: how 
many infants and toddlers would need to be carried by adults; and how many children had 
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special needs (physical and cognitive). In drills, children sometimes joked around. However, 
daycare personnel often observed that, when adults acted seriously, children became serious and 
followed their instructions well.  
Ms. Inui of Asagao Daycare Center, which had been conducting an extra monthly drill 
specifically for tsunami, described that the goal of drill for older children was to be able to “run 
(or flee) on your own feet.” She explained that it was especially crucial for children of current 
generation to have strength in their lower bodies, because most were given rides between home 
and daycare center daily, rather than by traveling on foot.  
In the interviews, many daycare directors described that the evacuations on the day of the 
disaster had gone well as in drills. A few explained that the reason for the successful evacuation 
was because it was the end of the school year and children were familiar with the evacuation 
procedures. They expressed their concerns of how it could have been different if the disaster 
happened at the beginning of a school year when children were not familiar with the teachers’ 
instructions or their surroundings. Ms. Endo of Hanamizuki Daycare Center gave the credit to 
children’s abilities to follow and listen to their teachers. Because children knew the procedures 
from drills, they just needed to follow their teachers’ instructions and made the evacuation 
smooth and successful.  
Ms. Egami of Hamanasu Daycare Center, on the contrary, stressed that it was her staff’s 
prompt actions that had successfully evacuated their children, while only eight households out of 
total 600 buildings in its surrounding neighborhood survived the tsunami. She further explained 
that it was critical for daycare teachers to pay close attention to children’s individual capacities 
in daily activities (e.g., how quickly they could follow teachers’ instructions, move from one 
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location to another, or change clothes) so that they could assist those children who would need 
additional help at the time of a crisis. 
These findings show to what extent childcare providers considered details of children’s 
capacities to develop and incorporate their disaster preparedness measures. This was especially 
crucial because children in daycare centers were young and small, at early stages of their 
physical and cognitive development, and would require different guidance and assistance from 
adults. These detailed planning, preparation and practices helped childcare workers to focus on 
safety of children and managed to evacuate them from the disaster. 
4.2.2 “Tsunami-gokko” – Psychological effects on children 
When the earthquake happened, children initially made noise because of the sudden event. 
However, most daycare personnel told me that they did not make much fuss during the 
evacuation or complain despite the conditions. Some even noted that, when they heard some 
children crying at evacuation locations, they were not of their daycare children, but of 
elementary school pupils or other babies. They observed that some children were tense but 
seemed to be aware of the seriousness of the situation, and remained quiet. Nonetheless, when 
they reunited with their parents after long hours of waiting, many children finally burst into tears 
out of relief. 
During the evacuation, childcare workers tried not to let children to see the tsunami. 
Some of the children who left with their families might have seen, or even experienced, it. No 
matter whether these children witnessed the tsunami or not, nevertheless, the entire disaster 
experience affected every child to some extent. For example, some got panicked or unstable, or 
cried in the nights, even at home with their parents. At daycare centers, although they appeared 
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to be healthy and normal, some children became very sensitive to, or easily upset by, 
aftershocks, or even to the sound of wind.  
Himawari Daycare Center was located in central area of the municipality. There were 
embankments, which were erected to protect the town from the ocean. However, the tsunami 
came over those concrete walls, and devastated the central town, which was followed by fire 
outbreaks. Himawari Daycare Center was flooded up to the floor level. Many of its children were 
from the neighborhood, and lost their homes in the tsunami. After the disaster, they were forced 
to stay at evacuation centers or other temporary housing arrangements (e.g., relative’s home). 
The director, Mr. Omi, initially noticed that children looked still, without much facial expression, 
and he later realized that it was because of their home situations.  
Ms. Egami of Hamanasu Daycare Center told me the stories of two children who had 
difficult times at her daycare center in the beginning. One child could not drink a glass of water 
for a week, because he had been covered with the muddy water up to his shoulders on the fourth 
floor of hospital. Another boy had cried every day for 10 days, thinking that another earthquake 
would come if he took a nap at daycare center. In fact, on the day of the disaster, his mother 
could not come, and he was still afraid that she would not come when another earthquake 
happened. Even after a few months passed, the director overheard him telling his peer: “You 
know, at that time (of the disaster), your mom came for you (while my mom didn’t).” No matter 
how small or big their disaster experiences were, children remembered, and might have been 
affected by, what they had gone through in different manners.  
There was one common play or game that children at daycare centers engaged in after the 
disaster. It was known as tsunami-gokko, or tsunami play, in which children recreated the 
tsunami, or their disaster experiences, by ‘playing tsunami.’ According to child psychotherapists, 
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this was a normal, or common behavior among children after difficult experiences (Japan 
Association for Play Therapy [JAPT], 2012). Children gradually did less tsunami-gokko after a 
few months, but it came back around the one-year anniversary of the disaster. Adults might be 
worried to see children recreating the tsunami experiences, but literature said that children were 
dealing with, or expressing their memories by imitating the experiences, and that it was part of 
their healing processes (Ibid.).  
Many daycare personnel, nonetheless, were hopeful that, by coming to daycare facilities, 
playing with friends, and participating in different activities and events, children’s anxieties or 
fears would gradually go away. At the same time, some of them were concerned about whether 
these children’s psychological effects might remain with them or not, and who would look after 
their psychological needs as they grew older. In Iwate, the prefectural education department 
established continuous psychological state assessment systems so that each school could 
continuously identify and assist their individual pupils and students who might need 
psychotherapy, counseling, or other assistance in later years (Iwate Prefectural Board of 
Education, 2014). 
4.2.3 Significance of childcare programs in crises 
We want to make children’s daycare experiences enjoyable, and to switch their minds to 
forget about the disaster. This (new) place (where the daycare center was relocated) is 
surrounded by nature, so … children could play in the field every day. They were very 
energetic and healthy mentally and physically, and they didn’t look like the children who 
had experienced the disaster. They were full of energy and didn’t skip classes until the 
beginning of winter.   
We’ve provided good daily lunch to children. (…) Even though it may not be a 
“complete” meal, they ask for seconds and empty their plates. Their attendance has been 
better than ever. (I think that) it is due to the quality of our daycare program. Young 
children may not comprehend (the situation), even if we explain them verbally. So, we 
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think that it would be the best for children that we, childcare workers, give them lively 
and fun daycare program (Ms. Chiba, Nanohana Daycare Center). 
The disaster brought many changes and challenges to daycare environments, homes, and 
communities. Because their facilities were damaged by the tsunami, daycare centers had to 
temporarily or permanently resume daycare programs in new locations. Some of their temporary 
facilities might not be suitable, or designed, for daycare use (e.g., community centers or 
temporary pre-fabricated buildings). Because resources and materials that were required to 
operate daycare programs were not easily accessible, childcare providers could offer limited 
services (e.g., half-day services, lunch boxes to be brought from home, or no late afternoon or 
evening services due to no electricity or heating systems). There were some personnel changes, 
such as transfer, retirement, resignation, personal or sick leaves, or moving away. 
At homes, children experienced different home and community environments. Some of 
them had to move into crowded evacuation centers. Their familiar neighborhoods were destroyed 
by the tsunami, and both indoor and outdoor play areas were limited. This limitation might have 
affected children’s physical exercise and development opportunities (JCU, 2014; UNICEF, 
2009b). Also, challenging living environments might have caused children psychological distress 
(IASC, 2007).  
In such changing and challenging environments, re-establishment and sustainability of 
childcare support activities like daycare programs is critical for children: not only to help 
children go through the changes and adjustments in their post-disaster situations; but also to 
regain normalcy in their lives and continue accessing critical developmental opportunities. 
4.2.3.1 Safe and secure places at the chaotic time  
We were not sure whether we should reopen our daycare center at the same facility (after 
it had been partially flooded). But there was no place to go, and all community centers 
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and elementary schools were full of evacuees, like villages. We couldn’t risk putting 
small babies into those messy places. If only with children of ages 4 and 5, we might 
have considered using one of the rooms at shelter to resume daycare program. But, for 
younger children, it was not feasible. 
We wondered a lot what we could do. We called the health department and asked 
them what we should be careful of if reopened the facility. We also consulted the local 
welfare official. We thought that it would be better for children and staff to reuse our 
building than staying at evacuation centers. … Of course, we didn’t plan to stay here for a 
long time. But, we thought that there had to be a place where we could ensure children 
with even two hours of free time (from their post-disaster situation) (Ms. Endo, 
Hanamizuki Daycare Center). 
The above quote revealed how daycare personnel had come to the decision to resume their 
childcare program, while they struggled with the idea of using the once-flooded facility. At the 
same time, they realized that other limited options were not safe or conducive for daycare 
purposes, especially to provide safe and secure environments for young children. This was 
evident throughout my interviews, in which many daycare personnel described their efforts to 
make their daycare center as “a place that children can feel easy” or “a place where children can 
play safely” even under the post-disaster circumstances. Despite the devastating conditions and 
limited available resources, childcare providers in tsunami-affected areas focused on the 
importance of providing spaces where children could feel safe and have peace of mind.  
Initial measures that these daycare centers took after the disaster might not have met the 
governmental standards, but returning to daycare environments itself was significant for 
children. As playing with friends and spending time with teachers, children were relaxed, away 
from their difficult living conditions at evacuation centers or in the devastated communities. At 
daycare facilities, childcare workers could stay with children all the time so that they could feel 
safe and protected. 
In crisis situations, daycare centers could become additional safe spaces for children. 
Evacuation shelters, or even children’s own homes, might not be the most ideal environments for 
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children in the post-disaster situations. Ms. Rikimoto who had worked as head childcare worker 
at Sumire Daycare Center, which had been located in 500 meters, or 0.3 mile, away from the 
shore, described her assessment of children’s states after the disaster:  
Perhaps, there might be something that children couldn’t solve just by being at home with 
their parents. But, by doing realistic tsunami-gokko together with other children (at the 
daycare center), they were expressing themselves (or their disaster experiences). I 
thought that when they were in a group (of children at the daycare center), they were 
expressing the pain in their hearts (Ms. Rikimoto, Sumire Daycare Center). 
 Many childcare workers tried not to talk about the disaster with or in front of children, 
not to remind them of the experiences. At Kantsubaki Daycare Center, Ms. Maehara shared her 
observation that while adults were afraid of talking to them about the disaster, children closely 
observed their parents and daycare teachers and wanted to know what adults were thinking. She 
felt like children were asking: “Sensei [Teacher], we are thinking like this (about the situation), 
so what shall we do?,” and looking for solutions or answers from adults. It might be difficult for 
young children to fully comprehend what had happened and explain what they thought or felt 
about it. However, these insights of daycare providers indicated that daycare environments had 
become safe spaces for children to express themselves or share their concerns with trusting 
adults. This would not only help children’s healing processes but also maintain their healthy 
psychosocial development (JAPT, 2012).  
4.2.3.2 Normalcy - “Usual daycare programs, normal lives” 
It had not yet passed one week because the disaster, but, when we visited them at home 
or evacuation shelter, children had waited for us. When we saw them, they came to jump 
onto us. Because of such a (difficult) situation, it was important, but also necessary, for 
them to be with their parents for the time being. But we also thought that children needed 
to have their usual place where they could play freely (Ms. Endo, Hanamizuki Daycare 
Center). 
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Many children lost their homes, and stayed at evacuation centers or their relatives’ homes. Their 
daily routines and familiar environments were suddenly lost. Many childcare workers realized 
the urgent needs to re-establish daycare spaces for children to regain or maintain some sense of 
normalcy even under such difficult circumstances. 
Figure 12. Text search result of "保育 or hoiku [childcare/daycare (program)]" in NVivo 
In the interviews, many daycare personnel often used the adjectives in Japanese like 
“normal,” “regular,” “usual,” “ordinary,” and “everyday” to describe what kind of childcare 
programs they had tried to provide to children after the disaster. Figure 12 was the text search 
result of “保育 or hoiku [childcare or daycare (program)]” in the interview transripts, generated 
in NVivo. The following are three (3) examples in which daycare personnel used the adjectives 
of “normal,” “regular,” or “usual”26 in relation to holiku or childcare [italics added]: 
(A) “We couldn’t do normal stuff at the beginning. We really made efforts to make a normal 
childcare program (Ms. Ota, Satsuki Daycare Center)”;   
(B) “… we did a field trip (and other activities) together (with our sister center), so it was 
same as our regular childcare program, but children’s parents might not think the same 
(Mr. Umemura, Yamabuki Daycare Center)”; and 
(C) “We (daycare staff) came together as a group and thought what we could do to make our 
daycare activities usual (like before) even under such an inconvenient circumstance (Ms. 
Mochida, Sumire Daycare Center).” 
26 Often these Japanese vocubraries for “normal,” “regular,” “usual,” or “ordinary” are interchangeable. 
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Each response indicated how important it was for these childcare workers to provide “normal,” 
“regular,” or “usual” daycare programs to their children. Ms. Ota (A) described how it had not 
been easy for them to do the normal daycare activities because of the post-disaster environments 
and frequent visits of humanitarian groups and researchers. Mr. Umemura (B) was worried about 
parents’ perceptions of their temporary arrangement, which might appear to be different from 
their regular program. Ms. Mochida (C) further explained: “We (childcare workers) thought that 
letting children have usual experiences would be one step close to their regular lives.”  
Despite the challenges to adopt the new “not normal” environments, childcare providers 
made extra efforts to make their daily daycare activities as normal as possible so that children 
could get back to their usual routines and daily lives. For example, Yamabuki Daycare Center, 
which was in the crowded neighborhood of downtown, was hosted by its sister daycare facility, 
while its once-flooded building was repaired. During that time, teachers worked together to 
integrate the curricula from both daycare programs so that all children could enjoy familiar and 
new activities together. It had not been easy for childcare workers to make things as normal as 
they used to be, Ms. Egami of Hamanasu Daycare Center said. They became flexible and 
adjusted to what were available to them in the given circumstances. It seemed that many 
childcare providers had realized that, as challenging as it could be, doing “usual” or “normal” 
things, which do not need to be extraordinary, helped children feel a sense of normalcy in such 
chaotic and changed environments (Aguilar & Retamal, 2009; Machel, 1996; UNICEF EAPRO, 
2005).  
4.2.3.3 Continuous access to development opportunities 
Even though our childcare program was reopened in a temporary building, there would 
be nothing ‘temporary’ about it for children. It’s one year of each child. Children would 
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get older in their normal year (or pace) despite the disaster experience (Ms. Maehara, 
Kantsubaki Daycare Center). 
Many daycare centers could initially operate partially, but it was important for children to have 
spaces to play safely and freely, even only for a couple of hours a day. Once they could provide 
lunch and operate for a full day, childcare workers noticed positive changes in children. A few 
directors noticed such changes that, after they started to eat lunch and take a nap at daycare 
centers, children gradually returned to their “usual” conditions, and looked healthy and relaxed.  
Standard lunch (and snack) services at daycare centers seemed additionally significant for 
children in the post-disaster situations. Food provided at evacuation centers might not always, or 
at all, meet the nutrition requirements for the healthy growth of young children (MHLW, 2013b; 
Okayama Prefecture, 2012). Even at home, families had difficult times to access regular grocery 
for a long time because local businesses were also affected by the disaster. As part of its 
Emergency Response Programme, for example, the Japan Committee for UNICEF (JCU) 
provided supplementary nutritious food assistance to daycare centers in tsunami-affected areas 
until regular food supply systems were re-established (JCU, 2013). There was a nutritionist 
usually hired by daycare center as part of the childcare standard, and she or he could manage the 
daily menus for lunch and snacks.  Thus, at daycare centers, children could at least have 
adequate nutritious food, which might not be readily available to them at homes or shelters. 
 In addition to meeting children’s nutritious needs, it was important for daycare providers 
to provide different opportunities for children to learn and grow despite the challenges and 
limitations that they faced in the post-disaster situations. However, some daycare directors 
expressed their concerns of whether and how these limits might affect, or had affected, children’s 
learning experience and physical growth for the future. Text search of the term “経験 or keiken 
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[experience]” in NVivo highlighted the following interview responses from daycare personnel  
[italics added]:  
(A) “We (childcare workers) thought that letting children have usual experiences would be 
one step closer to their regular lives (Ms. Mochida, Sumire Daycare Center);”  
(B) “Now we don’t know what will be the results. But we thought that there were many 
things that we were not able to let them experience (Ms. Yamanaka, Kinmokusei Daycare 
Center);” and 
(C) “In regards to their age specific experience or development, we were certainly anxious to 
supplement for each of them (Ms. Seto, Mikan Daycare Center).” 
As the response (A) was already mentioned in the previous section, Ms. Mochida emphasized the 
importance of children’s normal experiences at daycare center as a step forward to the recovery 
from the disaster. However, both Ms. Yamanaka (B) and Ms. Seto (C) expressed their concerns 
that because of the limited resources and challenging environments, they could not have been 
able to provide normal and sufficient opportunities for children to learn, grow and experience. 
Childcare workers were concerned how children’s post-disaster “normal” care and development 
experiences, or lack thereof, would affect their futures, such as getting ready for formal 
education and having suitable capacities to keep up at elementary schools and beyond.  
A few childcare workers observed some positive outcomes of the challenging situation. 
For example, older children looked after or showed more empathy toward younger ones. 
Children managed to adjust to the changed, and constantly changing, environments, but seldom 
complained about the situations. As literature discussed, children can be “agents of their own 
development who, even during times of great adversity, consciously act upon and influence the 
environments in which they live (Boyden, 2003).” It seemed that, despite the challenging and 
limited environments, children demonstrated their resilience to stay healthy and grow alongside 
with their familiar friends and teachers at daycare centers.  
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4.3 CHILDCARE WORKERS’ RESPONSES TO THE DISASTER 
As the demands for daycare services increased, the roles of childcare workers have become more 
significant for the lives and growth of young children in Japan. The taiki-jido, or wait- list 
children, problem has become a serious concern for the working families with young children. In 
2013, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) developed a package of initiatives to 
solve this problem, and one of them was a measure to hire more childcare workers (MHLW, 
2013e). The childcare professional society also stressed the same issue to be solved immediately 
(Japan Day Nursery Association, 2014). Hiring more childcare workers should be considered 
along with other concerns related to the current working conditions of childcare workers. For 
example, one report described that the ratio of temporary hired, or contracted, childcare workers 
increased among the full- time daycare staff (National Childcare Council, 2012). Another survey 
study indicated that there were gaps in employment and sustainability problems in employees 
(Japan Day Nursery Association, 2014). Some of the college students majoring in childcare or 
early learning did not even apply for childcare worker’s jobs. At the same time, while some of 
the reasons why childcare workers resigned were: marriage; childbirth and childcare; and other 
family matters, others also listed: preferences for other jobs; staff relationships; hardships; and 
loss of confidence at work. 
The work of childcare workers, indeed, is not an easy one. They are demanded, or 
expected, to fill the care and growth needs of young children. Even in an emergency situation, 
they could be expected the same, or might have to do so even more. In this section, I will review 
what and how these daycare personnel responded to provide the protection to young children in 
the 2011 disaster. 
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4.3.1 Sense of responsibility for children’s safety 
As described earlier, the survey showed that almost all daycare centers had integrated monthly 
evacuation drills in their programmes. Additional interviews revealed how these daycare 
personnel went “the extra mile” to prepare themselves to protect children from crisis events like 
natural disasters. Many of them thoroughly examined each component of their emergency 
response measures, including evacuation plans, routes, and locations. They reviewed both 
children’s and their own performances after each drill. In case of evacuation off the premises, 
they took children for a walk along the evacuation routes to get familiar with the surroundings 
and check children’s physical strengths. Ms. Rikimoto of Sumire Daycare Center described that 
they had repeatedly practiced and examined all the elements of their evacuation plans and drills 
until they felt confident about the safe evacuation of children. For Ms. Yoshii, the director of 
Botan Daycare Center, it was the fear of disasters that had driven her to make sure that their 
emergency preparedness and drills were thorough and in order. Botan Daycare Center used to be 
just 250 meters away from the nearest fishing port, and when the tsunami struck, her daycare 
center was completely submerged and only the roof of the building was floating away. As a 
contrast, Mr. Omi of Himawari Daycare Center said that they had not paid too much attention to 
who does what or what to take in an emergency, because their only focus was “protecting 
children’s lives.” 
On the day of the disaster, daycare personnel carefully but quickly assessed the situations 
and decided the actions to take based on children’s utmost safety. For example, Ms. Kariya, the 
childcare worker of Ajisai Daycare Center, described that, when they begun the evacuation, 
daycare staff checked the surroundings and found that a nearby sidewalk fence had collapsed. 
Instead of going to the pre-determined evacuation location, they chose a safer route to the nearby 
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kindergarten facility, which was located a few meters higher than Ajisai Daycare Center. At 
Nanohana Daycare Center, which had been within the Estimated Tsunami Inundation Areas, Ms. 
Chiba, the director, immediately thought, when they heard that the initial tsunami warning was 
50 cm (just below 20 inches): “Even a 50 cm (tsunami) is not safe (for children), so we must 
evacuate.” What Ms. Chiba further said exemplified how these childcare workers focused on the 
safety of children: “We (childcare workers) would take the best and safest means for children.”  
These childcare workers took the extensive evacuation with young children, and some 
had to carry small children on their backs, and ran or climbed the steep hills. They kept 
consoling children to make them feel safe and told that it would be okay and their parents would 
come soon. Once the situation was settled, daycare staff went around on foot to children’s 
homes, evacuation centers, and government offices to look for children and their families and 
find out their safety. Even in these very challenging environments, they quickly attempted to 
resume daycare services so that children and their families could recover their normal lives.   
The sights and experiences of such giant earthquakes and tsunamis (and subsequent fires) 
frightened many daycare staff, but a few explained that because being with children, they had to 
be determined and evacuate as quickly as they did. Some even told that if only among adults, 
they might have overestimated themselves and stayed behind longer. In fact, a few staff stayed 
behind to wait for children’s parents, to check the facilities, and to lock the doors and windows. 
Ms. Ota, the director of Satsuki Daycare Center, described that childcare workers might tend to 
feel, and act, like a “super-hero,” thinking that “I must protect these children even by sacrificing 
my own life.” She realized that it was equally important for the adults to be safe and alive so that 
they could protect children when needed. 
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Childcare workers, nonetheless, seemed to have the strong determination and 
commitment for children’s safety, and it was highlighted in the accounts shared throughout this 
research. They were constantly conscious of the risks that children might face and made critical 
decisions based on what would be the “best and safest” options for children even when facing the 
disaster. These childcare workers seemed to have a strong sense of responsibility to keep 
children safe and sound, or protect them from any harm, while they were under the care of 
daycare programs. The head childcare worker of Katakuri Daycare Center, which was the largest 
daycare center affected by the disaster in Iwate, Ms. Emura described that childcare workers 
might need to become like children’s parents, if necessary, to give them peace of mind at daycare 
center:  
The first thing is to provide a sense of security (to children). Of course, we cannot 
entirely become like their parents, but, if anything happened, we will try to be like their 
parents, and make them feel safe while at daycare center (Ms. Emura, Katakuri Daycare 
Center). 
Her comment summarized that childcare workers had understood and taken their ‘in loco 
parentis’ roles seriously so that they could focus on protecting and taking care of daycare 
children during the disaster.  
4.3.2 Disaster effects on caregivers 
The 2011 disaster not only brought serious challenges and changes to daycare centers but also 
impacted childcare workers at personal levels in one way or the other. Many lost their homes, 
belongings (including their personal vehicles to commute between home and work), and family 
members, and these were extremely devastating experiences for them personally. From my 
interactions with daycare personnel just one month after of the event, it was clearly noticeable, 
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and understandable, that some of them were in states of complete shock and loss, with 
overwhelming sadness, or even anger.  
Even though they had experienced such personal tragedies, these childcare workers 
immediately returned to work. They went around to look for children and their families and 
checked out their safety and whereabouts. Some of the daycare personnel helped at the local 
evacuation centers, like looking after children, assisting other evacuees, or cooking meals. 
However, a few government-hired daycare staff had to take on emergency civil service duties, 
such as operation of evacuation shelters or registration of burials, which made difficult for them 
to return to their usual daycare work.     
To reopen or relocate their daycare centers, personnel repeatedly cleaned the tsunami-
devastated facilities and tried to find anything that they could salvage. Even after reopening 
daycare centers, or moving to temporary facilities, they were constantly worried about the safety 
of childcare environments and surroundings in the affected communities. In the mean time, these 
daycare staff also looked after their personal matters, such as looking for the lost items or 
missing family members, staying at evacuation shelters, and recovering and rebuilding their 
homes.  
These daycare centers in tsunami-affected area, furthermore, received frequent outside 
visitors. Some of these visits were to assess the conditions of daycare centers and provide the 
assistance in their recovery needs, and others came to raise daycare children and personnel’s 
spirits, or “cheer them up.” However, these visits sometimes altered the daily activities of their 
daycare programs. At Satsuki Daycare Center, which used to be located in the crowded 
downtown neighborhood, Ms. Ota had to ask her staff to “entertain” such numerous visits at least 
for the fist year of the disaster. These visits were out of generosity, and many daycare directors 
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expressed their appreciations for the visitors’ kindness, but childcare workers often needed to 
adjust their daily programs and curriculum to accommodate such visits. 
While I reviewed and coded the interview transcripts using the qualitative research 
analysis software NVivo, a few worth-noting overlapping themes emerged (See Table 13).  For 
example, 34 interview responses of the total 61 entries coded as “disaster effects on caregivers” 
were also coded for “post-disaster recovery challenges.” This may not be a definitive relation, 
but it shows that while many childcare workers were personally affected by the disaster, such as 
loss of their family members, houses and belongings, they also faced the responsibilities and 
challenges to recover and rebuild their daycare centers. For example, even though some of them 
did not know, or could not find out, what happened to their own families or houses, daycare staff 
stayed with children until their parents arrived. Despite losing their vehicles to the disaster, they 
also walked long distances, or hitch-hiked, to find out children’s safety. While they were coping 
with their own losses and suffers, these childcare workers made extra efforts (e.g., cleaning the 
flooded classroom floors, looking for an alternative facility) to resume their daycare programme 
for children and their families as soon as possible.  
Table 13. Overlapping nodes with “3.2 Disaster effects on caregivers” 
3.2 Disaster effects on 
caregivers 
No of sources 
coded (s=15) 
No of 
references 
coded (r=61) 
1.3 Post-disaster recovery challenges 12 34 (55.7%) 
2.2 Psychological support needs of children 6 11 (18.0%) 
3.1.2 Sense of responsibility for children's safety 7 13 (21.3%) 
 135 
Despite less frequent than the first example, many daycare personnel were concerned of 
children’s psychological well-being because of their disaster experiences. They were constantly 
worried about and watching carefully how children were doing. In addition, a few told me that 
even after the disaster was over, they still thought about they could have hurt daycare children if 
they had acted differently. Clearly the disaster affected these childcare workers both 
psychologically and physically (e.g., worried, concerned, nervous, tired, or exhausted), and 
because of the disaster, they seemed to be more concerned of, and taking more seriously about, 
children’s safety and well-being.  
Because of the disaster, these childcare workers had been constantly under different 
stresses, psychologically and physically. At my field visits, I often noticed that many daycare 
personnel seemed exhausted from the overwhelming situations. JCU and the Japan Association 
of Play Therapy (JAPT) provided trainings on psychosocial support for young children in an 
emergency to childcare workers in the tsunami-affected region. However, it came to our 
attention that those adults who provide care to children needed to be first assessed on their own 
psychological support needs. Ms. Egami of Hamanasu Daycare Center remembered that a 
clinical psychotherapist had advised her staff to take a break or a day off when they realized 
themselves becoming tired or exhausted. However, it had not been easy for any of them to take a 
day off because someone else had to fill in and no one wanted to burden others, she explained.  
After the disaster, a few daycare providers could not fill the vacancies, which also 
became additional burden to the existing personnel. This was a serious concern in the tsunami-
affected municipalities, because the population outflows increased and the housings and 
accommodations were limited in their region. To attempt to ease the stressful situations, JCU 
developed a series of projects to deploy volunteer certified childcare workers from the other parts 
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of the country to the tsunami-affected daycare centers in Iwate (JCU, 2012). The projects were 
carried out in the partnerships with the Childcare Workers Committee of the Tokyo Council of 
Social Welfare (CWC-TCSW) as well as the Japan Overseas Cooperative Association (JOCA). 
Initially, the CWC-TCSW sent its member childcare workers to the Iwate’s coastal daycare 
centers for a few days to a week. Later, the JOCA deployed its alumni members, who had 
worked as childcare specialists in the overseas projects, for longer assignments (from one month 
to a few months). 
This study does not explicitly show any gender effects in their response and coping 
capacities, although the majority of the childcare workers that I met were female. Not particular 
to their gender compositions, I observed differences among the tsunami affected daycare centers 
in how their personnel were overcoming, and coping with, their disaster experiences. At some 
daycare centers, different ‘degrees’ of their individual disaster experiences and impacts, such as 
losses of family members, affected the relationships among peers. At other daycare centers, 
personnel managed to overcome together the difficult times and challenges at both homes and 
daycare centers. Ms. Kitano, the director of Ayame Daycare Center, explained: 
It was because everyone was in the same position. … Because everyone was affected by 
the disaster, because everyone shared the same feeling (of devastation), things turned to 
be okay. I’m sure that each of us had difficult challenges at home, but everyone had same 
problems. … At the graduation ceremony, I thought that I was really glad to be in this 
line of work. If this were a normal job, I would have already given it up (Ms. Kitano, 
Ayame Daycare Center). 
Ayame Daycare Center used to be in the location only 100 meters away from the beautiful beach 
where children used to take a walk or play. Ms. Kitano seemed to value her job as ‘special,’ not 
only because they managed to protect young children from the serious disaster, but also because 
all the co-workers shared the difficult experiences and overcame such extraordinary situations 
together. Although everyone was affected by the disaster, their individual experiences and 
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coping processes could be largely different, which might become problems at these work places. 
Some daycare centers sought help of counseling from clinical psychotherapists, but others 
seemed to have managed among themselves. Either way, these processes were emotional for 
many, and the states of these daycare personnel could also influence children’s psychosocial 
well-being. 
Many daycare personnel expressed that returning to their own work and working 
alongside their co-workers after the disaster had significant meanings to them. Having children 
back at daycare centers also became the important encouragement and motivation for them to 
continue working hard for children. It seemed to be extremely challenging, but critical, for these 
childcare providers to and maintain the supportive relations among peers, and to (re-)establish 
healthy working environments for themselves to help each other for both individual and 
collective recovery from such a devastating event. 
4.3.3 Issue of staff allocation 
Many directors shared their concerns of whether or not the current staff allocations of childcare 
workers, or hoikushi, per daycare program would be adequate to protect all the daycare children 
at the time of another crisis. In the interviews, although it was not significantly different, the 
directors of public daycare centers tended to discuss their concerns of the staff allocation 
situations. According to the government’s standards, currently one childcare worker was 
allocated for 3 children at ages 0-1, for 6 children at ages 1-3, for 20 children at ages 3-4, for 30 
children at ages 4-6 ("The Standards for the Equipment and Management of the Child Welfare 
Facilities," 1948 [Last Amendment: May 31, 2012]). There were additional administrative and 
cooking staff per daycare center, and a few childcare providers were assigned as Childcare 
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Support Center27 , in which extra childcare workers were allocated. These extra hands were 
always needed, especially in younger age classes. Infants and toddlers, or children with 
disabilities, could not walk or run, or suddenly climb hills, at the time of an emergency, and 
completely depended on the adults. Most agreed that the more adults were in place the more 
children could be assisted in the evacuation.  
Even for older children, Ms. Inui of Asagao Daycare Center, suggested that, perhaps, the 
staff allocation should be reviewed based on the states of “today’s children.” She explained that 
many present-day children were raised among few or no siblings, and their socialization skills or 
cognitive development might differ from the past standards and require additional assistance.  
Although many daycare personnel were regretted to have let children go with their 
parents before the tsunami’s arrival, they also explained that they might not have been able to 
save the lives of all children in their daycare centers, if those parents did not come and take 
children away. For the governments, this should be one of the critical issues that they need to 
closely consult with childcare providers for appropriate direct and alternate solutions.   
4.4 FAMILIES AND DAYCARE RELATIONS 
In Iwate, as discussed in the earlier section, the user number of daycare centers increased while 
the number of enrolments in kindergartens decreased for the last decade or longer (Iwate 
Prefecture & Iwate Prefectural Board of Education, 2005). This was supported by the recent 
changes in household compositions, such as 1) the increase of woman’s participation in 
                                                 
27 According to the Ministry of Welfare, Labour and Health, Childcare Support Center, which is part of the Special Childcare Project, is the 
community-based service where the families with small children have access to various childcare supports, including 1) a place for informal 
gathering; 2) consultation; 3) information sharing; and 4) workshops (Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare, 2012b). 
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workforce, resulting in both parents working; 2) the increase of single-parent families, especially 
those with mothers as household heads; and 3) the decrease of household sizes (e.g., changes 
from extended families to nuclear families) (Iwate Prefecture, 2010b).  
These trends were generally seen across the country, including in the coastal region of 
Iwate. For working parents, these daycare programs play crucial roles to supplement or fulfill 
their children’s care and educational needs. Both parents and childcare providers must work 
together to best support young children’s healthy development and well-being. In the case of a 
crisis situation, this close relations between parents and childcare providers would become even 
more critical to ensure the safety and security of children all the time, and to help smooth 
transitions between home and daycare environments. In this section, I will discuss a few issues 
aroused from their 2011 disaster experiences in regards to how children’s parents and daycare 
providers helped each other to focus on the safety of young children in the crisis situation. 
4.4.1 Safe return of children to families  
The survey results indicated that, prior to the disaster, only 16% of the daycare centers in Iwate 
had carried out evacuation drills with children’s parents or other family members (See Figure 
13). Daycare staff explained that most parents could not attend because of their work schedules. 
Some daycare centers attempted to schedule drills during the hours when parents pick up 
children. At least, most daycare providers informed children’s families of their annual evacuation 
drill activities in writing or verbally, but not many had shared or discussed with families about 
their detailed emergency response procedures.  
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Figure 13. Survey result: % of daycare centers that carried out evacuation drills with parents 
On the day of the disaster, immediately after the earthquake happened, parents and other 
family members rushed to collect their children from daycare centers. After they were reunited 
with children, many families headed back home or to other locations before the tsunami’s arrival. 
Unfortunately, a few of the children who left with their families lost their lives in the tsunami, 
while there were no casualties among the children who evacuated with childcare providers,.   
According to the daycare personnel that I interviewed, although some daycare centers 
have provided pick-up and drop-off services in recent years, it is also a common practice that 
parents are assumed, or responsible, to drop off and pick up their children at daycare facilities. 
Furthermore, it had been common understanding between families and childcare providers to 
immediately hand over children to their parents or family members in case of a crisis. As for the 
duty as daycare provider, Ms. Rikimoto of Sumire Daycare Center explained: “We thought that, 
if we could not give children back to their families, we did not fulfill our responsibilities.” Many 
described that, prior to the disaster, they had thought that children would be safe with their 
families, and that, the more children were back with their families, the fewer children they had to 
protect from an emergency event. Whether they lost any children in the disaster or not, most 
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daycare personnel expressed their regrets to have returned children to their families and let them 
leave. They struggled with the thoughts of what they could have done differently, or that there 
could have been more casualties of children if the situations were different.  
Another situation that daycare personnel had not expected was that parents would not be 
able to come for their children. The massive destruction damaged the transportation systems, 
including roads and vehicles. Many parents had to walk long distances, or cross over some 
mountainous areas, to reach their homes or look for their children. Because some daycare centers 
had to move from one evacuation location to another, it became more difficult for family 
members to locate their children. Moreover, parents from the same families arrived for their 
children at different times, and they could not find each other after they headed homes or 
shelters. They were separated for an extended time after the disaster. It took a few days for some 
families to reunite.  
After they handed over children to their parents, daycare providers faced additional 
challenges to re-connect with children and their families due to the breakdown of the 
communication systems. Daycare personnel searched for children at homes or evacuation centers 
on foot, looked for their names in the governmental lists of evacuees, or put up posters. Once the 
cellphone lines were repaired, they could use the e-mail communication systems with families 
(e.g., e-mail list services). Yet, a few had difficult time to locate children and their families in 
such a chaotic time. Especially, as one director noted, some families, such as single-parent 
families or those without extended family support, could become vulnerable and isolated under 
such hostile environments. In post-disaster situations, childcare providers could play critical 
roles not only to check the safety and whereabouts of all children and their families, but also to 
monitor their individual situations and identify their assistance needs.  
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Based on these experiences, childcare providers reviewed and revised their emergency 
response policies and procedures in regards to the pick-up of children at the time of a crisis. Most 
of the daycare providers whom I interviewed had decided not to hand over children to their 
families while any disaster notice or warning was in effect. Even if parents came for children, 
families must evacuate first with daycare personnel. Furthermore, childcare providers noted that 
parents might put their own safety at risk to come for children. They requested children’s 
families to take safe refuge first for themselves, and come for children after the situation was 
confirmed as safe. Throughout the year after the disaster, these daycare centers discussed with 
and disseminated to the families about detailed information on their revised emergency response 
procedures. A few daycare centers even provided evacuation maps to the families or took 
children’s parents to the evacuation locations to get familiar with their emergency procedures. 
They ensured parents to know that their priority would be to immediately evacuate children to 
safe areas in case of an emergency. Ms. Chiba of Nanohana Daycare Center stressed: “At 
daycare centers, we would choose the best options for children. Even for a small tsunami, we 
would take the safest measure for them.” 
4.4.2 Daycare programs and families’ early recovery  
When we have children at our daycare center, their mothers will come to pick them up. 
Then, we could see how their mothers look or ask how their home situations are. When 
some families did not come out (after the disaster), we visited them at home to see how 
children were doing. If their mothers seemed to hold on to their children at home, we 
gradually told them that their children would like to play with friends (at the daycare 
center).  
In addition, some families were worried about the fees. So, we asked the child 
welfare official about the fee reduction, and informed parents about it. We encouraged 
children (and their parents) to come out to the daycare center and have fun, not just to 
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remain at home. Once children came out, we could also see the states of their parents 
(Ms. Inui, Asagao Daycare Center). 
Many of these childcare providers not only looked after children but also carefully watched the 
states of their parents and home situations. Even immediately after the disaster, some daycare 
personnel volunteered to look after children at evacuation shelters so that their parents could look 
for their homes and personal belongings or search for their missing family members. When 
daycare centers were reopened, childcare workers encouraged a few uneasy parents to let 
children come out and play with friends. Some other parents were worried about daycare fees. 
Especially, many disaster-affected families were suddenly in financially challenging situations, 
and accessing the daycare services could mean additional expenses to the families. Daycare 
personnel informed such families about the government’s guidelines for temporary fee 
exemption or reduction so that they could send their children to daycare services. 
At Shakunage Daycare Center, Ms. Ueda, who had retired as its director one year after 
the tsunami, shared several stories how daycare centers could support children’s parents in the 
post-disaster situations. She noted that one of the children’s fathers specifically asked the same 
and familiar teachers to look after his children. Ms. Ueda was also worried about a few parents 
who had faced additional challenges after the disaster: One mother took care of her teenage 
nephews and elderly parents because of the loss of her sibling; and another father became a 
single parent after losing his spouse. She seemed to have closely observed each family situation 
and thought about any help that her daycare center could offer to such families in need.  
Ms. Endo of Hamanasu Daycare Center also observed the similar concern:  
These mothers (and fathers) will become unstable from now on (one year after the 
disaster). So, as long as these families are with our daycare center, we (daycare staff) will 
be involved in every child (on behalf of their parents). 
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These childcare providers seemed to pay close attentions to children’s conditions as well as the 
family situations, which could have major effects on the states of children.  
Having children in daycare centers might not only have positively influenced the 
psychological well-being of both children and their parents (e.g., ease the stress), but also helped 
families to recover and rebuild their lives (e.g., start looking for housings and jobs). Ms. Seto, the 
former deputy director of Mikan Daycare Center, which had been flooded up to more than 1 
meter high on the ground floor, explained:  
These children have to rely on the daycare center – they are betting on the childcare 
program. So, it is important that everyone enjoys the time together, without any worry. 
Then, we think that their parents could work peacefully, which would impact on their 
lives as well (Ms. Seto, Mikan Daycare Center). 
In post crisis situations, to help children get back to their normalcy could also help their families 
to quickly rebuild their lives and return to their work. Although it may not be definitive, the table 
below could be another indicator of the same (See Table 14). Among the 26 references coded 
under the node of “families’ early recovery,” 12 references were also coded to the nodes of 
“psychological support needs of children” and “significance of ECD programs” each 
respectively. Some of the daycare personnel emphasized that if children returned to daycare 
centers and enjoyed spending time with friends and teachers, their parents could focus on their 
family recovery. Moreover, while congested shelters or small temporary housing units could not 
be comfortable for anyone, parents could have peace in mind that daycare centers looked after 
their children in the safe and protected, and spacy and sanitary, environments.  
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Table 14. Overlapping nodes with “4.3 Families’ early recovery” 
4.3 Families' early recovery 
No of 
overlapping 
sources coded 
(s=13) 
No of 
overlapping 
references coded 
(r=26) 
2.2 Psychological support needs of children 8 12 (46.2%) 
2.3 Significance of ECD programs 8 12 (46.2%) 
I still remember the day when Kantsubaki Daycare Center, which was submerged up to 
the ceiling height by the tsunami water, resumed at a temporary school building, which was 
assisted by the Japan Committee for UNICEF (JCU). It was such a symbolic day because the 
parents who dropped off their children looked so relieved to see their children with familiar 
teachers and friends, and they could then focus on rebuilding their own and family lives. In post-
emergencies, the re-establishment of childcare and educational institutions like daycare centers 
should be the first step, and one of the priority areas, to achieve the rapid recovery and rebuilding 
of family lives in the affected communities.   
After the disaster, daycare providers developed safer emergency evacuation policies and 
procedures to share with the families. As for parents, they paid more careful attention to the 
emergency response measures at daycare centers. Many daycare personnel commented that 
parents had become more actively involved in the activities at daycare centers (e.g., parent 
associations, volunteering) and communicated more with daycare personnel about their family 
situations and children’s conditions at homes. These closer and stronger relations between 
childcare providers and parents should be noted as one of the critical elements to make sure of 
protective environments for children between homes and daycare facilities at the time of a crisis. 
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4.5 COMMUNITY COOPERATION  
Prior to the disaster, I had never traveled to the coastal area of Iwate, let alone to Morioka, the 
prefectural capital. It has the unique and beautiful coastlines facing the Pacific Ocean. The region 
is part of the Sanriku coast, which was well known for its rich fishing grounds and established 
fishery industries. However, the recent demographic changes, including 1) declining populations; 
2) declining birthrates; and 3) aging communities, have heavily affected these remote fishery 
communities (Iwate Prefecture, 2011b). Furthermore, the economic development in the northern 
and coastal areas of Iwate remained slow, and their individual income averages continued to be 
lower than the central and southern regions (Iwate Prefecture, 2008). 
Tohoku, or northeastern regional, people are often described as being reserved and 
humble. It could take time for outsiders to get to know them or earn their trust. After the disaster, 
moreover, the true characters of these communities were masked by the senses of loss and grief. 
Most of the people whom I met in the tsunami-affected area looked completely lost, devastated, 
heavily stressed, frustrated, and angry. At the beginning, it was equally difficult for me: to 
imagine how these coastal communities had looked before the tsunami; and to ‘figure out’ how 
these communities used to interact with each other. However, the more time I spent with them, 
the more comfortable and familiar the local partners and counterparts became with me (and the 
organization for which I worked, the Japan Committee for UNICEF [JCU]).  
I gradually learned that each of these communities was a small, tight knitted community 
where everyone knew everyone, and they valued the protection of their children, future 
generations of the communities. This was highlighted at one community meeting that JCU 
organized to discuss the future of children in the communities. At the meeting, local participants, 
including (grand-)parents, teachers, childcare workers, and community leaders, described that 
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they always felt like “the community is raising children in the neighborhoods.”28 This showed 
how strong their neighborhood ties were in these remote and small tsunami-affected 
communities.  
In such local environments and cultures, the cooperation with and support from the local 
communities would be one of the formulas for daycare providers to ensure the protection of 
young children in the local neighborhoods. In an emergency, without these protective relations 
with the communities, small children of daycare centers might be exposed to safety risks or other 
harm. In this section, I will exemplify the importance of community relations for childcare 
institutions in crisis situations.   
4.5.1 Watchful eyes of local residents 
The coastline municipalities in Iwate were prone to tsunami risks when earthquakes occurred in 
the Pacific Ocean. Local governments organized annual evacuation drills in which daycare 
personnel also participated. Some neighborhood communities formed self-administered disaster 
response groups to manage community- level activities, such as drills, development of disaster 
response manuals, and installation of emergency stock storages. Prior to the disaster, a few 
daycare centers had some community volunteers who could assist in their drills (e.g., community 
guard/watch group, or mimamori-tai, at Mikan Daycare Center), but many found it difficult to 
identify the local residents who could help. Most of the neighborhood residents worked during 
the day. Even if there were any, they were often assigned to other emergency duties, such as 
28 From the meeting note prepared after the community meeting to discuss the reconstruction assistance for children  [子どものための復興支援
を考える青空座談会], at  the Kissho-ji temple, Kirikiri, Otsuchi, on June 30, 2011 (15:00-17:00). 
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members of the neighborhood self-governing bodies or community fire fighter volunteers. 
Moreover, those who remained at homes during the day were often elderly.  
On the day of the disaster, nonetheless, many community members helped the evacuation 
of daycare children in one way or another. Neighborhood residents, nearby office workers, or 
local middle school students assisted young daycare children by holding hands, helping them 
climb the steep hills or fences, or pushing buggies packed with toddlers. Local firefighters and 
neighborhood emergency response teams guided the evacuation of daycare groups. Some local 
residents gave children rides to evacuation locations or opened their homes for them to take 
refuge.  
There were a few remarkable stories that the community’s disaster risk awareness led to 
save children’s lives. At Omoto Elementary School in Iwaizumi-cho, neighborhood residents 
noted that the school’s original evacuation route was not safe because it passed the Estimated 
Tsunami Inundation Area. Subsequently, their discussion with the municipality’s authority 
resulted in the construction of evacuation stairs that connected straight from the school buildings 
to the higher ground. On the day of the disaster, a total of 88 school pupils safely evacuated 
through the stairs (Iwate Prefecture, 2013). This was a great example that the community 
initiative could impact the safety of children in emergencies.  
As the seriousness of the disaster became evident, evacuation centers were quickly 
established. Many local residents, including evacuees themselves, volunteered to manage the 
shelters, set up the rules of how to use the facilities, take turns as night guard to keep everyone 
safe, and prepare food. At shelters, young children were given the priority in the room 
assignments as well as the distributions of food, water, blankets, and heaters, if available. Many 
local residents gave them candies, snacks or even hand warmers for comfort. If any doctors were 
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present at shelter locations, they frequently checked on children and responded to their medical 
needs if necessary. In the testimonies by daycare personnel, there were many such examples that 
the communities looked after daycare children during the emergency evacuation.  
4.5.2 Risks in massive evacuation 
The 2011 disaster caused massive evacuations of local residents, which could have become 
additional harms or risks to young and small children of daycare centers. First, large-scale 
evacuation could cause confusion during evacuations and separate the groups of daycare children 
and personnel. Ms. Emura of Katakuri Daycare Center described that, because the nearby 
elementary school groups had been also evacuating on the same routes, some daycare children 
followed those elementary school pupils to the different locations. Furthermore, a few daycare 
groups were also temporarily separated during their evacuations (e.g., Nanohana and Hamanasu 
Daycare Centers). Local residents kindly provided rides to daycare personnel and children to 
shelters, but, because they had to be divided into different vehicles, drivers were confused and 
some of them arrived in different locations.  
Second, there were risks for young children to be pushed, or become vulnerable to 
injuries in massive and sudden movements of large evacuee groups. For example, Ms. Inui of 
Asagao Daycare Center explained that they had kept their children stay outside until it became 
dark. Although neighborhood residents took refuge inside the temple, she was fear of the 
aftershocks that might trigger the other evacuees to suddenly move and crush or injure children. 
The other daycare personnel also agreed that they had moved their children away from the 
crowds due to the fear for children’s safety.   
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 Third, daycare personnel constantly evaluated the shelter environments. Most of the 
daycare centers that took refuge in community evacuation shelters experienced the deterioration 
of sanitary conditions (e.g., no electricity to pump water, or overflowed and clogged toilets). 
Daycare staff often assessed that it was not safe for children to use the sanitary facilities at 
shelters. In addition, due to the limited availabilities of (emergency) food and drinking water, 
some of the daycare groups did not have enough food and drinking water for their children. 
There were a few reports that some children had become sick from dehydration.   
 Massive evacuation of local populations could be additional risks for anyone, but 
especially it became a serious concern for childcare institutions, like daycare centers, which 
cared for young and small children. Luckily, although facing the various challenges, there was 
no serious accident or injury that involved children of daycare centers under the chaotic and 
harsh evacuation conditions. A few daycare personnel stressed the importance of cooperation 
with other childcare and educational facilities in the same neighborhoods, like schools, 
kindergartens, and other daycare centers. In addition, they also suggested that community 
evacuation shelters should be equipped with adequate emergency stocks and child-friendly 
facility environments. Childcare institutions like daycare facilities should carefully consider of 
risks in the neighborhoods and coordinate and prepare with local partners, such as neighboring 
schools and community leaders, to manage the safety of children in case of massive evacuation. 
4.5.3 Mutual relations with communities 
The interviews re-emphasized the importance of community support and cooperation for daycare 
centers in their disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures. As discussed above, it is critical for each 
community to identify a safe evacuation shelter location(s) with: indoor spaces with essential 
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facilities (e.g., toilets and water access); and emergency stocks (e.g., food, drinking water, 
blankets, and heaters), which are suitable for most vulnerable members of the communities, 
including young and small children. Especially, this would help childcare providers to focus on 
assisting the safe evacuation of young children, not to worry about post-evacuation measures, 
such as shelter spaces and emergency stocks. Moreover, it was also suggested to make these 
shelter facilities to be ‘small child friendly,’ such as toilet facilities for young children, separate 
spaces for children (and other vulnerable groups, e.g., elderlies and people with special needs) 
emergency food for babies, and stocks of baby diapers.  
After the disaster, a number of local meetings were constantly held in the affected 
community to discuss their temporary living conditions and community reconstruction and 
relocation plans. Some of these meetings were led by the municipalities, and others were by the 
communities themselves, or by the civil organizations. One of such meetings was focused on the 
issue of childcare support systems in the affected community and participated by the 
governmental officials, NGO/NPO workers, and local residents. These forums were crucial 
opportunities for all the concerned stakeholders to discuss and share the important values of 
creating more child-friendly and protective community environments.  
In addition to these community forum opportunities, some daycare centers also attempted 
to strengthen their relations with the local communities to make sure of the safety for children. 
Ms. Maehara of Kantsubaki Daycare Center, which had been temporarily relocated in a different 
neighborhood, considered coordinating with the community self-governing body in regards to 
neighborhood’s emergency response measures and evacuation plans once they were settled in a 
permanent location. At Kinmokusei Daycare Center, which provided childcare services to the 
remote peninsula community, the director, Ms. Yamanaka, was planning to discuss with local 
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business owners about the neighborhood safety for children. Furthermore, the local 
neighborhood group discussed and included a new location plan for Hanamizuki Daycare Center 
in their community reconstruction and relocation planning as one of the priority items.  
Many daycare personnel valued their relations with the communities, not only because 
the communities helped daycare centers to reopen, rebuild and sustain after the disaster, but also 
because the re-establishment of daycare centers helped the recovery and healing processes of 
local communities. As they resumed their daily programs, childcare providers re-connected with 
local businesses and communities. They invited local residents to their annual events, like 
summer fairs, athletic competitions, or plays. Initially, they hesitated to carry out such events, 
because the entire communities were grieving. However, as children enjoyed these events, the 
local residents who attended these events seemed to be encouraged by the healthy and energetic 
children. Ms. Egami of Hamanasu Daycare Center explained:  
We were not sure whether we should be doing our usual school events like the “evening 
breeze” gathering and fireworks in the summer or the athletic competition. Many people 
died in this neighborhood, and there were a lot of people still living in the temporary 
housing units. But, once we did it, people in the community came from the distance 
temporary housing locations and enjoyed themselves (watching our children). They were 
genuinely laughing and smiling as they saw how energetic and healthy “our 
neighborhood kids” were. So, we thought that we should do our daycare program as 
normal as possible (for children and the community) [italics added]. 
Another director of Botan Daycare Center, Ms. Yoshii, agreed.  
This time (at the disaster), neighborhood people took care of us on many occasions. So, 
we invited them to our events and held appreciation gatherings for them. We thought that 
it was truly necessary (for daycare center) to have very close relations with neighborhood 
people. It was good that we had (the relationship with the community).  
Daycare providers also seemed to value the opinions that community members had about 
their childcare programs. Ms. Tonda, the newly appointed director of Ajisai Daycare Center, 
explained that it was important for her to know “how people around the neighborhood see the 
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daycare center.” She was pleased to hear how one community member had been impressed by 
the way that daycare children had followed teachers’ instructions and evacuated orderly on the 
day of the disaster.  
As discussed, the communities assisted daycare centers in drills, helped children evacuate 
from the tsunami, assigned separate spaces at shelters, provided emergency food and water, or 
identified rooms at shelters for temporary daycare use. In return, daycare providers were keen to 
have good impressions and influences to the local communities. It seemed that, after their 
disaster experiences, these childcare providers realized the importance of neighborhood relations 
and valued the community support mechanisms to ensure the safety and security of their daycare 
children at the time of a crisis.  
4.6 EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO AFFECTED COMMUNITIES 
When a major disaster happens, the Government of Japan would immediately establish formal 
emergency response mechanisms for relevant governmental agencies to readily respond to the 
urgent situation ("Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures," 1961). When the first earthquake 
happened on 11 March 2011, as in the law, the headquarters for emergency disaster 
countermeasures were immediately established at all levels of the governments, and different 
disaster response agencies were deployed, including the Self-Defense Forces, local police and 
fire departments, and emergency medical teams. Soon after, large amounts of help and assistance 
started pouring into the affected region from the other parts of the country as well as from 
overseas. 
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 In this section, I will focus on a few of the impacts that external assistance, including 
international and national organizations, non-governmental and non-profit organizations (NGOs 
and NPOs), and volunteers, had brought into the 2011 tsunami disaster relief operations in Japan. 
The surveys and interviews with daycare providers in Iwate did not provide explicit insights to 
this subject, but the following include the accounts based on my field observation and 
experiences of working for one of the external humanitarian organizations in Iwate.  
4.6.1 Influx of civil organizations  
A total of 29 countries, regions and international organizations dispatched their rescue teams and 
disaster response specialists to Japan, and 163 countries and regions and 43 international 
organizations offered emergency supply and monetary assistance, including the total relief fund 
of more than 17.5 billions Japanese Yen (Government of Japan, 2012; Government of Japan & 
World Bank, 2012). The Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS) and other national and international 
civil organizations also raised emergency funds and donations and established response 
structures.  
Hundreds of, if not a thousand, civil organizations, such as non-governmental or non-
profit organizations, known as NGOs or NPOs, participated in the emergency responses and 
humanitarian assistance. These NGOs and NPOs were registered as corporations (e.g., non-
profit corporations, public service corporations, incorporated foundations, religious corporations) 
with the government. Some of these organizations specialized in the development and 
humanitarian assistance programs overseas, including in-country fundraising and advocacy 
activities, and the others worked as community-based organizations within the country. As of 
January 2012, although the registration with the network was not mandatory for relief agencies, 
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the Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in East Japan (JCN) had registered a total of 712 
organizations and groups working in and for the tsunami-affected communities (Government of 
Japan & World Bank, 2012).  
Many of these organizations had capacities to raise funds, do advocacy work, and 
implement programs in their specialized areas. For examples, JCU and the Japan Platform (JPF) 
raised more than 4.8 billion Japanese Yen by end 2013 and 7.1 billion Japanese Yen by March 
2014 for their East Japan Disaster Emergency Response Programs respectively (JCU, 2014; 
Japan Platform, 2014). Moreover, these organizations often had pools of personnel with 
extended professional experiences in the field of emergency response and humanitarian 
assistance. Otherwise, they had their own recruitment systems to hire necessary personnel to 
fulfill their program requirements.    
It is worth noting that, in addition to the contributions from foreign countries and civil 
organizations, a total of 1,110,000 volunteers from the different parts of the country had worked 
in the three (3) tsunami-affected (Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima) from March 2011 to September 
2012 (Reconstruction Agency, 2012). These volunteers registered themselves at local Disaster 
Volunteer Centers, which were managed by the Social Welfare Councils. They were often 
assigned to various tasks, such as debris and mud cleaning, moving and soring emergency 
supplies, and helping at shelters and kitchens (Iwate Prefecture, 2013). The numbers could be 
higher, because many volunteers were also registered with and dispatched by NGOs and NPOs.  
4.6.2 Coordination for effective humanitarian assistance  
In an emergency situation where humanitarian assistance is required, the State is responsible to 
meet the urgent needs of the affected populations and to coordinate required actions (UN General 
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Assembly, 1991). In the contexts of international relief operations, as discussed in Chapter 2, the 
United Nations and other international agencies could assist host nations to coordinate with 
various humanitarian organizations to respond to emergency needs of the affected. In Japan, 
however, as an industrial nation, its governments were assumed to lead the emergency response 
coordination. The post-disaster report noted that “there were no coordination mechanisms in 
place that functioned properly on the ground,” and the reason was given as “the municipal 
governments have quite limited experience in working with CSOs (civil society organizations) 
(Government of Japan & World Bank, 2012).  
 This lack of coordination was evident from my experiences of working in Iwate. Each 
agency had to find a way to coordinate with relevant government offices or other organizations 
to deliver their assistance to the affected communities. For example, JCU initially started with 
building contacts and sharing information with individual partners (e.g., JCU and Save the 
Children Japan [SCJ] discussed to divide the operational areas to avoid duplication). Then, JCU 
and JPF jointly called for a first coordination meeting among the NGOs/NPOs. 29  Later, the 
Children and Family Division of the Iwate Prefectural Government finally organized an 
information-sharing meeting with the civil organizations, universities and other specialized 
groups. This prefectural level initiative was attended by about thirty (30) organizations and 
groups, and became the periodical events to discuss the program progresses and concerns 
focusing on children in the tsunami-affected areas. 
There were other initiatives in which local and external civil organizations came together 
to form coordination networks on the ground. For example, the NPO Iwate Fukko Collaboration 
                                                 
29 The list  of organizations that attended the first meeting included the following ten (10) organizations: Campaign for Children in Palestine; 
Japan Committee for UNICEF (JCU); Japan Platform (JPF); Kokkyo naki Kodomotachi; Good Neighbors Japan; Nippon International 
Cooperation for Community Development; NPO Corporation Neos; Peace Winds Japan; Save the Children Japan (SCJ); and World Vision 
Japan. 
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Center was established and assigned to facilitate that the emergency response assistances would 
meet the needs of the affected populations. For another example at the central level, the East 
Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster Children Support Network was established to promote 
and respond to the needs of children in the disaster affected areas. Both networks were 
“spontaneous coalition(s) for coordination (Government of Japan & World Bank, 2012)” and 
aimed to fill the gaps between the governmental policies and responses and affected populations’ 
needs and concerns through information sharing and coordination of activities.  
In the 2011 disaster in Japan, there were large numbers of NGOs and NPOs with different 
capacities and resources to assist local governments to respond to emergency needs of the 
affected populations. These external resources could be vital to fill the gaps that governments 
could not fill. At the same time, these external organizations might not be familiar with crucial 
local contexts. The governments at all levels should invest and prioritize the establishment of 
coordination mechanisms, in which the critical local knowledge can be shared and vital external 
assistance can be maximized for the overall emergency response capacities.  
4.6.3 “Do no harm” – Respect local social contract relations  
As they often came from the outside into the affected region, many external humanitarian 
organizations needed to learn the local contexts as they went. It was the same for the 
organizations like the Japan Committee for UNICEF (JCU), which worked closely with both 
local authorities and individual childcare and educational providers. It was important for 
humanitarian actors to work with them, not to work for them, because relief agencies were there 
to support local capacities to respond to the emergency and recovery needs and re-install and 
rebuild their community mechanisms. For this, humanitarian workers had to carefully make 
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several operational and program decisions, not to undermine the existing local social contract 
structures.  
For example, one of the operational decisions that JCU made in Iwate was to assist the 
building of temporary daycare facilities, instead of (re-)constructing permanent buildings for 
tsunami-affected childcare providers. Limited availability of ‘safe’ land spaces after the disaster 
was the serious issue in the saw-toothed coastline of Iwate, where the local populations had been 
concentrated at the shore areas, instead of inlands. During the first year of the disaster, the local 
governments did not allow any new permanent buildings to be (re-)built in the once-tsunami-
flooded areas. This was because the land safety and usability assessments had to be thoroughly 
done and reconstruction and relocation plans needed to be finalized and agreed. Without such 
plans, or without knowing where the local communities would settle, it was not feasible for 
tsunami-affected childcare providers to rebuild, or relocate, their permanent daycare facilities. As 
an assisting organization, JCU instead chose a temporary measure of building pre-fabricated 
school facilities, considering of the urgency to provide the best and safest daycare environments 
to children based on the given circumstances.  
Because local services and businesses were also impacted, for another example, JCU had 
to explore all possible supply procurement and service capacities at all levels: locally, regionally, 
and nationally. At the beginning, we sought the supply procurement capacities outside the 
tsunami-affected areas. As post-disaster recovery was moving forward, we could use local 
business and service suppliers. By doing so, JCU could in turn help the larger community 
recovery and development. Because relief organizations brought external resources into the 
affected communities, their humanitarian assistance activities could affect the local service and 
business capacities. Thus, humanitarian actors should carefully assess the situations and seek the 
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local knowledge of wisdom, if necessary, to help, but not undermine, strengthen the social 
contracts and networks within the affected communities.  
 One of my field encounters could exemplify the case where external actors could 
interfere the local relations to protect children from harm and violence. While operating an after-
school care center in the tsunami-affected community, a staff of one NPO noticed that one boy 
seemed experiencing domestic abuse. This NPO contacted our organization, JCU, for guidance. 
We recommended that, if they did not have the capacity, or were not authorized, to deal with 
such domestic cases, they should not directly intervene in the family, but should consult local 
authorities, such as child protection official or local police department (from the researcher’s 
fieldnote). This showed that external humanitarian actors could encounter, or might be even 
engaged in, such local and domestic issues involving children, especially when they directly 
interacted with the local populations. They should align with the local systems to deal with any 
local legal and protection issues that would affect the individuals whom they work for in the field.  
4.7 GOVERNMENTAL ROLES IN PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM DISASTERS 
Iwate Prefecture is located some 300 miles away from Tokyo, and its economy has relied on 
agriculture and fishery. The installment of the Tohoku Bullet Train Line and Tohoku 
Expressway helped its recent successes to bring manufacture industries into the inland southern 
part of the prefecture. Yet, its economic growth has been slow to impact the income levels of the 
Iwate’s population. In 2007, the individual income average of Iwate Prefecture was at the 40th 
among the total 47 administrative divisions of the country (Iwate Prefecture, 2010c). As 
discussed in the previous section, the economic development in the northern and coastal areas 
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had stagnated, and the individual income averages had been lower than the rest of the prefecture 
(Iwate Prefecture, 2008). For the communities that were economically vulnerable and prone to 
natural disasters, like the Iwate coastal region, governmental roles and capacities would become 
critical for their survival and sustainability. In this section, I will review to what extent the 
governments supported childcare institutions like daycare centers to prepare for and cope with 
such a severe disaster. 
4.7.1 Disaster prevention standards and guidance 
Many local governments had taken various emergency countermeasure initiatives, because their 
geographical areas were prone to certain natural disasters. Many coastline municipalities 
annually carried out area-wide emergency drills with local residents for tsunami risks. Estimated 
Tsunami Inundation Areas were marked within the municipality parameters. Local radio systems 
were installed to broadcast public notices or warnings for any extreme weathers, disasters, or 
other emergency situations. According to daycare personnel, some municipalities showed 
computer simulations of tsunami to the communities in recent years to raise public awareness.  
 On the day of the disaster, most of the daycare personnel heard the first tsunami-warning, 
but later the public radio systems were shut down. Furthermore, the tsunami reached beyond the 
marked Estimated Tsunami Inundation Areas. This shows that emergency events, including 
natural disasters, could happen outside the places, timings, and scales that people expected. The 
following are some of the key roles and responsibilities that the governments played, or could 
have played, to help childcare institutions like daycare centers and the communities prepare for 
and to respond to the unexpected severe disaster event like the 2011 tsunami.  
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Disaster preparedness standards: As discussed earlier in this chapter, monthly drills 
clearly contributed to the safe evacuation of daycare children in Iwate in the 2011 disaster. It was 
part of the national standards, and the survey result indicated that almost all daycare centers in 
Iwate had conducted monthly evacuation drills prior to the disaster (See Section 4.1.1). Other 
emergency disaster preparedness and response standards may not be explicitly stated in the same 
governmental ordinance that includes the standards on evacuation drills. However, they are often 
part of the local government’s standards and auditing items for childcare institutions. 
Governments are responsible to audit each daycare center every year, including (but not limited 
to) the following safety requirements and emergency disaster prevention items: 
1) earthquake resistance for buildings;  
2) safety measures inside the facilities (e.g., anti-fall measures for furniture and equipment; 
anti-shatter measures for window glasses and lighting fixtures; emergency exits);  
3) evacuation measures (e.g., routes; locations; emergency stocks; emergency trolleys; 
‘walking ropes’; baby carriers); and  
4) emergency procedures (e.g., personnel roles; emergency contact lists).  
The survey showed that not all the measures were incorporated at all the daycare centers 
in Iwate. Installing these disaster prevention measures could be costly. In the interview, Mr. 
Umemura of Yamabuki Daycare Center, which was a private provider, mentioned that they had 
to allocate the general operational budgets to fulfill such requirements and he wished that 
governmental assistance could be available for them to install necessary disaster preventive 
measures and equipment. Ms. Seto of Mikan Daycare Center also noted that some of the 
suggested measures by the authorities might not be relevant in certain situations. For examples, 
 162 
their evacuation route had a steep slope, which was not suitable to use trolleys, but childcare 
workers could use baby carriers instead.  
Crises may not happen every day, but it should be a critical concern for every daycare 
provider. At the same time, each daycare center may face different challenges in emergency 
preparedness and evacuation measures. Thus, some of the standards could be mandatory, but 
others should be carefully evaluated for necessary assistance required for both individual and 
general cases. Nevertheless, governmental authorities must guide and assist daycare centers to 
meet the emergency preparedness standards as a critical issues to protect children’s safety and 
security within the childcare programs.   
Emergency manuals and guidance: In order to ensure daycare centers to be well-
prepared for any emergency or disaster situation, it is important for personnel to develop 
emergency response manuals and to receive technical guidance by local authorities or disaster 
prevention specialists. The interviews discovered that most of the daycare centers had emergency 
response manuals that had been developed by them and revised over time. Not many used 
external manuals or reference materials given by governments, and only a few used the manuals 
developed and shared by the neighborhood communities. Because the scale of the 2011 disaster 
was bigger than what they had assumed within the scope of their emergency manuals, many felt 
that manuals would not be useful in such severe disasters where unexpected situations could 
arise. Ms. Ota of Satsuki Daycare Center expressed her concern that manuals might not be 
sufficient to respond to unexpected events like the tsunami in 2011:  
We had a manual before the disaster, and it was well written, covering earthquakes, fires. 
… But, after we experienced the disaster, I thought: “What is a manual?” Did we follow 
the manual? Not exactly. I’ve been worried how useful this ‘excellent’ manual could be 
in future, when something happened. After we moved here, I couldn’t complete the 
development of a manual for this (new) location. I’m worried that an ordinary manual 
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like the one before wouldn’t be enough (for next disaster) (Ms. Ota, Satsuki Daycare 
Center). 
At the same time, many credited to the manuals, and knowing and having practiced what 
to do in case of an emergency, which had helped them respond to unexpected situations. If there 
were no concrete organizational response structures and procedures arranged and agreed in 
advance, the situations could have been even more chaotic and confusing. Especially this could 
be a serious issue for daycare providers, because their priority should be protecting children from 
harm. Procedural details should be pre-determined and agreed among concerned adults, and 
should not become problems in the middle of such chaotic situations. 
As part of their disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures, childcare providers were closely 
engaged with local fire departments. Their emergency response plans must be submitted to and 
approved by the fire departments or other concerned local authorities. Once or twice a year, fire 
department officials oversaw their evacuation drills, and firemen interacted with daycare children 
to talk about fire, disaster, or other hazards.  
Many daycare directors explained that these occasions also benefited their staff. They 
could ask fire department officials questions about their disaster risks and response measures. 
Furthermore, a few recounted that on the day of the disaster, local firefighters had assisted their 
evacuation. Having close relations with local fire departments helped these childcare providers 
with their emergency preparedness as well as at the actual evacuation.  
Based on their 2011 disaster experiences, many daycare directors expressed that it could 
have been more helpful if governmental authorities had given them clearer and more concrete 
emergency response guidance, such as clear public announcement of disaster information and 
warnings and concrete ‘orders’ for evacuation. Ms. Rikuta, the director of Suzuran Daycare 
Center, another private provider, explained that this was particularly important for her who was 
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in the position to make such critical decisions to order the evacuation within her daycare center. 
This seemed to be a more serious concern for the directors of private daycare centers, because 
they were the heads of institutions. Many interview responses corresponded with this.  
Whether private or public, nevertheless, clear governmental guidance on disaster 
preparedness and response measures, with consideration of different crisis scenarios, could help 
daycare providers to make prompt and appropriate decisions at the time of a crisis. Furthermore, 
such official governmental guidelines could be shared as agreed emergency measures with 
children’s parents by childcare providers.  
 This study revealed how much these daycare center directors had thought about their 
responsibilities to make sure of protecting children in crisis events. Local authorities, including 
fire departments and other relevant government offices, must support and reinforce these efforts. 
Their support should include, but not limited to: 1) identifying childcare providers’ concerns and 
assistance needs; and 2) providing them with necessary and relevant knowledge and skills, to 
respond to emergencies and focus on the protection of children in crises situations. 
4.7.2 Leadership in post-disaster recovery 
In addition to disaster prevention measures, governments are expected to take leadership roles in 
emergency response and recovery and reconstruction efforts at the time of major crises. However, 
the local governments, including the social welfare offices, were directly affected by the disaster 
and completely overwhelmed by the large scales of disaster impacts to the local populations. 
These stressed conditions often limited their capacities to provide timely guidance and assistance 
to the affected childcare institutions and to facilitate incoming aid and other activities to the 
affected communities. 
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In the interviews, for example, several daycare directors remembered that there were 
initially no guidance or assessment from the local welfare offices on how they could resume their 
childcare programs. As their daycare facilities were directly affected by the disaster, timely and 
appropriate guidance could have been most help for these childcare providers to determine on the 
temporary measures to re-establish the programs, such as: a) facility (re-)locations; b) 
procurement of equipment and supplies; c) temporary program arrangements and operational 
hours; d) fee exemptions or reduction; and e) emergency recovery budget (re-)allocations.  
Local governments’ capacities to coordinate and facilitate the situations largely made 
difference among tsunami-affected daycare providers to access additional resources for their 
recovery efforts. For example, Kosumosu and Yamabuki Daycare Centers were temporarily 
merged to their sister daycare centers, where their childcare workers were also reassigned, by 
their parent organizations. A few municipalities also facilitated the identification and assignment 
of available facilities for tsunami-affected daycare centers. Without such umbrella organizations 
or municipality support, a few independent private childcare providers had to handle the 
devastating situations on their own. If they could not figure out the ways to re-establish, they 
would have laid off the staff and closed the programs. This could have been not only a serious 
concern of daycare providers, but also a long-term problem for local governments in their 
childcare support capacities available to the families and communities.  
As discussed in the previous section, there were lack of governmental guidance and 
coordination capacities, which could affect effective relief activities by external humanitarian 
groups. Affected populations were already overwhelmed and confused by the massive influx of 
external groups, like humanitarian agencies and research groups. This was evident from my 
interviews and field observation that there was no coordination for external research groups to 
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conduct their assessments or researches. As a result, a number of similar assessment or research 
activities became burdens to the affected communities (e.g., they had to repeat their disaster 
stories). Local, or prefectural, authorities could have coordinated these incoming assistance and 
activities to avoid duplications, ensure equal distributions for those in need, and prevent 
overstressing the affected populations.  
Finally, there were some operational gaps among the governments at all levels: local, 
prefectural, and central. For example, although the Ministry of Education set up temporary 
emergency assistance measures to allocate additional funds for recovery activities, local tsunami-
affected education offices were not aware of such decisions. The bureaucratic systems in the 
governments hindered these counterparts to proactively interact each other, and to share the same 
urgency in the situations. Such information and operational gaps among the governmental bodies 
could affect critical local response capacities.  
Another example was that the existing administrative divisions created different, or 
unequal, responses to different service providers. In Iwate, the municipalities’ welfare offices 
administered both public and private daycare programs, the local education boards managed 
public schools and kindergartens, and the general affairs department of the prefectural 
government was in charge of private schools and kindergartens. In the coastal area, schools were 
mostly public, and their emergency and recovery needs were quickly assessed and responded. 
However, the similar needs of affected daycare centers and private kindergartens were somehow 
delayed, and they often relied on external assistance in the private sector. This was because, 
while the public school systems were well aligned, the childcare support program was only one 
of many services in the welfare sector, and, for private kindergartens, there was no 
administrative accountability at local level.  
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Although some challenges in the governmental response capacities and structures were 
uncovered, there were some cases of good coordination and collaboration work between 
governmental agencies and civil organizations. For example, JCU supported a  “Back to School” 
program in Iwate immediately after the disaster. In this program, the Iwate Prefectural Board of 
Education and Iwate Prefectural Teachers’ Union coordinated with their regional and local 
counterparts to assess the situations, and JCU and the Iwate Consumers’ Co-operative Union 
(Co-op) supported the distribution of individual stationary packages for a total of 17,152 
elementary school pupils in the affected areas. This was one of the instances that governmental 
leadership and coordination with civil organizations worked well under such challenging 
situations.  
To the contrary, the following fieldnote summary exemplified how governmental 
guidance and facilitation had affected the recovery condition of one daycare center:  
After its facility was washed away by the tsunami, Botan Daycare Center, which was run 
by the local municipality, was relocated to the nearby elementary school. This school had 
been a shelter for local evacuees for more than six (6) months. Its school building did not 
have a kitchen, toilet facilities suitable for daycare-age children, or appropriate outdoor 
spaces. Later, the building was assessed for demolition as part of the municipality’s 
reconstruction plan. The prefectural government office expressed its concern about safety 
of the building, and advised either to look for an alternative facility or to improve the 
situation to meet the childcare service standards. JCU also offered to assist in building a 
temporary daycare facility. However, the local authority’s decision was delayed. Even 
after both the school itself and all the evacuees vacated the building, Botan Daycare 
Center remained in the facility under the same conditions for a total of two years (From 
the summary of the researcher’s fieldnote entries). 
In the end, Botan Daycare Center managed to stay safe in the school building, and moved to a 
temporary school building supported by another organization. However, Ms. Yoshii, the director, 
was constantly worried about the safety of children inside the facility, including: aftershocks and 
emergency evacuation; arrangement with evacuees; sanitary conditions; outsourcing their lunch 
preparation; and lack of playground. If the local social welfare office, which was in charge of 
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Botan Daycare Center, had taken a more proactive leadership and coordination role in this 
specific matter, they could have found a solution to provide safer daycare environments to 
children and childcare workers much earlier.  
 Timely governmental leadership and facilitation could affect the early recovery of 
disaster-affected communities, including their childcare support capacities. By coordinating with 
incoming humanitarian groups, governments could have maximized their own relief capacities to 
meet the urgent needs of affected populations. For external organizations, furthermore, clear 
governmental guidance and coordination could allow them to access critical local knowledge to 
verify where and what the relevant needs were and legitimize their relief activities for their own 
accountabilities. Such cooperation would help relief agencies focus on the humanitarian 
principles (as discussed in Chapter 2, “humanitarian imperative,” “neutrality,” and 
“impartiality”[, and perhaps “Do No Harm”]) to ensure equal access and avoid duplications of 
their assistance.  
In such major disasters, all relevant parties should immediately focus on reinforcing or 
re-installing the local governmental response capacities to lead and coordinate relief operations 
on the ground. In the end, these capacities could affect the recovery and rebuilding of affected 
communities, including childcare support systems. The focus in emergencies, or even in normal 
situations for the matter, should be to respond to the essential survival and development needs of 
the (affected) populations beyond their bureaucratic limitations. 
4.7.3 Child-friendly disaster resistant community planning 
The 2011 disaster exposed the local populations in Iwate, including young children and 
personnel of daycare centers, to various unexpected risks. In addition to the earthquake, tsunami 
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and fire, a few rural coastline or peninsula communities along the Pacific Ocean faced serious 
risks of isolation from the rest of the region. In the remote areas in Iwate, some communities had 
only one accessible road, which was damaged and closed down by the disaster. The populations 
in such communities became isolated and could not access to the emergency services. Ms. 
Yamanaka of Kinmokusei Daycare Center shared her experience of being temporarily isolated in 
the rural peninsula community: Daycare children and personnel, together with local residents, 
evacuated to a mountain top inn from the tsunami and subsequent fire outbreaks, and they were 
inaccessible by road, only next day rescued out by helicopters. To make their communities more 
disaster resilient, it is critical for local authorities to assess unique risks and consider additional 
safe road access to prevent isolation and inaccessibility of these rural coastal communities at the 
time of a crisis.  
Even though they managed to avoid the giant tsunami safely, some daycare centers had to 
make their way by climbing the fences, crossing over the mountains, passing the railway tracks, 
or walking long distances with small children. Many of the extended evacuations that they took 
were not suitable or safe for young children of daycare centers. Local governments should ensure 
the installation of safe and proper evacuation routes, including appropriate steps and slopes to 
higher grounds and designated passages safe for small children, as part of local disaster 
prevention measures in these disaster prone-communities.  
As for evacuation locations, the conditions of many shelters did not appear to be 
appropriate for small children, without adequate emergency stocks or functioning sanitary 
facilities. The main problem was that those assigned evacuation centers could not handle the 
sudden and massive evacuation of local residents. It was noted that most of these evacuation 
facilities were not considered to be ‘young child friendly’. Government-assigned evacuation 
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centers must be equipped with appropriate emergency stocks (e.g., baby food and milk, diapers) 
and facilities (e.g., toilets for small children) for small children to safely take refuge.  
At the time of the interviews, tsunami-affected municipalities and communities were still 
discussing over their post-disaster reconstruction plans. While each municipality was developing 
their specific plans, the Iwate Prefecture Government (2011d) outlined its overall reconstruction 
frameworks under the following three principles:  
1) Ensuring safety through disaster-preventative community planning (including coastal 
protection facilities, safe living environments and land-use planning, and cultural 
measures) and stronger transportation networks;  
2) Rebuilding lives including housing, employment, health and medical care, welfare 
systems, nursing structures, education and culture, regional communities, and 
administrative functions; and  
3) Regenerating industries through constructing production systems, developing 
infrastructure, and financial and systematic support to encourage production activities.  
Although it did not explicitly focus on children’s safety and security, the plan of  “ensuring 
safety” included “(allowing) people to live safely and securely” and “(promoting) people-
friendly community planning based on a philosophy of universal design” [italics added]. 
Different safety and security risks and needs of all the local residents should be considered in 
rebuilding disaster resilient communities. Especially for those in need of assistance, including 
young children (and elderlies and people with special needs), special consideration should be 
given to ensure their safety and security even at the time of a crisis.   
 The reconstruction planning experiences highlighted different initiatives that promoted 
children’s participation in the processes, especially at the community and municipality levels. 
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For example, international NGOs like SCJ and JCU supported the initiatives to promote 
children’s participation in rebuilding their own communities (JCU, 2014; Save the Children 
Japan [SCJ], 2014). These child participation activities not only provided children with the 
opportunities to express themselves to local, and national, authorities about what they would 
expect their communities to be, but also promoted their sense of ownership in the reconstruction 
process. Nonetheless, these children’s contributions should be considered as opportunities for the 
governments to integrate the concept of more child-friendly and disaster resilient community 
development into their reconstruction planning. 
The affected communities, in addition, should consider new locations of childcare service 
providers as one of the priority areas in their reconstruction and relocation planning. In the 
interview, Mr. Omi of Himawari Daycare Center, whose floors were covered by the tsunami 
water, expressed his concern that the numbers of enrolments had declined after one year since 
the disaster. Many local residents, including the daycare users, moved out of the neighborhood to 
the temporary housing units or outside of the town center. Possible relocation of local residents 
might not only affect his daycare program but also completely change the picture of childcare 
service demands in the neighborhood.  
This example showed that the disaster itself and its subsequent post-disaster situations 
could affect the operations and survivals of these childcare providers as well as the landscape of 
local childcare support capacities in tsunami-affected communities. Ideally, the safer and more 
appropriate childcare services were available, the more families with young children would 
consider staying in or moving to the communities. In turn, these families would contribute not 
only to the recovery of disaster-affected communities and but also to the further development of 
local businesses and industries. Survival and future of tsunami-affected daycare centers should 
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not be individual concerns of the service providers, but should be considered as an interest of the 
whole communities and for the protection of next generations.   
4.8 SUMMARY 
Based on the thorough data collection and field observation, this chapter described the disaster 
experiences of the daycare centers in Iwate. Although the mixed methods were employed, the 
qualitative and descriptive analyses helped this study offer detailed portrayals about the roles and 
meanings of early childhood development (ECD) programs for young children in the disaster-
affected situations. Furthermore, the study findings highlighted critical roles and relations among 
the concerned stakeholders to ensure and sustain children’s access to their care and development 
opportunities during and beyond the challenging time of the disaster. 
 To synopsize all the detailed findings presented in this chapter, I borrow the eight 
dimensions of the Landgren’s Protective Environment Framework model (2005) (See the 
descriptions of the eight dimensions in APPENDIX B) as examples to highlight some of the 
protective capacities of the disaster-affected communities in Iwate revealed in this study as 
follows:  
For example, the 2011 disaster experience proved that the governmental law and 
standards, and their auditing mechanisms, for the disaster prevention measures in daycare 
programs had clearly worked (“2. Protective legislation”; and “8. Protective monitoring, 
reporting, and oversight”). At the same time, the study unveiled some weakness in the 
governmental coordination capacities to deal with massive external relief contributions and 
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organizations, despite their well-established internal emergency response mechanisms and relief 
capacities (“1. Protective government commitment and capacity”).  
This study also revealed that even young children at daycare centers had demonstrated 
their abilities to cope with the disaster (“5. Protective children’s life skills, knowledge, and 
participation”). Furthermore, it reaffirmed that to access the crucial childcare and educational 
services, like daycare programs, had brought back the normalcy to children’s lives, given them 
the environments where they could feel safe and protected, and secured their continuous care and 
development opportunities even in the chaotic community conditions (“7. Protective essential 
services”).  
In this study, it was shown that the local community shared the value of protecting 
“(their) neighborhood children” in the disaster (“3. Protective culture and customs”) and there 
were constant opportunities for them to express and discuss their concerns in regards to 
protection of children in the disaster-affected communities (“4. Open discussion”). In addition, 
while the disaster-affected family and community situations had significant effects on children, 
the states of children also had impacts on the recovery capacities of families and communities 
(“6. Protective capacity of families and communities”).  
These only represented the brief extracted summary of the immense descriptive findings 
generated in this study. In the conclusion chapter, I will fist recap the detailed highlights of the 
study findings based on the eight (8) dimensions of the Protective Environment Framework. 
Emerged from there, I will then analyze the research outcomes in relation to how these findings 
would contribute to and expand, or challenge, the conceptual frameworks presented earlier in 
this dissertation as well as the past practices in the field of education and ECD in emergencies.  
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5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to understand the roles of early childhood development (ECD) 
programs in protecting children and their childhood experiences in emergencies. The previous 
chapter portrayed comprehensive pictures of the 2011 disaster, focusing on daycare centers in 
Iwate. It highlighted the detailed situations that young children had faced before, during and after 
the disaster. It also detailed the roles and relations of their caregivers and stakeholders, such as 
childcare workers, families, communities and governments, in saving these children and 
providing protective environments for them. Their efforts to re-establish daycare programmes 
immediately after the disaster resulted in ensuring children’s regular courses of healthy growth 
and development. At the same time, this research revealed how early recovery of the childcare 
support systems had directly and indirectly influenced families and communities to bounce back 
from their disaster experiences.  
In this final chapter, I first summarize the research findings in line with the eight (8) 
dimensions of the Landgren’s Protective Environment Framework. Second, I re-organize and re-
examine these research outcomes by theme, as follows:  
1) ECD programs to protect children in emergencies (See Section 5.1.1);
2) ECD programs to protect children’s continuous development and well-being (See
Section 5.1.2); and
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3) ECD programs to protect sustainable development and generational security in post-
disaster communities (See Section 5.1.3). 
Third, I propose a few recommendations for actions for those who are concerned about ECD and 
education programs in emergencies, in both Japan and the international community. Last, I 
discuss the contributions, and limitations, of my study in terms of theories, research methods and 
future research possibilities.  
5.1 DISCUSSIONS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
As discussed in the conceptual framework chapter, Pais emphasized that protecting children’s 
rights and ensuring their well-being and development should require a multi-disciplinary and 
cross-sectoral approach (1999). During the research analysis process, I closely followed the 
Landgren’s Protective Environment Framework (2005), which proposed comprehensive 
components, or dimensions, that can be critical to protect children. Although my research 
findings may not be exactly or equally applied to each dimension of the framework, I attempted 
to rearrange the highlights of my research findings based on its eight (8) dimensions as follows, 
and the table is organized by timeframe: before, during, and after the disaster (See Table 15):  
176 
Table 15. Summary of research findings based on the Protective Environment Framework 
Dimension Disaster preparedness 
(before the disaster) 
Emergency response and 
evacuation  
(during the disaster) 
Post-disaster recovery 
and reconstruction  
(after the disaster) 
1 Protective 
Government 
Commitment 
and Capacity 
Local municipalities 
implemented disaster 
preparedness measures 
(e.g., disaster radio 
systems; Estimated 
Tsunami Inundation 
Areas; evacuation 
locations and shelters; 
community-wide 
emergency drills; tsunami 
awareness using 
computer simulations) 
Local fire departments 
provided technical 
guidance and emergency 
disaster risk awareness 
training to daycare 
centers 
The disaster damaged 
community radio 
systems, and the tsunami 
reached beyond marked 
Estimated Tsunami 
Inundation Areas  
Evacuation shelters did 
not have adequate 
emergency goods and 
facilities to accommodate 
massive evacuees 
Assigned evacuation 
centers were not 
equipped to be young 
child friendly, such as 
toilets for toddlers or 
emergency baby food  
Governmental assistance 
were limited or delayed 
to respond to recovery 
and reconstruction needs 
of daycare programs 
(e.g., technical, material, 
financial); Often they 
were not prioritized, and 
relied on external 
assistance 
Local governments did 
not have adequate 
capacities to coordinate 
with external assistance 
agencies (c.f., prefectural 
and national governments 
to immediately support 
local governmental 
capacities)  
Reconstruction planning 
should be focused on 
child friendly and disaster 
resilient community 
development.   
Children’s participation 
in community rebuilding 
planning should be 
promoted 
2 Protective 
Legislation and 
Enforcement  
Policies and standards of 
emergency disaster 
prevention measures for 
childcare institutions 
were developed  
Daycare centers 
implemented emergency 
preparedness measures as 
per the standards, 
especially evacuation 
drills  
Daycare centers 
successfully executed 
emergency response 
measures, including 
evacuation procedures 
Drills were proven as 
effective at the actual 
evacuations  
Governments should 
provide relevant 
guidelines and standards 
to resume daycare 
programs in post-disaster 
situations, including 
temporary measures to 
operate under difficult 
circumstances 
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Table 15. (continued) 
 Dimension Disaster preparedness 
(before the disaster) 
Emergency response and 
evacuation  
(during the disaster) 
Post-disaster recovery 
and reconstruction  
(after the disaster) 
3 Protective 
Culture and 
Customs  
Limited community 
members participated 
daycare centers’ 
evacuation drills as 
community guard/watch 
group 
Local residents assisted 
evacuation of daycare 
children (e.g., holding 
hands, helping them 
climb hills) 
 
Communities prioritized 
children to access spaces 
and emergency goods at 
shelters 
 
Community 
reconstruction planning 
included relocation of 
daycare center  
 
Local residents shared the 
value of protecting 
children in post-crisis 
conditions (c.f., local 
residents considered 
daycare children as “their 
neighborhood children”) 
 
4 (Protective) 
Open 
Discussion 
Daycare centers had 
consultations with 
community leaders and 
residents about 
evacuation measures in 
the neighborhoods  
 
Daycare personnel could 
seek technical advice 
from local fire 
departments about 
disaster risks and 
evacuation measures 
 
Daycare personnel shared 
their concerns about 
disaster risks and 
discussed ways to 
improve their 
preparedness practices 
 
 Communities included 
daycare centers in 
reconstruction and 
relocation planning 
discussions 
 
Local residents actively 
participated in 
community forum 
opportunities to discuss 
their concerns of 
children’s safety and 
future 
 
At daycare, personnel 
shared their disaster 
experiences and concerns 
among peers  
5 Protective 
Children’s Life 
Skills, 
Knowledge, 
and 
Participation 
Daycare children learned 
about disaster risks 
through disaster 
awareness education, and 
acquired abilities to 
follow teachers’ 
instructions in drills 
 
Daycare centers carried 
out special drills for 
tsunami risks, and made  
Children demonstrated 
their ability to follow 
teachers’ evacuation 
instruction and cope with 
extremely challenging 
situations during the 
evacuation 
 
Children were affected by 
the disaster in many ways 
(e.g., lost their parents,  
Children showed 
different signs of 
psychological effects, 
(e.g., tsunami-gokko, 
regression, aggression, 
nightmare, bed-wetting) 
 
Children could play 
freely, feel easy, and 
express themselves as 
daycare environments  
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Table 15. (continued) 
 Dimension Disaster preparedness 
(before the disaster) 
Emergency response and 
evacuation 
(during the disaster) 
Post-disaster recovery 
and reconstruction 
(after the disaster) 
  children familiar with 
tsunami 
Childcare workers paid 
special attention to 
additional assistance 
needs of younger children 
and children with special 
needs during drills 
 
family members, houses, 
friends, belongings; 
experienced or witnessed 
the disaster; long 
separation from their 
families) 
 
represented normalcy and 
provided safe and secure 
spaces 
6 Protective 
Capacity of 
Families and 
Communities 
Family participation in 
daycare centers’ 
emergency drills was 
limited, because most 
parents worked during 
the day 
 
Limited cooperation from 
neighborhood residents; 
many worked outside, 
and only a few helped as 
community guard/watch 
group 
Many families 
immediately arrived for 
children, but a few lost 
their lives to the tsunami 
after they left for home 
 
Other families were 
unable to come for their 
children, and daycare 
personnel had to stay 
with them for extended 
hours and days 
 
Many families lost homes 
and moved to shelters or 
relatives’ homes, and 
daycare staff had to 
travel long distances on 
foot to find out about 
children’s safety and 
whereabouts 
 
Local residents assisted 
evacuation of daycare 
children 
 
Massive evacuation of 
local populations could 
become a serious safety 
hazard for young children 
(e.g., en route, at shelter) 
 
 
Daycare centers and 
families renewed their 
shared understanding of 
emergency safety 
measures (e.g., agreed 
procedures, evacuation 
maps) 
 
The disaster affected 
children’s families, and 
unstable home 
environments also 
affected children 
 
Re-establishment of 
daycare programs helped 
families’ recovery (e.g., 
returning to work) and 
recovery and healing 
process of affected 
communities (e.g., 
generating local 
businesses and services, a 
symbol of “hope”) 
 
Local forums included 
discussions on (re-) 
building young child 
friendly disaster resilient 
community environments 
as part of reconstruction 
planning (e.g., safety 
measures at evacuation 
routes and shelters, 
evacuation procedures) 
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Table 15. (continued) 
 Dimension Disaster preparedness 
(before the disaster) 
Emergency response and 
evacuation  
(during the disaster) 
Post-disaster recovery 
and reconstruction  
(after the disaster) 
7 Protective 
Essential 
Services  
Daycare providers 
ensured their emergency 
disaster prevention 
measures, especially 
evacuation drill 
procedures 
 
Disaster awareness 
education and training 
with local fire fighters 
were provided to daycare 
children 
 
Families relied on 
daycare programs to 
support caring for 
children, and childcare 
workers had strong sense 
of responsibility toward 
children’s safety/lives 
 
 
 
Daycare providers 
responded to the disaster 
situation as they had done 
in trainings and drills; In 
Iwate, all the children 
who were with daycare 
personnel evacuated 
safely  
 
Childcare workers 
demonstrated their risk 
awareness skills during 
the actual evacuation 
(e.g., “Children’s safety 
was the No.1 priority”; 
“the best and safest for 
children”) 
 
Childcare workers 
showed their strong sense 
of “in loco parentis” as 
children were temporarily 
separated from parents  
 
All daycare centers 
across Iwate, whether 
damaged by the tsunami 
or not, were affected by 
the disaster (e.g., 
disruption of basic utility 
systems, constrain in food 
and fuel supplies) 
 
Childcare workers were 
also affected by the 
disaster; Their well-being 
could affect daycare 
children (e.g., importance 
to care caregivers) 
 
Daycare providers made 
extra efforts to 
immediately resume 
daycare programs; many 
had to begin with 
temporary measures (e.g., 
half-day services, no 
lunch or snacks, no 
heating)  
 
Affected daycare 
facilities faced various 
challenges (e.g., unsafe 
environments, health and 
sanitation concerns, 
limited available 
buildings, disruption of 
basic utility and supply 
chain systems) 
 
Daycare providers did not 
receive either timely or 
clear governmental 
guidance or assistance on 
temporary measures to 
resume daycare 
programs; Many relied on 
external assistance 
 
Daycare programs:  
- brought normalcy back 
to children’s lives; 
- provided safe and 
secure environments for 
children (e.g., addition, 
or alternate, to their 
homes); and 
- made children access 
continuous care and 
development 
opportunities  
 
Childcare workers valued 
their job as “special” and  
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Table 15. (continued) 
 Dimension Disaster preparedness 
(before the disaster) 
Emergency response and 
evacuation  
(during the disaster) 
Post-disaster recovery 
and reconstruction  
(after the disaster) 
    were motivated to care 
for children; they were 
also often exhausted in 
difficult conditions  
 
Existing staff allocation 
standards might not be 
sufficient in the event of 
an emergency; concerned 
stakeholders should 
consider what and how to 
fill or supplement the gap 
 
8 Protective 
Monitoring, 
Reporting, and 
Oversight  
Governmental auditing 
was regularly conducted 
to ensure disaster 
prevention measures in 
place at daycare facilities 
 Local governments 
should carry out 
immediate thorough 
assessment (e.g., RALS, 
damage assessment) and 
continuous monitoring to 
provide timely and 
appropriate assistance to 
daycare providers 
 
 
Chapter 4 presented the immense and detailed insights of daycare centers’ experiences and 
concerned stakeholders’ roles and relations in providing protection to children during the 2011 
disaster. The above table exhibited the key extracts of: how daycare centers in Iwate had 
prepared for such a sever catastrophe; how they responded to and coped with the disaster; and 
what challenges they faced and overcame to ensure rebuilding protective environments for young 
children.  
In the following, I re-organize the highlighted research findings and examine them in 
relation to the conceptual frameworks that were presented earlier in this dissertation. Some 
findings were consistent with such frameworks and past experiences, and others might contribute 
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new, or better, understandings of the situations that this research was focused on. To attempt to 
synopsize them, I draw three main thematic concerning areas as follows: 1) early childhood 
development (ECD) programs to protect young children from emergencies; 2) ECD programs to 
protect children’s continuous development and well-being; and 3) ECD programs to protect 
sustainable development and generational security. Each sub-section consists one or more 
significant subjects that emerged from this study. 
5.1.1 ECD programs to protect children in emergencies 
• Ensuring the disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures for ECD programs and their 
children 
In emergency situations, children, especially younger children like those in daycare programs 
(ages 0-5), could become vulnerable and face additional hazards, because they require adults’ 
assistance (Nantchouang, 2011; Tran, 2011). To ensure children’s safety at the time of a disaster 
is a serious concern for childcare institutions like daycare centers, which care for large numbers 
of young children. This is why it is critical for childcare, or educational, institutions to consider 
and take thorough emergency preparedness, or disaster risk reduction (DRR), measures based on 
their assessed risks.  
This study confirmed that the DRR, or disaster preparedness, measures that the Iwate’s 
daycare providers had taken were very effective against the 2011 earthquake and tsunami. The 
survey result indicated that almost all daycare providers in the prefecture, whether in the 
tsunami-prone area or not, had conducted monthly emergency evacuation drills, which was the 
governmental standard for childcare institutions ("The Standards for the Equipment and 
Management of the Child Welfare Facilities," 1948). Many daycare personnel whom I 
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interviewed credited that these drills had been very effective and their immediate evacuations on 
the day of the disaster were “perfect.” Moreover, this research indicated that, although younger 
ones needed assistance from their caregivers, children demonstrated their ability to follow 
teachers’ instructions and, therefore, survived the terrifying and uncertain situations. This was 
certainly a result of the regular drills, and perhaps various disaster risk awareness activities, such 
as use of story and picture books and interactions with local firemen, through which these young 
children had built the resiliency to cope with the crisis event like the 2011 disaster (Tran, 2011). 
The interviews with daycare personnel unveiled the detailed efforts that these childcare 
workers had made to prepare for a disaster situation. These personnel not only carried out drills 
regularly but also repeated and examined them thoroughly “until they felt confident” of ensuring 
children’s safety. During the actual evacuation, they promptly made critical decisions on every 
action that they took based on the safest options available for their children. It is evident that 
these childcare workers had strong sense of responsibility for children’s lives, and such 
protective capacities that they had demonstrated should be further strengthened through relevant 
disaster response and risk awareness measures and trainings.   
As extensively discussed in the previous chapter, this research also stressed that it was 
important for the governments to provide appropriate technical guidance and standards to 
support and strengthen daycare centers’ capacities to ensure the safety of children in 
emergencies. Without such measures, childcare and educational institutions, which accommodate 
large numbers of children, could become serious safety risks for children inside the facilities 
(Kirk, 2008). In any emergencies, whether natural or man-made disasters, those institutions 
should be safe and secure spaces for children, and caregivers and educational personnel must be 
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trained to be aware of safety hazards and risks and provide protective, or protected, environments 
for children in these facilities.  
• Strengthening the cooperation of families, communities and governments to protect young 
children in the disaster 
Daycare personnel expressed their strong sense of responsibility toward children’s safety, but 
also spoke about their fears that they could not have saved all the young children’s lives if they 
had to do it by themselves. Some shared their concerns of the existing staff allocation limits. 
Even though it was revised in 2012, the staff distribution standards were based on the regular 
time, and not on emergency conditions. This issue of staff allocation appeared to be a critical 
gap, or challenge, that these childcare providers remained to be concerned of.   
Through the field observations and numerous formal and informal interactions with 
daycare personnel, I came to deeper understanding of the important daycare-family relationships 
in regards to their disaster experiences. Many daycare personnel acknowledged that it had been 
their shared understanding and practice to hand over children to their families in the case of an 
emergency. Some described: “We thought that children were safe with their families”; and “We 
thought that, if we could not give children back to their families, we did not fulfill our 
responsibilities.” Nonetheless, the 2011 disaster taught an important lesson to both daycare 
personnel and children’s families not to risk their lives and to focus on their mutual safety. It 
became clear that these childcare providers and families needed to share the sense of risks and 
dangers and build better cooperative relations to keep everyone safe at the time of a crisis.  
As many conflict- or natural disaster-affected foreign communities had already proven 
(Davies, 2005; Glad, 2009; Mathieu, 2006; M. Smith, 2010), this research also re-stressed the 
essential roles of local communities and governmental authorities in helping daycare centers 
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protect children in emergency situations. The communities and local authorities together could 
ensure developing appropriate community disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures, which were 
also young-child friendly. These measures could include, but not limit to, the establishment of 
community evacuation centers with adequate emergency food, water and equipment as well as 
(young) child-safe evacuation routes and locations. Especially, these community efforts would 
allow daycare providers to primarily focus on immediate physical safety of children in 
emergencies. Furthermore, close coordination with neighborhood residents, local authorities, and 
nearby schools and businesses would prevent daycare children from possible harms that could be 
caused in massive evacuation.      
5.1.2 ECD programs to protect children’s continuous development and well-being  
• (Re-)establishing ECD programs for physical, cognitive and psychosocial protection of 
young children in post-disaster 
The 2011 disaster experience was anything but what children in Iwate had dreamed of. Some of 
them directly experienced or witnessed the disaster; and some others lost their parents, family 
members, friends, homes, or neighborhoods. Their familiar environments were suddenly, and 
violently, taken away from them, and everything became “not normal.” Their lives were 
changed. It was clear that the giant tsunami disaster had affected these young children in many 
different ways. Some children were psychologically distressed, e.g., nightmares, bedwetting, 
aggression, regression and more. They also became sensitive to their caregivers’ conditions and 
surroundings.  
Delaying, or neglecting, crucial assistance to these young children who experienced the 
serious crisis event could result in serious consequences, such as delay in their physical and 
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cognitive development as well as negative effects to their psychosocial well-being (CGECCD, 
n.d.; CGECCD & INEE, n.d.; Landers, 1998; Vargas-Barón, 2005). If these critical child 
development processes were delayed, many of the capacities required for later healthy 
development could be compromised or altered, and it would be difficult to reverse (CGECCD & 
INEE, n.d.; Mustard, 2005). As research in the field of ECD in emergencies suggested, this study 
agrees that it was important for tsunami-affected daycare providers to quickly resume their 
childcare programs and re-establish safe and familiar environments for their children after the 
disaster.  
The stories told in the interviews highlighted that these young children had demonstrated 
the resiliency under such chaotic and challenging circumstances, and it was because they could 
access and enjoy protective, or protected, environments like daycare programs. This research 
reiterated that, as various literature discussed, the Iwate’s daycare centers had: 1) become safe 
and secure spaces for children in tsunami-affected communities (Aguilar, 2001; UNICEF, 
2009b; UNICEF & University of Pittsburgh, 2004); 2) brought back normalcy, daily routines, 
and familiarity into their lives (Aguilar & Retamal, 2009; Machel, 1996; UNICEF EAPRO, 
2005); and 3) ensured these children could access continuous development opportunities, both 
cognitive and physical (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003; UN General Assembly, 1989). Despite the 
initial difficulties to provide their “regular” programs, daycare centers in Iwate became the child-
friendly spaces in practice, where children had access inclusive and integrated essential services 
(Aguilar, 2001; UNICEF, 2009b; UNICEF & University of Pittsburgh, 2004). This suggests that 
the (re-)establishment of childcare, and educational, programs should be the crucial strategy to 
ensure children’s physical, cognitive and psychosocial protection needs for their survival, 
development and well-being in the crisis-affected situations. Moreover, it is critically important 
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that this strategy should be considered and incorporated as emergency response and humanitarian 
assistance (Aguilar & Retamal, 2009; Sinclair, 2002; UNESCO, 2000). By doing so, it would 
prevent delays or gaps for children to pursue their continuous development opportunities and 
utmost potentials in their post-disaster lives. 
• Assisting ECD programs as a critical strategy to support family and community recovery 
This study suggests that the relations among children, their families (or parents) and daycare 
programs were mutually important in their recovery processes. Daycare centers not only 
provided protection to children during and after the disaster on behalf of their parents, but also 
helped families recover from the disaster by making childcare support services available to them. 
When children had access safe and familiar environments like daycare programs, their parents 
could start rebuilding their lives, return to work, and support their families again. 
Children’s well-being influenced the states of caregivers, both their parents and childcare 
workers. At the same time, as young children closely observed their immediate caregivers, the 
states of adults also influenced the conditions of children as well. As Vargas-Baron described, 
the situations of “families drive the trends for child survival, development and school readiness 
(2005, p. 4).” As other literature also agreed (Heroman & Bilmes, 2005; Nantchouang, 2011; 
Tran, 2011), the re-establishment of childcare programs could help families to provide adequate 
care to their children and promote healthy child-to-caregiver relations in the crisis-affected 
communities.  
Similarly, resuming childcare support programs and educational activities became an 
early symbol of recovery for tsunami-affected communities as a whole. As Machel (1996)  
explained, “education” not only “gives shape and structure to children’s lives” but also “can 
instill community value” and “enhance (…) stability (p. 54).” Re- introducing childcare and 
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educational activities in the crisis-affected situations could represent not only “a state of 
normalcy for children” but also “hope for the community” (IASC, 2002; UN General Assembly, 
1991). In Iwate, the neighborhood residents were happy to see that daycare children were healthy 
and active, and the local businesses also resumed their dealings with daycare centers. Thus, it 
could become one of the positive and significant humanitarian assistance strategies to accelerate 
the recovery of affected communities in emergency situations.  
These described connections between the re- installment of daycare programs and 
recovery of children’s families and local communities were some of the important findings in 
this study. In humanitarian assistance, governmental agencies and other relief organizations tend 
to mind their own specialized operational activities. However, it should be their common 
strategic focus that ensuring the protection of children in emergencies could generate, and even 
accelerate, positive and sustainable recovery and reconstruction impacts to their families and 
communities.  
• Strengthening both international cooperation relations and local social contract capacities  
The Government of Japan and World Bank’s joint report (2012) pointed out that there were no 
coordination capacities at local or prefectural levels to deal with the massive influx of external 
assistance, including civil humanitarian organizations and private sector aid. Lack of 
coordination might not have affected the overall humanitarian response capacities in a 
devastating way. However, it caused enough confusion and frustration at the field level, which 
was evident from the interviews of daycare personnel and my field experience as a humanitarian 
worker. External assistance, both international and domestic, is a great asset to local relief and 
recovery response efforts in emergencies. Without timely and strong (governmental) leadership 
and coordination, external assistance could only go as far as where their donors and partners 
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wanted their contributions to be used without consideration of local assessment or priorities. To 
ensure and maximize the humanitarian assistance to reach those in need, with the humanitarian 
principles (including humanitarian imperative, neutrality, and impartiality, as discussed in 
Chapter 2) in mind, local leadership and coordination capacities should be carefully examined 
and strengthened so that all incoming aid could be monitored and facilitated for better and more 
effective distribution of assistance. In turn, this will also encourage external aid groups to 
demonstrate greater commitments and accountabilities for their humanitarian assistance activities 
and contributions.  
Without governmental leadership and coordination, external actors might risk 
“undermining the social contract between citizen and state,” as described by Burde (2004b, p. 
73). It could be easy and quick for civil organizations, such as NGOs and NPOs, to directly work 
with the communities, but the sustainability of their inputs might rely on the local relations and 
capacities of both affected communities and local authorities. Furthermore, working and 
coordinating with the governments would benefit external agencies with crucial local knowledge 
and assessments of the situations, and help them focus on the humanitarian principles to ensure 
their contributions reach those in need. 
In the field of international cooperation, there were wide-ranging experiences in the 
coordination of humanitarian assistance, especially in the UN systems. In Japan, the UN 
presence was not operational because the country had not required development assistance from 
the UN agencies for decades. Japan also had extensive earthquake and other disaster response 
experiences and expertise. Nevertheless, the country could have applied the international models 
of coordination mechanisms in its 2011 disaster response. Humanitarian assistance could be an 
appropriate field to ‘borrow’ and learn valuable lessons and references from the international 
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experiences, including coordination, rapid responses, minimum standards, humanitarian 
principles, and many others, in both natural disaster and armed conflict contexts.  
5.1.3 ECD programs to protect sustainable development and generational security in 
post-disaster communities 
• Making the establishment of protective environments for children in the communities as a 
priority  
The daycare programs that were reviewed in this research managed to provide physical, 
psychosocial, and cognitive protection for children in the affected communities (Nicolai & 
Triplehorn, 2003; UN General Assembly, 1989). At the same time, the disaster exposed some 
critical child protection concerns in relation to both the disaster effects and pre-existed problems, 
including childcare support, home environment, and domestic violence issues. While the 
situations were moving from recovery to reconstruction, daycare centers could actively work 
with families, neighborhood residents and local authorities to (re-)build more (young) child-
friendly, and disaster resilient community environments for the current children and future 
generations. Moreover, these daycare programs, and other educational programs, should become 
a central part of the community child protection systems. These child-focused programs have 
great potential to become the spaces where families and communities could identify, discuss and 
take appropriate preventive actions on different child protection concerns in their neighborhoods. 
In the case of Iwate, daycare providers began to develop closer partnerships with all concerned 
stakeholders to re-build and enhance protective environments for children in tsunami-affected 
communities.  
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Humanitarian assistance and development activities have often been considered separate 
enterprises (Pigozzi, 1999), which caused gaps in the transition from the former to the latter 
(Brannelly et al., 2009). Ensuring “emergency assistance (…) provide ways that are supportive 
of recovery and long-term development (UN General Assembly, 1991 [cited in Aguilar & 
Retamal, 1998),” the protective environment framework approach seems to be able to bridge 
these two phases: not only responding to children’s immediate essential protection needs in 
emergencies; but also building continuous and sustainable protective capacities in the 
communities. As protecting a child, and his or her rights, requires a multi-disciplinary and cross-
sectoral approach (Pais, 1999), a strategy that focuses on the protection of children and their 
childhood experiences has a great potential as a harmonizing approach, rather than as a parallel 
one. The value of ensuring protective environments for children in a crisis should be shared and 
understood by all the concerned stakeholders in order to build a culture of safety and resilience 
(UNISDR, 2005), and promote the generational protection and sustainability of the disaster-
affected communities (Aguilar & Retamal, 2009; McClure & Retamal, 2010; UNISDR, 2005; 
Vargas-Barón & McClure, 1998).  
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTIONS 
Based on the above summary discussions, which highlighted the research findings and their 
subsequent analyses, I recommend the following actions in the context of Japan, specifically in 
Iwate but also for the rest of the country in general, and of international humanitarian assistance 
for other crisis-prone nations: 
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Recommendation 1: Ensure ECD programs provide protective environments for young 
children at the times of emergencies 
For Japan (Iwate specifically, and the rest of 
the country in general):  
For other crisis-prone nations and 
humanitarian organizations:  
• Continue and reinforce child-safe 
disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures 
in ECD programs, such as daycare 
centers and kindergartens (e.g., facility 
safety measures, emergency response 
procedures, manuals, drills, equipment) 
 
• Involve families, community and local 
authorities in the development of 
community-wide child-friendly DRR 
measures (e.g., safe evacuation routes 
and locations assigned, and child-
friendly evacuation shelters) 
 
• Include financial and material assistance 
requirements for DRR measures in 
childcare institutions as public sector 
budget plans (e.g., training, technical 
assistance, facility safety measures, 
equipment)  
• Develop, implement, monitor, and 
update DRR measures and standards, 
appropriate to the locales and abilities of 
children, for ECD programs and other 
educational institutions  
 
• Provide appropriate technical and 
financial assistance to train the program 
personnel and install emergency 
response equipment and safety measures 
in the facilities 
 
• Promote community involvements in 
planning and implementation of 
emergency response measures 
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Recommendation 2: Assist immediate (re-)establishment of ECD programs, or safe spaces that 
support care and development activities, for continuous protection of young children and their 
childhood experiences during and after emergencies 
For Japan (Iwate specifically, and the rest of 
the country in general):  
For other crisis-prone nations and 
humanitarian organizations:  
• Ensure and provide immediate assistance 
to recover and resume ECD programs, 
like daycare centers and kindergartens 
(e.g., alternative facilities, supplies and 
equipment, additional personnel) 
 
• Consider strategies to protect children as 
critical steps for the recovery of affected 
families and communities  
 
• Re-install and reinforce local 
governmental leadership capacities to 
provide appropriate and timely guidance 
and assistance to affected childcare 
providers in emergency response and 
recovery measures 
 
• Support and strengthen governmental 
coordination capacities at all levels to 
guide and facilitate external assistance, 
including civil groups (NGOs/NPOs), to 
respond to the critical humanitarian needs 
of affected in an effective and timely 
manner 
 
• For external organizations, support and 
reinforce social contract relations between 
the local authorities and populations (e.g., 
close consultation with the local 
governments and community leaders) 
 
• Share the common values of protecting 
children’s safety and security among all 
stakeholders (e.g., policy development, 
community discussion) 
• Include immediate (re-)establishment of 
ECD programs as emergency response and 
recovery strategies to ensure young 
children’s access safe and secure 
environments, return to normalcy, and 
continue their un-interrupted healthy 
growth and development opportunities  
 
• Encourage community participation in the 
process of establishing protected spaces, 
both outdoor and indoor, for young 
children within the affected communities 
and share experiences and values of 
protecting children among local 
communities 
 
• Focus on and support immediate (re-
)installment of local capacities to respond 
to the critical relief needs of affected 
communities and provide the guidance to 
and work closely with the humanitarian 
assistance community 
 
• Establish strong coordination systems led 
by host governments to re-constitute social 
contract relations between the populations 
and authorities 
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Recommendation 3: Expand and strengthen ECD programs to promote and protect sustainable 
development and generational security in post-crisis communities 
For Japan (Iwate specifically, and the rest of 
the country in general):  
For other crisis-prone nations and 
humanitarian organizations:  
• Consider (young) child-friendly, disaster 
resilient community planning as a 
sustainable development and generational 
security strategy for tsunami-affected 
communities and beyond 
 
• Continuously support and strengthen the 
initiative of ensuring protective 
environments for children in daycare 
centers as preventive measures for various 
child protection issues at homes and in the 
communities 
 
• Coordinate, and/or consolidate, among 
governmental bodies concerned with 
childcare and development (e.g., MHLW, 
MEXT) for more effective technical and 
administrative assistance to childcare and 
educational programs in the country 
• Plan and build sustainable protective 
environments for children based on ECD 
programs or safe spaces established as 
emergency and recovery response 
 
• Apply multi-disciplinary and cross-
sectoral approaches to bring all concerned 
stakeholders to develop and execute child-
friendly crisis resilient community plans  
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Recommendation 4: Support assessment, evaluation and research capacities for better 
understanding of and more effective responses to emergency situations  
For Japan (Iwate specifically, and the rest of 
the country in general):  
For other crisis-prone nations and 
humanitarian organizations:  
• Continue monitoring and documenting 
post-disaster conditions of tsunami-
affected daycare programs and children, 
using various research instruments (e.g., 
survey, interview, observation) 
 
• Apply the findings to strengthen both 
local and national disaster preparedness 
mechanisms and capacities for daycare 
centers and their young children 
 
• Disseminate the disaster experience good 
practices and lessons learned widely 
within the country and with other nations 
to inform culturally–responsive local 
emergency plans 
• Apply different inquiry methods, both 
qualitative and quantitative, for situational 
analyses, program evaluation and research 
 
• Adapt qualitative inquiry approaches to 
better understand complex contexts 
presented in various emergency situations 
for more effective and relevant responses 
 
• Share the knowledge developed from 
emergency experiences globally to 
improve crisis preparedness and response 
capacities 
5.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Education in emergencies is a fairly new sub-field of international development education. 
Tomlinson and Benefield noted: “while there are clearly research gaps in what is a new and 
developing field, the biggest gap is that between research and practice (2005, p. 8).” This is 
especially true for the field of early childhood development (ECD), or early learning, in 
emergencies. Nonetheless, more needs to be done in this emerging field, including assessments 
of current practices, empirical and theoretical researches, policy and program development, 
training, and advocacy. Thus, this study is an empirical observation and analysis of Japan’s 
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emergency disaster experience that informs and contributes to this growing field. At the same 
time, the research methods employed in this study share numerous critical lessons for future 
research in the field of humanitarian assistance. In the following, I discuss my dissertation’s 
theoretical contributions and methodological advantages in the research field of education and 
ECD in emergencies and share some limitations that present in my research.  
5.3.1 Theoretical contributions 
Japan has been prone to major and chronic natural disasters, but has established the disaster 
prevention and response structures. This case study provides comprehensive understandings of 
how childcare and educational institutions like daycare centers prepared for, responded to and 
coped with the serious disaster. What they learned in the 2011 disaster is the shared interest not 
only within the country itself for future events, but also with the nations in the world that are 
concerned of their own crisis risk reduction and response capacity development for similar 
calamities or other emergency situations. 
This study reaffirmed the significance of protective, or protected, environments, like 
daycare programs, where young children could be continuously attended for their care and 
development needs in difficult situations. This is the primary reason why the education and ECD 
sector(s) should be considered as critical part of humanitarian assistance for the crisis-affected 
communities. Childcare support and educational activities give children order in their lives and 
sense of normalcy in unstable environments. Even though the long-term impacts of such 
programs need to be continuously monitored and evaluated, the courses of children’s healthy 
growth and developments are protected, or at least interruption can be minimized, after 
experiencing a tragic event like natural disaster or even armed conflict. 
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The research also revealed how those childcare workers had acted in loco parentis for 
daycare children during the emergency evacuations as well as in the post-disaster conditions. 
Their strong senses of responsibility towards children’s safety and security significantly 
contributed to maintaining children’s psychosocial well-beings in the unstable environments.  
Moreover, the study indicated that the states of children had influenced the recovery of affected 
families and communities. For humanitarian agencies, focusing on the child protection strategies 
from the beginning will not only help (re-)build protective environments for children but also 
contribute to the recovery and continuous development of affected communities. Thus, 
protecting children and their childhoods in emergencies should be considered as a central 
strategy for long-term and larger community development. For this, the study also stressed that it 
was critical for the humanitarian community to support and reinforce, rather than undermine, 
existing social contracts between the populations and local authorities. Hence it would lead to 
more self-reliant sustainable development of the affected communities in post-crisis situations.  
International comparative educationists urged further research on education in 
emergencies, especially in relation to (human) security and child protection (Davies, 2005; 
Tomlinson & Benefield, 2005; Williams, 2000). In my study, security appeared to be necessity, 
not only in regards to physical protection, but also about individual, or human, security 
(University of British Columbia, 2005). This security includes the protection of children’s rights 
to survival, development, participation, and protection (Aguilar, 2001; Nicolai & Triplehorn, 
2003). For the affected communities, security meant collective and generational. Through this 
research, I learned that starting from early childhood care and development interventions in 
emergencies could generate positive effects to families and communities, and contribute to the 
generational security of local populations. 
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5.3.2 Methodological benefits 
As discussed in this dissertation, education in emergencies is a fairly complex field (Davies, 
2004), and, because of  being multidisciplinary and intersectoral in its nature, the field of early 
childhood development (ECD) in emergencies is even more complicated. For better 
understandings of such complex fields, multiple inquiry methods could be useful and effective as 
I did in this research. The case study on the disaster experiences in Iwate exemplified benefits of 
both quantitative and qualitative research methods to study the challenging and complicated 
situations that daycare providers had to face.  
In this dissertation research, the survey questionnaires were proven as practical methods 
to reach out larger groups of study samples in the limited time. However, I found that it was 
challenging to simplify, but still structure, the formats and questions, because interpretation of 
the questions relied on respondents. Bhattacherjee (2012) pointed out that survey research could 
present some systematic biases, such as non-response bias, sampling bias, social desirability bias, 
recall bias, and common method bias. Especially my multiple-choice survey was formulated in 
the way to limit how and what to answer, while making easy to measure, or quantify, the 
responses. This simplified, and somehow quantifiable, survey tool seems to be more suitable for 
the inquiries to examine ‘expected’ or ‘feasible’ variations of the responses from study sample 
groups.  
While the multiple-choice survey provided the wide-raging data of the shared 
experiences among all the daycare centers across Iwate, the open-ended survey and semi-
structured interviews were focused on more specific and detailed complex disaster experiences 
of the targeted groups. These qualitative, and descriptive, inquiry methods not only helped me 
access detailed insights of the complicated and difficult disaster situations, but also gave study 
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participants some spaces, or freedom, to describe and express themselves, rather than limiting 
and controlling their responses. This became one of the crucial methodological benefits in this 
research. These qualitative accounts of the study not only complimented the quantified 
situational analyses, but also unveiled hidden realities and relations in the complex disaster-
affected communities, which may not be obvious through quantitative inquiries.  
I do not claim my dissertation study as ethnography, but ethnographic inquiry training 
helped me prepare and situate myself to better understand the complex and challenging 
conditions of the disaster-affected communities in Iwate. “(B)eing in situ (Spindler & Spindler, 
1997a)” and “(using) some model of cultural process in both the gathering and interpretation of 
data (Spindler & Spindler, 1997b, p. 50)” resulted in “the ethnographic research cycle (Spradley, 
1980).” These ethnographic approaches are not only useful for actual research activities but also 
when working in a multi-cultural environment that often consists complex cultural conditions. 
Application of ethnographic inquiry methods, such as: direct and participant observation; 
continuous formal and informal interactions with local populations; and repeating the inquiry 
cycles, helped me realize emerging important issues and subject matters that became critical 
findings of this study. Although each research method presented some challenges, it appears that 
all the research instruments that were applied in this study complemented one another, and 
supplemented each other’s limitations.  
5.3.3 Study limitation 
As discussed earlier, some of my data collection activities were designed to serve dual purposes: 
1) my dissertation research; and 2) the survey study that was supported jointly by the Japan 
Committee for UNICEF (JCU) and Iwate Prefectural Government. While these arrangements 
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might have influenced my research capacities, the situations of the study site and researcher’s 
relation to the study subject also presented some limitations to its scope and structures. In the 
following, I discuss some of the specific limitations that I faced throughout my research 
processes: 
Scope of the Study: I spent one year after the 2011 disaster in the study site, Iwate, while 
working as a humanitarian worker. This duration of the time in the study site allowed me to “be 
there” and take part of the “cultural process” in the tsunami-affected communities (Spindler & 
Spindler, 1997a). Furthermore, the targeted surveys and interviews were carried out after the 
one-year anniversary of the disaster. It was somehow the right timing: 1) after the study 
participants, of whom many had been directly affected by the disaster, should be given suitable 
time and space before participating in the research on their disaster experiences; and 2) before 
they would forget the details of their experiences.  
These data collection activities produced massive volumes of the information and data for 
this study. Due to the time and financial limitations, it was not feasible for me to stay on in the 
study site and carry out additional data collection activities, except for some follow-up 
correspondences with the interview participants remotely from the US. Despite the great 
progress during the first year, additional fieldwork and research could have been valuable to 
further investigate how the initial emergency and recovery responses had impacted, or were 
translated, to the subsequent reconstruction and continuous development of the disaster-affected 
communities.  
As the study was focused on the disaster experiences of daycare centers in Iwate, its 
research instruments were developed to target the groups of daycare personnel, especially 
directors and head childcare workers, as study informants. During my time in the field, I had 
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numerous formal and informal interactions and discussions with those who worked in the 
childcare support field, such as daycare staff, government officials, social workers, civil group 
representatives, policy makers and other researchers. If the resources (e.g., time and finance) 
were available, I could expand my study sample groups to different stakeholders as listed above, 
and their different perspectives in regards to protective environments for children could be 
compared and contribute additional insights to the scope of my research.  
Sensibilities towards study participants: Soon after I began working in the disaster 
affected area in early 2011, I found that it was extremely difficult and challenging to engage with 
the affected populations. Many of the local people who I met initially seemed to be completely 
devastated, and overwhelmed by huge grief, sadness, sense of loss, and even anger. It required 
time and space for me (or other humanitarian workers) to build any kind of trusting work 
relationships in the affected communities.  
Even though the focused data collection exercises took place one year after the disaster, I 
still needed to be sensible when addressing questions about the disaster experiences. During the 
interviews, for example, I carefully observed reactions of the study participants. I often started 
with rather generic questions about disaster preparedness measures at their daycare centers, and, 
after they showed some comfort with me, I asked more specific questions about the disaster and 
their experiences.  
I also respected the availabilities of interview participants, because interviews were 
carried out during their working hours. A few complained that there had been apparently a 
number of research and assessment activities carried out at their daycare centers, without much 
coordination between one another. The research community should be aware of the fact that, 
when their study participants were crisis-affected populations, they might relive their crisis 
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experiences through the research inquiry processes. Thus, conducting research or assessments 
about emergency situations should be carefully designed and coordinated, or consolidated, so as 
not to cause affected communities unnecessary stresses and burdens.  
Asking questions about people’s crisis experiences was not an easy task, and a few 
participants might have felt hesitant, or looked suspicious, of what I would ask them. However, 
having worked as a humanitarian worker in their communities seemed to have helped me build 
trusting relationships with them, understand better about small details of their situations, and 
carry out my research activities in the field smoothly. One daycare director confessed to me at 
the end of the interview:  
I’ve never had a chance to talk about the experience this much until now. I haven’t talked 
(about it) this much. I couldn’t talk, even if I wanted. Even when I talked honestly (about 
the difficult experience), the people would dismiss me (because my daycare center did 
not lose any child in the disaster) (Anonymous participant).  
Even though some had difficulties to talk about their experiences, others simply needed safe 
spaces to share their experiences, without someone else judging their actions on the day of the 
disaster. At the interviews, I explained to the participants the purpose of my study, which was 
not to evaluate their performances, but simply to learn what they had gone through before, 
during, and after the disaster. In the end, nevertheless, responses of the study participants were 
largely positive, and some respondents seemed to use my research exercises as opportunities to 
talk about their disaster experiences and share their related concerns.  
Researcher’s subjectivity: As discussed earlier in this dissertation, I considered myself as 
an insider of the study subject, because I was from the country and shared similar sense of loss 
and sympathy in the country’s disaster experience. However, I was also uniquely an outsider in 
my own country because I was a humanitarian worker and researcher. I often found myself being 
both an active participant and a passive observer in my fieldwork (Bhattacherjee, 2012). 
 202 
Neutrality is one of the key humanitarian principles, but as Boyden described: “research is not a 
neutral exercise (2000).” By doing a descriptive and interpretive research, I could perhaps 
present the conditions, or voices, that might have been unnoticed, or not represented, like the 
situations that tsunami-affected daycare centers had faced. 
These characteristics as a researcher may have translated to my own subjectivity in 
relation to the research subjects. For doing (qualitative) research, there is always a possibility 
that a researcher may bring his or her pre-existing notions or biases into the field observation and 
understanding of the subjects under study. Bhattacherjee explained that “qualitative analysis is 
heavily dependent on the researcher’s analytic and integrative skills and personal knowledge of 
the social context where the data is collected (2012, p. 113).” It may be difficult, or even 
impossible, for researchers to avoid their subjectivities from influencing their research, since 
each researcher is an individual being. However, researchers have an ethical responsibility to 
present their relations with the study subjects and acknowledge to the readers or audiences about 
where their subjectivities come from. Thus, they can transmit or deliver their research based on 
the shared understanding of how they situate themselves in the research paradigms.   
5.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster caused the estimated economic damage at 16.9 
trillion Japanese yens, or 210 billion US dollars, to the affected region of the country. 
(Government of Japan & World Bank, 2012). In the Iwate coastline region, the damage to its 
capital stocks was about 3.5 trillion Japanese yens, and it recorded as the highest rate of loss at 
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47.3 % among all the affected areas 30 (Iwate Prefecture, 2013). Furthermore, the numbers of 
unemployed persons and welfare recipients were expected to increase due to the lack of 
employment opportunities in tsunami-affected region (Iwate Prefecture, 2011e). One year after 
the disaster, some progresses and improvements were seen due to the recovery and 
reconstruction work, but it was a long way to return to the pre-disaster conditions (Iwate 
Prefecture, 2012b).  
In addition to these economic impacts, affected communities suffered population outflow 
after the disaster. For example, the populations of tsunami-affected coastline municipalities in 
Iwate decreased between 2010 and 2013 at the rates between 2.5 % and 22 % (National Institute 
of Population and Social Security Research [NIPSSR], 2013). The same report even estimated 
that the population decrease rates would reach up to an average of 41.6 % in 2040 (Iwate Nippo, 
2014).31 As for school age children, the numbers of elementary and junior-high school students 
who transferred out of the coastal municipalities significantly increased in 2011 (Iwate 
Prefecture, 2012a).  
In Iwate, there was no casualty among children who had evacuated with daycare 
personnel in the 2011 tsunami disaster. This study documented that disaster preparedness 
measures at daycare centers had worked, and the dedication and courageous actions of childcare 
workers were the key to successful evacuation of young children in such a grave disaster. Saving 
children’s lives was a heroic action itself, as such a crisis event could change the courses of 
children’s lives. In the post-disaster situation, bringing back normalcy to children’s lives was 
critically important for their protection and continuous care and development opportunities. In 
order to achieve such normalcy at a chaotic time, extraordinary action and special attention, 
                                                 
30 The estimate did not include various damages caused by the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant’s accident. 
31 Based on the NIPSSR report, the selected data for the coastal municipalities in Iwate were extracted and summarized by the Iwate Nippo. 
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coupled with the principle of humanity, were required. In Iwate, childcare workers’ 
commitments to rebuild daycare programs resulted in the continuity of children’s access to care 
and development opportunities and provision of their familiar daily routines and safe and secure 
spaces. All other stakeholders, including children’s families, local communities, external groups, 
and governments, supported daycare programs in the disaster preparedness, emergency response, 
early recovery, and reconstruction efforts.  
This study also revealed the critical relations between protection of children’s well-being 
and development and coping capacities of families and communities. These were mutually 
related: If there were no childcare support systems reinstalled, families would not be able to 
rebuild their lives; if families and communities were not recovering from the disaster, children’s 
safety and security could be in danger; and if families left the affected municipalities because 
they could not ensure children’s safety and security, local reconstruction and development 
prospects could be jeopardized. This is a critical generational survival and security issue not only 
for children, but also for their families and communities.  
In the context of Japan, especially of the Iwate coastline region, protecting children is a 
critical area of concern for society, because of the persistent issues of declining populations, low 
childbirth rates, and aging communities. A serious adversity like the 2011 disaster could heavily 
affect local child protection capacities. The experiences in Japan could inform the significance of 
not only protecting children and their childhood experiences in emergencies, but also building 
protective environments and capacities for sustainable development of local communities. In 
addition to the existing childcare support systems in Japan, as Morita proposed, the country, and 
local municipalities, needs to carefully re-examine and strengthen the community childcare and 
child protection capacities: 1) to respond to diverse childcare support needs of families with 
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children; and 2) to make childcare and educational programs accessible and available to all 
young children (Morita, 2012). For the field of international development and humanitarian 
assistance, thus, such child protection policies should be considered as a critical strategy for the 
protection of children and their childhoods at the time of a crisis and for generational survival 
and sustainable development of the communities and nations.  
APPENDIX A 
RELEVANT ARTICLES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR 
THE CHILDREN’S RIGHTS TO EDUCATION 
I. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
Article 26 
(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and 
fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional 
education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible 
to all on the basis of merit. 
(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the 
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and 
shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 
(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children. 
Source:  UN General Assembly. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. General 
Assembly Resolution 217 A(III). 
II. The Conventions on the Rights of the Child (1989)
Article 28 
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this
right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular:  
(a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all; 
(b) Encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, including general 
and vocational education, make them available and accessible to every child, and take 
appropriate measures such as the introduction of free education and offering financial 
assistance in case of need;  
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(c) Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate 
means;  
(d) Make educational and vocational information and guidance available and accessible to all 
children;  
(e) Take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction of drop-out 
rates. 
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that school discipline is
administered in a manner consistent with the child's human dignity and in conformity with
the present Convention.
3. States Parties shall promote and encourage international cooperation in matters relating to
education, in particular with a view to contributing to the elimination of ignorance and
illiteracy throughout the world and facilitating access to scientific and technical knowledge
and modern teaching methods. In this regard, particular account shall be taken of the needs of
developing countries.
Article 29 
1. States Parties agree that the education of the child shall be directed to:
(a) The development of the child's personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to
their fullest potential; 
(b) The development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the 
principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations;  
(c) The development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural identity, 
language and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is living, 
the country from which he or she may originate, and for civilizations different from his or 
her own;  
(d) The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of 
understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, 
ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin; 
(e) The development of respect for the natural environment.  
2. No part of the present article or article 28 shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty
of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject always to the
observance of the principle set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article and to the
requirements that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum
standards as may be laid down by the State.
Source:  UN General Assembly. (1989, 20 November). Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(resolution 44/25). 
III. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War (Fourth Geneva Convention) (1949)
Article 24 
The Parties to the conflict shall take the necessary measures to ensure that children under fifteen, 
who are orphaned or are separated from their families as a result of the war, are not left to their 
own resources, and that their maintenance, the exercise of their religion and their education are 
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facilitated in all circumstances. Their education shall, as far as possible, be entrusted to persons 
of a similar cultural tradition. 
The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate the reception of such children in a neutral country for 
the duration of the conflict with the consent of the Protecting Power, if any, and under due 
safeguards for the observance of the principles stated in the first paragraph. 
They shall, furthermore, endeavour to arrange for all children under twelve to be identified by 
the wearing of identity discs, or by some other means. 
Article 50 
The Occupying Power shall, with the cooperation of the national and local authorities, facilitate 
the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children. 
The Occupying Power shall take all necessary steps to facilitate the identification of children and 
the registration of their parentage. It may not, in any case, change their personal status, nor enlist 
them in formations or organizations subordinate to it. 
Should the local institutions be inadequate for the purpose, the Occupying Power shall make 
arrangements for the maintenance and education, if possible by persons of their own nationality, 
language and religion, of children who are orphaned or separated from their parents as a result of 
the war and who cannot be adequately cared for by a near relative or friend. 
A special section of the Bureau set up in accordance with Article 136 shall be responsible for 
taking all necessary steps to identify children whose identity is in doubt. Particulars of their 
parents or other near relatives should always be recorded if available. 
The Occupying Power shall not hinder the application of any preferential measures in regard to 
food, medical care and protection against the effects of war which may have been adopted prior 
to the occupation in favour of children under fifteen years, expectant mothers, and mothers of 
children under seven years. 
Source:  ICRC. (1949, 12 August). Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention). 
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APPENDIX B 
EIGHT DIMENSIONS OF THE LANDGREN’S PROTECTIVE ENVIRONMENT 
FRAMEWORK 
Landgren (2005) described each of the eight dimensions of protective environments for children 
as follows: 
1) Protective Government Commitment and Capacity would include ratification of
international conventions, without reservations; budgetary provisions for child protection;
public declarations of commitment; explicitly “child friendly” policies; and support for
public prosecutions.
2) Protective Legislation and Enforcement would include incorporation of relevant
international standards; prosecution of violators; police and judiciary functioning without
interference; accessible redress mechanisms; child friendly and confidential legal
procedures; the availability of legal aid; no criminalization of victims; and a juvenile
justice regime in place.
3) Protective Culture and Customs would include (among other illustrative examples) an
environment in which women and girls face little discrimination; childcare practices do
not involve corporal punishment; violence is not a key component of masculine identity;
spouses are not required to have FGM/C or be underage; peaceful dispute resolution is
valued; children are attributed with dignity; recourse to state institutions is common;
harmful practices are not underpinned by religious beliefs; sexual exploitation of children
is socially unacceptable; and children with disabilities or orphaned by AIDS are not
stigmatized.
4) Open Discussion, including the engagement of civil society and media would require
that harmful phenomena are recognized as such and are reported in the media; that
protection failures are acknowledged at the community and national level; that young
people are able to refer to such issues at home, at school, and with each other; that
victims are not threatened or ostracized; and that NGOs and media are able to work with
minimal interference.
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5) Protective Children’s Life Skills, Knowledge, and Participation, would include an
environment in which children are aware that they have rights; are encouraged to form
views and express them; are provided with necessary information; are taught problem
solving and negotiating skills; have their self-esteem valued by adults; and are listened
to within the family, school, and community.
6) Protective Capacity of Families and Communities would include parents and other
caregivers observing protective childrearing practices; families supported for childcare
needs; communities supporting and monitoring protection; and the existence of some
demographic balance (no adult shortage).
7) Protective Essential Services would include (among illustrative examples) education
that is free for all children, including refugees; nondiscriminatory provision of health care,
including for sex workers and detainees; a functioning social welfare system, with social
workers, shelters, and hotlines; trained teachers who are present and working; and safe
and supportive classrooms.
8) Protective Monitoring, Reporting, and Oversight would include systematic collection
of data, transparent reporting of data and review by policy makers; access by
independent observers to children in traditionally marginalized groups; and
encouragement of and respect for civic review.
Source:  Landgren, K. (2005). The protective environment: Development support for child 
protection. Human Rights Quarterly, 27, 214-248. 
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APPENDIX C 
RESEARCH INSTRUMENT TEMPLATES 
The following materials were developed for this dissertation research and were submitted to the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) for approval. All the research instrument templates were 
initially prepared in Japanese for the study implementation, and they were translated in English 
for the IRB submission. They include the following three (3) research instruments used in the 
study, presented in both Japanese original and English translation:  
• Figure 14. Research instrument (1): Multiple choice survey questionnaire
• Figure 15. Research instrument (2): Open-ended survey questionnaire
• Figure 16. Research instrument (3): Interview process and questions
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Figure 14. Research instrument (1): Multiple-choice survey questionnaire 
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Figure 14. (continued) 
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 Figure 14. (continued) 
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Figure 14. (continued) 
216 
Figure 15. Research instrument (2): Open-ended survey questionnaire 
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Figure 15. (continued) 
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Figure 15. (continued) 
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Figure 15. (continued) 
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Figure 15. (continued) 
221 
Figure 15. (continued) 
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Figure 16. Research instrument (3): Interview process and questions 
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Figure 16. (continued) 
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Figure 16. (continued) 
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Figure 16. (continued) 
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APPENDIX D 
SUMMARY RESULTS OF THE MULTIPLE CHOICE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
RESPONSES 
The below tables are the results highlighted from the multiple choice survey conducted for this 
dissertation research: 
Table 16. Summary results of the survey questionnaire responses 
1. State of pre-3.11 earthquake and tsunami disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures and preparedness
at your nursery school
Total 
(n=263) 
Affected areas 
(n=73) 
Other areas 
(n=190) 
Number % Number % Number % 
(1) Did you have your school assessed on the following earthquake resistance and other safety 
measures? (Multiple selections permitted) 
a 
Had school buildings 
assessed/approved for earthquake 
resistance 
67 25.5% 16 21.9% 51 26.8% 
b Had measures against earthquake and tsunami risks 137 52.1% 44 60.3% 93 48.9% 
c Conducted safety checks on exits/doorways and evacuation routes 253 96.2% 69 94.5% 184 96.8% 
d Secured safe outdoor spaces (e.g., in the playground) 223 84.8% 57 78.1% 166 87.4% 
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Table 16. (continued) 
Total 
(n=263) 
Affected areas 
(n=73) 
Other areas 
(n=190) 
Number % Number % Number % 
(2) Did you take the following DRR measures against earthquakes? (Multiple selections permitted) 
a Anti-fall measures on large equipment and furniture 167 63.5% 41 56.2% 126 66.3% 
b Anti-shatter measures on window glasses 160 60.8% 48 65.8% 112 58.9% 
c Safety measures on light fixtures 173 65.8% 56 76.7% 117 61.6% 
d Safety measures on electrical appliances and handling fire 198 75.3% 53 72.6% 145 76.3% 
(3) Did you take the following measures and preparation for earthquake/tsunami disaster? (Multiple 
selections permitted) 
a Developed an earthquake (tsunami) disaster response manual 188 71.5% 54 74.0% 134 70.5% 
b Developed an emergency contact system for children’s parents/guardians 180 68.4% 56 76.7% 124 65.3% 
c Developed an emergency contact system for families of staff members 86 32.7% 21 28.8% 65 34.2% 
d 
Prepared a specific measure in case 
when parents/guardians cannot pick up 
their children at the time of disaster 
63 24.0% 19 26.0% 44 23.2% 
e Built cooperation/coordination mechanisms with neighbors  111 42.2% 28 38.4% 83 43.7% 
f Identified and confirmed of evacuation locations and routes 217 82.5% 56 76.7% 161 84.7% 
(4) How often did you conduct regular evacuation drills with children/staff? 
A Less than once per month 3 1.1% 1 1.4% 2 1.1% 
b Once per month 222 84.4% 62 84.9% 160 84.2% 
c More than once per month 36 13.7% 9 12.3% 27 14.2% 
d Have not implemented 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
e No answer 2 0.8% 1 1.4% 1 0.5% 
(4)-2 Did you incorporate the following methods? (Multiple selections permitted) 
a A surprise drill 150 57.0% 36 49.3% 114 60.0% 
b With parents/guardians 42 16.0% 16 21.9% 26 13.7% 
c With neighbors 39 14.8% 7 9.6% 32 16.8% 
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Table 16. (continued) 
Total 
(n=263) 
Affected areas 
(n=73) 
Other areas 
(n=190) 
Number % Number % Number % 
(5) Were you doing the following DRR education? (Multiple selections permitted) 
a DRR training for staff members 141 53.6% 34 46.6% 107 56.3% 
b Book reading and video viewing about earthquake DRR 229 87.1% 65 89.0% 164 86.3% 
c Book reading and video viewing about tsunami 43 16.3% 24 32.9% 19 10.0% 
(6) How did you inform parents about DRR measures of your school? (Multiple selections permitted) 
a Held workshops 8 3.0% 2 2.7% 6 3.2% 
b By writing 113 43.0% 33 45.2% 80 42.1% 
c Verbally 113 43.0% 30 41.1% 83 43.7% 
2. State of your nursery school when the 3.11 earthquake happened
Total 
(n=263) 
Affected areas 
(n=73) 
Other areas 
(n=190) 
Number % Number % Number % 
(3) Did you notice at your school that there was an earthquake? 
a Clearly noticed 255 97.0% 69 94.5% 186 97.9% 
b Somehow noticed 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
c Did not notice at all 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
d No answer 8 3.0% 4 5.5% 4 2.1% 
(4) What were your children doing when it happened? (Multiple selections permitted) 
a Under care inside school 89 33.8% 25 34.2% 64 33.7% 
b Under care in the playground 1 0.4% 0 0.0% 1 0.5% 
c Taking a walk outside 1 0.4% 1 1.4% 0 0.0% 
d Taking a nap 220 83.7% 56 76.7% 164 86.3% 
e Getting ready for home 4 1.5% 1 1.4% 3 1.6% 
f Closed (no children in school) 1 0.4% 0 0.0% 1 0.5% 
(5) What did your children and staff do when it happened? (Multiple selections permitted) 
a Went down under tables/desks and covered heads 230 87.5% 64 87.7% 166 87.4% 
b Turned off gas stoves/heaters 179 68.1% 47 64.4% 132 69.5% 
c Went out to the playground 62 23.6% 17 23.3% 45 23.7% 
d Checked around inside the school 156 59.3% 38 52.1% 118 62.1% 
e Did nothing 1 0.4% 0 0.0% 1 0.5% 
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Table 16. (continued) 
Total 
(n=263) 
Affected areas 
(n=73) 
Other areas 
(n=190) 
Number % Number % Number % 
(6) When the tremor stopped, what did you do? (Multiple selections permitted) 
a Carried out the roll-call and safety-check inside the buildings 165 62.7% 38 52.1% 127 66.8% 
b Carried out the roll-call and safety-check outside 126 47.9% 40 54.8% 86 45.3% 
c Checked the earthquake information 164 62.4% 36 49.3% 128 67.4% 
d Contacted children’s parents/guardians 64 24.3% 6 8.2% 58 30.5% 
e Did nothing (Went back to regular care work) 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
(7) How did you confirm of the earthquake/tsunami information? 
a Via radio 187 71.1% 44 60.3% 143 75.3% 
b On TV 19 7.2% 4 5.5% 15 7.9% 
c On the Internet 8 3.0% 1 1.4% 7 3.7% 
d By phone 52 19.8% 9 12.3% 43 22.6% 
e From the neighbors 54 20.5% 24 32.9% 30 15.8% 
(8)-1 Conditions of the daycare facilities after the earthquake (Yes="usable"; No="unusable") 
a Electricity 2 0.8% 1 1.4% 1 0.5% 
b Landline phone 21 8.0% 4 5.5% 17 8.9% 
c Cellular phone 75 28.5% 10 13.7% 65 34.2% 
d Water supply 155 58.9% 16 21.9% 139 73.2% 
e Sewage water (toilet) 164 62.4% 24 32.9% 140 73.7% 
f Gas 171 65.0% 35 47.9% 136 71.6% 
3. Evacuation measures following the earthquake
Total 
(n=263) 
Affected areas 
(n=73) 
Other areas 
(n=190) 
Number % Number % Number % 
(1) Did you evacuate outside the school compound? 
a 
Evacuated outside the school compound 
(e.g., government-assigned evacuation 
locations, locations identified by daycare 
centers in advance, or others) 
70 26.6% 36 49.3% 34 17.9% 
b Stayed inside the school compound (e.g., classrooms, playgrounds) 188 71.5% 33 45.2% 155 81.6% 
c No answer 5 1.9% 4 5.5% 1 0.5% 
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Table 16. (continued) 
Total 
(n=263) 
Affected areas 
(n=73) 
Other areas 
(n=190) 
Number % Number % Number % 
(3) What did you bring when evacuated? (Multiple selections permitted) 
a Registers of children 159 60.5% 45 61.6% 114 60.0% 
b First aid kit 124 47.1% 38 52.1% 86 45.3% 
c Protective hoods/Hard hats 14 5.3% 6 8.2% 8 4.2% 
d Blankets/towels, etc. 133 50.6% 38 52.1% 95 50.0% 
e Radio, radiophone, cellphone, etc. 132 50.2% 36 49.3% 96 50.5% 
f Money, including small change 34 12.9% 15 20.5% 19 10.0% 
(4) Were you able to follow the evacuation manual? (Yes/No) 
a Guiding evacuation 243 92.4% 65 89.0% 178 93.7% 
b Turned off stoves/heaters 249 94.7% 65 89.0% 184 96.8% 
c Roll calls of children 247 93.9% 63 86.3% 184 96.8% 
d Safety check inside school 225 85.6% 53 72.6% 172 90.5% 
e Contact with children’s parents/guardians 63 24.0% 8 11.0% 55 28.9% 
(5)-1 Where did you return children to their parents/guardians? (Multiple selections permitted) 
a At nursery school 239 90.9% 62 84.9% 177 93.2% 
b On the evacuation route 63 24.0% 40 54.8% 23 12.1% 
c At evacuation location 17 6.5% 16 21.9% 1 0.5% 
(6) When did you return the last child to his/her parents/guardians? 
A During the business hours on that day (e.g., by 7:00pm) 199 75.7% 28 38.4% 171 90.0% 
b During the same day (before midnight) 19 7.2% 5 6.8% 14 7.4% 
c Next day (03/12/2011) 17 6.5% 17 23.3% 0 0.0% 
d Day after next day (03/13/2011) 12 4.6% 12 16.4% 0 0.0% 
e Others 8 3.0% 8 11.0% 0 0.0% 
f No answer 8 3.0% 3 4.1% 5 2.6% 
(7) When did you complete checking the safety of all children and staff (including those absent on that 
day)? 
A Same day 143 54.4% 18 24.7% 125 65.8% 
b Next day (3/12/2011) 41 15.6% 10 13.7% 31 16.3% 
c Day after next day (3/13/2011) 17 6.5% 7 9.6% 10 5.3% 
d Others 50 19.0% 33 45.2% 17 8.9% 
e No answer 12 4.6% 5 6.8% 7 3.7% 
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Table 16. (continued) 
Total 
(n=263) 
Affected areas 
(n=73) 
Other areas 
(n=190) 
Number % Number % Number % 
(8)-1 When did you reopen school? 
a Next day (3/12/2011) 83 31.6% 8 11.0% 75 39.5% 
b Day after next day (3/13/2011) 2 0.8% 0 0.0% 2 1.1% 
c 3/14/2011 89 33.8% 20 27.4% 69 36.3% 
d 3/15/2011 29 11.0% 6 8.2% 23 12.1% 
e Others 46 17.5% 36 49.3% 10 5.3% 
f No answer 14 5.3% 3 4.1% 11 5.8% 
(8)-2 Under what condition did you reopen your school? 
a Full-time care (including lunch) 123 46.8% 25 34.2% 98 51.6% 
b Full-time care (no lunch/bring own lunch) 27 10.3% 19 26.0% 8 4.2% 
c Half-day care (no lunch) 78 29.7% 16 21.9% 62 32.6% 
d Others (upon request, etc.) 27 10.3% 11 15.1% 16 8.4% 
e No answer 8 3.0% 2 2.7% 6 3.2% 
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